The Belarusian dictator, Alexander Lukashenko, has emerged as an early beneficiary of the aborted Wagner march on Moscow, but those benefits may not have a long shelf life.
Whether or not Lukashenko played quite the enterprising broker’s role described in the statements coming out of the Kremlin and Minsk (and most analysts are sceptical), he has emerged in the Russian press as the hero of the hour, the man who saved Moscow.
That is very much a step up from the part of a frail provisional satrap, which Lukashenko, 68, has played since Vladimir Putin stepped in to save his regime in the wake of apparent election defeat in 2020.
Over the intervening three years, the Belarusian agreed to form a “union state with Russia”, allowed his country to be a springboard for the full-on invasion of Ukraine and offered to store Russian tactical nuclear warheads in Belarus, all while rumours have circulated constantly about his health.
Now he will host another of Putin’s dangerous secret weapons, Yevgeny Prigozhin.
“The president of Belarus informed the president of Russia in detail about the results of negotiations with the leadership of Wagner PMC [private military company],” the official statement from Lukashenko’s office said. “The president of Russia supported and thanked his Belarusian counterpart for the work done.”
The Kremlin spokesman, Dmitry Peskov, said the deal, in which Prigozhin called back the Wagner column advancing on Moscow on Saturday and agreed to move to Belarus, was Lukashenko’s “personal initiative which was coordinated with President Putin”.
Belarus analysts have doubts about the official account.
“I just don’t think we have any solid reason to believe that Prigozhin would listen to Lukashenko and his assurances and that Lukashenko has enough leverage and voice in Russian domestic politics to be the broker of such deals,” Artyom Shraibman, nonresident scholar at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Centre, said.
Shraibman, who is also the founder of Sense Analytics political consultancy, suggested that the governor of the Tula region, Alexei Dyumin, with strong ties to both Prigozhin and Putin, is more likely to have been the real mediator.
“There are suggestions that Lukashenko was not actually party to negotiations throughout the day, and somehow came into the fold within a very short time of the announcement,” said Olga Onuch, a politics lecturer at Manchester University.
Whatever his true role, Lukashenko is the official guarantor of the agreement and at least appears on the Russian stage as a leader in his own right, rather than simply an extension of the Kremlin.
“It has clearly changed the relations between Lukashenko and the Kremlin because after 2020 he became a kind of a puppet for the Russian authorities. He was treated as someone who was not equal,” Ryhor Astapenia, director of the Belarus initiative at the Chatham House thinktank, said.
“Now you can say he’s one of the winners of this failed coup and it will restore some of his agency in his relations with Russia, at least in the near future.”
The longer term outlook is difficult to gauge, not least because so little is known about the agreement and what it means for Belarus.
“We don’t know exactly who is moving to Belarus. Is it just Prigozhin and his security or some sizeable chunk of his army?” Shraibman said. “I assume it’s not going to be his army because it would be a threat to Lukashenko, who would not tolerate these unpredictable goons on his territory.”
Whatever the size of the entourage, Belarus experts do not expect a man of Prigozhin’s character and appetites to be content to remain in Belarusian exile for long.
“It’s not comfortable for Belarus society for the country to become a guest house for war criminals,” Astapenia said. “I think that they will want him to go somewhere else, maybe to work in African countries.”
Another question is how long Prigozhin can survive in Belarus. Shraibman does not think the direct threat would come from Lukashenko, who would want to be seen to honour his deal, but whether he could protect his guest from the Kremlin is another matter.
“Prigozhin might be concerned about drinking a cup of tea that has not been controlled by him,” he said. “I don’t expect him to be safe anywhere just now.”
Over the coming months and years, Lukashenko should also be worried. The events of the past 48 hours have shaken belief in the stability of the Putin regime, and have therefore raised questions about his own staying power.
“We clearly see that the Kremlin is not as solid as many people thought,” Astapenia said: “Lukashenko should be a bit worried about whether Putin, or those around him, are going to survive this war.”
