The Syrian opposition’s recent capture of the country’s largest city of Aleppo caught much of the international community by surprise. After the involvement of Russia, Iran and Hezbollah in the prolonged Syrian civil war, many observers assumed that Bashar al-Assad’s forces had won the conflict.
Nothing in war, however, is static.
After Aleppo, opposition forces continued their advance against the Syrian government, culminating in the seizure of the capital of Damascus that has forced al-Assad to flee the country for Russia.
Syrians are celebrating the fall of a dictator who put them through a protracted civil war and the end of his family’s half-century iron grip on the country.
But the opposition forces that brought him down in 2024 aren’t the ones supported by the United States and its allies in 2013. Fundamentalist groups, versus the Americans’ preferred moderate organizations, now dominate the opposition.
What’s more, the fall of al-Assad is unlikely to restore peace to the country in the short term.
The Syrian civil war
The Syrian civil war has been one of the world’s most protracted ongoing conflicts. Starting in 2011 as part of the broader Arab Spring, opposition forces sought to topple al-Assad, Syria’s longstanding dictator.
Initially, the western nations rallied behind the Syrian opposition forces. The al-Assad regime’s brutal tactics, which resulted in over half the population of the country being displaced, created mass international sympathy.
This rallying effect, however, was short-lived. Short global attention spans, and the emergence of ISIS, caused western governments to prioritize this terrorist threat over the war. This allowed al-Assad to garner support from other entities to shore up his regime.
Initially triumphant
Many analysts argued that al-Assad had won the Syrian civil war by 2018, and the U.S. under Donald Trump substantially withdrew its support for the Syrian rebels.
Al-Assad’s government, meanwhile, retained considerable support from Russia, Iran and Lebanese armed group Hezbollah.
But even though al-Assad’s forces maintained control of much of the country and its key infrastructure, they proved incapable of permanently defeating Syrian rebel forces. Support for al-Assad’s regime, furthermore, began to wane among his allies for various reasons.
Russia found itself in a protracted conflict in Ukraine. Israel revealed Iranian vulnerabilities in a series of retaliations over the past year. Even more significant, Israel killed several Hezbollah leaders over the last several months, severely compromising its military power.
Read more: Amid the West's wavering aid to Ukraine, North Korea backs Russia in a mutually beneficial move
The al-Assad regime did not possess a wide enough basis for support among its own people to replace their external allies.
Simultaneously, however, the Syrian rebel forces also underwent a transformation.
The changing nature of the rebels
Syrian opposition forces have undergone a stark evolution following years of struggle.
It’s important to note that these disparate forces were never entirely united. Instead, the Syrian opposition ranged from liberal and moderate elements to Islamic fundamentalist forces. The only thing that truly united them was opposition to al-Assad’s tyranny.
The withdrawal of support by the U.S. and many of its allies undermined the position of the more moderate elements of the opposition. Furthermore, Syria’s Self-Defense Forces suffered significant losses against Turkey in 2018 and have yet to regain their former strength.
The loss of western allies and the enduring nature of the Syrian civil war itself gave rise to increasingly radicalized voices. Most prominent among them is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. It formed in 2017 from the merger of various fundamentalist elements among the Syrian rebel forces.
A plethora of countries have designated Hayat Tahrir al-Sham a terrorist organization linked to other radical organizations in the region. It is the most powerful armed group among the Syrian rebel forces.
While Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has claimed it’s progressed from its extremist origins, that remains unclear.
Post-war picture
The immediate question in the aftermath of al-Assad’s fall is what form post-war Syria will take. The country has occupied an important strategic position in global affairs since the Cold War.
Syria’s strategic significance, in fact, has grown since the start of the civil war as the world has grown increasingly multipolar instead of dominated by the U.S. and its allies.
President-elect Trump has already announced the U.S. will not become involved in Syria under his watch. That aligns with his earlier policy of withdrawing U.S. forces from Syria and his broader isolationist stance in terms of foreign policy.
With the U.S. soon unwilling to act and al-Assad’s traditional allies unable to intervene, a vacuum has been created that has two likely outcomes.
Turkish involvement
The first, and most obvious, is the Syrian opposition takes power. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham will play a significant role. That said, with al-Assad removed and the sole unifying factor among all the opposition groups no longer present, internal conflicts are likely.
The second likely development is Turkey will become more involved in Syria, possibly in conjunction with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.
Turkey, like several other countries, has declared Hayat Tahrir al-Sham a terrorist organization. This designation, however, has not prevented Turkey from working with the group in the past.
Turkey, however, views the Syrian Kurdish forces as a bigger threat than a Islamist groups. This is due to the significant Kurdish population in northern Syria. Turkey vehemently opposes Kurdish nationalism in all forms because of the significant Kurdish population within its own territory.
Read more: Turkey's suppression of the Kurdish political movement continues to fuel a deadly armed conflict
None of these developments is likely to return stability to Syria. Instead these developments will probably result in the continued displacement and suffering of the Syrian people.
James Horncastle does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
