Almost seven months after the regime change in Bangladesh, the imprints of the shift in Dhaka’s foreign policy outlook aren’t exactly unexpected. However, some aspects of this shift could raise diplomatic eyebrows. A clear instance of this can be seen in the ripples caused by recent remarks made by Bangladesh’s chief adviser, Muhammad Yunus – currently the key executive authority in the country – during his visit to China.
While the new impetus he is seeking for Beijing-Dhaka alignment may not be surprising for New Delhi, its tone and tenor will not go unnoticed in India’s strategic circles. Pitching Bangladesh’s geostrategic significance as a trade corridor to China’s economic and strategic interests, Yunus stated: “Seven states of India – the Eastern part of India, known as the Seven Sisters – are landlocked. They have no way to reach out to the ocean. We are the only guardian of the sea. This opens up a huge possibility (that) this could be an extension of the Chinese economy.”
This statement lends itself to two interpretations, each with a different degree of impact.
At first glance, there is the understandable eagerness to attract Chinese investment, positioning Bangladesh’s connectivity to India’s Northeast as an added advantage for trade links and new markets. This part of the statement aligns with a typical investment pitch. However, that was not all he said. It was the latter part of his statement that caught the attention of foreign policy watchers in Delhi and struck a jarring note. By referring to Bangladesh as the “sole guardian of the sea,” the current regime appears to be emphasising its role as the only maritime route for India’s Northeast. Moreover, this posturing raises questions about Dhaka’s stance on the transit routes that facilitate India’s access to the Bay of Bengal. Given India’s concerns about the vulnerabilities of the Chicken’s Neck region – the Siliguri Corridor – and its plans for more robust connectivity with Dhaka as a regional ally, Yunus’s framing of the issue is not how India would prefer its northeastern neighbor to view regional transit routes.
When the Sheikh Hasina-led government was forced out of power last year, speculation about the foreign force behind the student protests ranged from theories of a US-engineered strategy to nurture a vassal state to murmurs of a Beijing-backed plot to install a compliant regime. Both possibilities had their own rationale. China’s interest in increasing its influence in Bangladesh has been evident in recent years. The ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina was aware of China’s ambitions and accommodated Beijing on some fronts – but not to the extent that China would have liked. While Bangladesh was careful to balance its economic ties with China and India, there were moments of competition. Hasina’s preference for India to execute the Teesta project, which China was also interested in, was a case in point. Signs of China’s growing distance from Hasina’s administration emerged, despite Dhaka’s efforts to avoid antagonising Xi Jinping. Unlike Hasina’s 2016 visit to Beijing, her 2024 visit was largely cold-shouldered by top Chinese officials and yielded little financial assistance for Bangladesh, as noted by Veena Sikri, a former diplomat who also served as India’s High Commissioner to Bangladesh. The visit did, however, see a theoretical commitment from both countries to strengthening “comprehensive strategic cooperation”. Still, Hasina’s government continued to prioritise India as a regional ally, leaving China eager to fill any strategic void.
Last month, China reiterated its policy of non-interference in Bangladesh’s political affairs – an assurance that now aligns with Yunus’s roadmap for reforms as a precondition for elections. Amid ongoing political instability, Dhaka sought assurances from a major regional ally, especially given its currently strained ties with India. The Chinese assurance was reciprocated by Bangladesh formally reiterating its support for the “One China” policy, signaling a deliberate distancing from Taiwan’s cause.
Another concern for India is the new government in Dhaka signaling approval for Chinese companies to participate in the Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project. This development is strategically significant, as it involves Chinese involvement in a cross-border water project – an issue already sensitive due to environmental concerns. Furthermore, the move bypasses efforts to reach a consensus with Delhi on shared river resources, adding to the chill in recent Delhi-Dhaka ties. This also raises the question of whether Dhaka has fully considered the costs of strained relations with India on its core interests.
Beyond evaluating the risks and rewards of expanding ties with China, Bangladesh must tread cautiously when engaging in large-scale Chinese infrastructure projects, such as the expansion of Mongla Port. Excessive reliance on such projects could put Bangladesh at risk of falling into a debt trap – a scenario eerily reminiscent of Sri Lanka’s financial woes.
The evolving contours of Beijing-Dhaka engagement will ultimately be assessed in Bangladesh’s strategic circles against the backdrop of India’s regional influence. Instead of a knee-jerk reaction, New Delhi can recalibrate its policy to allow Dhaka’s own cost-benefit analysis to steer it towards limiting the extent of its strategic ties with China. Regional geopolitics has already seen similar power struggles play out, such as in Nepal, where China’s ambitions clashed with India’s traditional influence. While India exercises diplomatic patience in resetting and rebuilding ties in such contexts, Dhaka must also consider how Washington perceives Yunus’s deepening engagement with China.
Before drawing conclusions from his remarks in Beijing, there is little clarity on how Dhaka intends to prioritise its diplomatic alignments. Even less is known about how the coming months will shape the competitive dynamics between Beijing and New Delhi for Bangladesh’s attention. India, however, will hope that a clear-eyed cost-benefit analysis nudges Dhaka toward a closer relationship with New Delhi. All eyes are now on the expected bilateral meet between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Yunus on the margins of the BIMSTEC meet in Thailand.
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