Gen Christopher Cavoli is due to come to the end of his term as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (Saceur) this summer. Since 1951, this post has been filled by American four-star officers, admirals or generals.
But Cavoli might be the last American in the role, at least for a while. The Trump administration is considering relinquishing this important post as part of a cost-saving US Armed Forces command restructuring exercise and, potentially, as a step back from its leading role in European security since the 1950s. In parallel, the UK and German defence ministers have taken over chairing this week’s Ukraine Defence Contact Group, a gathering of defence ministers from 30 countries, which has previously been chaired by the US defense secretary.
Cavoli said, during a hearing in the Senate this month, that it would be problematic if the US steps back from its leadership role in Nato. Previous heads of the Nato command have agreed. They’re not wrong. Removing the American Saceur position is not an internal matter like replacing senior officers serving in US posts who do not fit a particular political profile. It would have profound effects on Nato’s military capability and immediately significant and tangible repercussions for alliance deterrence strategy.
An enemy’s perception of the military capability of Nato forces is a fundamental element of its deterrence strategy. Replacing a US Supreme Commander with a European would inject significant uncertainty into perceptions of US commitment to Nato and could critically undermine that perception of coherent military strength. It would be made to work, but Nato’s deterrence posture would be less convincing, and this is especially important given European concerns about Russian aggression in the region.
It is not clear yet how the Trump administration’s view of Nato will evolve. Public statements advocating support for Nato contradict private views expressed by his cabinet in the notorious Signal-gate chat. Previous US president, Joe Biden, viewed allies as an unrivalled strength. Trump seems to care little about the impact of his decisions on his allies. Deleting the US Saceur post would emphasise that interpretation and weaken Nato deterrence at a critical moment in its relations with Russia.
What’s the history?
Trump is not the first US president to make a foreign policy shift away from Europe. President Barack Obama announced a pivot to Asia in November 2011. This focus on China as a “pacing threat” offering major challenges to the US has persisted.
It manifests itself under Trump as a transactional demand on European allies to contribute more to Nato so the US can release resources to focus on the Pacific, potentially redeploying personnel and capabilities there. Trump has never concealed his disdain for Nato, often wondering what its benefit for the US was. Much of this rhetoric may be for his domestic audience, but it negatively affects international perceptions of Nato’s power.
The idea of a European Saceur has also been proposed before, including by former US secretary of state Henry Kissinger in 1984. That proposal was made at a low point of the cold war and Kissinger’s rationale was political. European military leadership would force European political leaders to acknowledge their responsibilities for Nato nuclear policy.
Political control of military force is, of course, important for any democratic state. Saceur reports to the North Atlantic Council (the NAC, Nato’s highest body) which comprises ambassadors from every member country. Its chair, the secretary-general, is always a European (or Canadian), and the deputy secretary-general is always an American.
The highest level of military command authority, the ability to organise and employ commands and forces to accomplish assigned missions, is known in the US as Combatant Command (COCOM). Most Nato states retain the COCOM equivalent but delegate the next lower level of command; Operational Command (OPCOM) to Nato commanders.
Issues at stake
US domestic law requires COCOM to be exercised over US forces – but only by US officers. This authority cannot be delegated. An American Supreme Commander Europe exercises operational command over all forces assigned to Nato, but a European leader in the same role could exercise only a much more restrictive level of authority over assigned US forces. There is dispensation for an exception to this to meet an attack on Nato, but not for training exercises. Unity of command is challenging enough in multi-national operations, even after 75 years of training, so this is a major obstacle.
Another issue is that the authority to release all US nuclear weapons is retained by the US president. Accordingly, every key post in the Nato nuclear operations chain is held by a US official. A Nato request for a nuclear strike is made to the US president through Saceur. It is not clear how this would work if Saceur were no longer American. This is one of the major potential obstacles ahead of any decision to move the command to a European.
And here’s another. In a crisis, Nato would plan to deploy 30 army divisions (of 15,000 personnel each), 30 squadrons of fighter aircraft and 30 combat warships from across the alliance within 30 days. Any Supreme Commander Europe would have to command international forces numbering hundreds of thousands of personnel. There are very few (if any) European officers who could credibly claim to be suitably experienced to replace Cavoli. No British officer has commanded even one deployed division since the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
But by the summer if Cavoli is replaced by a European, Nato needs to have most of these thorny issues resolved, or at least come up with plans on how to do so, or create significant risks for European security. For now, this is not looking simple at all.
Andrew Corbett does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
