As pundits and Western officials speculated wildly this week on what the apparent exile of the Wagner Group and its chief Yevgeniy Prighozin to Belarus might mean, Germany announced it would move to base 4,000 troops -- an entire combat brigade -- in neighbouring Lithuania.
Monday's joint German-Lithuanian announcement -- the product of months of lobbying from Lithuania for the German-led Nato battle group in its country to be tripled permanently in strength -- was not directly linked to Wagner's weekend march on Moscow, widely viewed as an attempted coup.
But it represents one of the most important shifts in Western defence since the Cold War ended with the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991.
Germany's pledge to increase defence spending to the Nato commitment of 2% of GDP is likely to see it become the largest military spender in Europe. Coming barely three weeks before Nato's Vilnius summit, Germany's unilateral Lithuania troops announcement repositions it as a much more major military player, potentially undercutting more traditional heavyweights, particularly Britain.
Since Russian President Vladimir Putin's invasion of Ukraine in February last year, multiple eastern and central European countries have expressed a desire for existing Nato forces on their territory to be similarly strengthened.
Other troop-contributing countries, however, have avoided making that commitment -- although Britain did this year demonstrate its ability to temporarily deploy additional troops to Estonia as part of its spring military drills.
While the weekend chaos in Russia has prompted speculation in Western capitals and beyond over whether Mr Putin might be swept from power, the short-term instability may make Nato's eastern members more nervous, not less.
That will be intensified if it is confirmed that the Wagner Group has taken up permanent residence in Belarus, which borders Nato members Latvia, Lithuania and Poland and could be a launchpad for operations against those nations as well as northern Ukraine.
During the Cold War, what was then West Germany played host to tens of thousands of British, US and French troops as part of a vast Nato army intended to deter a Soviet invasion. Announcing the Lithuania deployment this week, German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius explicitly referenced that history, describing the German decision to permanently base troops in Lithuania as a sign of similar commitment to defending allied nations.
"We were the ones who could always rely on Nato partners standing by our side in an emergency," Mr Pistorius said, adding that as the largest economy in Europe, it was now Germany's "responsibility and obligation" to "stand up for the protection of the eastern flank".
ROBUST DEFENCE
In the short term, the Ukraine conflict has left the US even more central to European defence than at any point since the Cold War ended. In the long run, however, the potential return of Donald Trump to the White House or a future isolationist US administration might push European nations back to the forefront. That leaves an opportunity -- some might argue a requirement -- for Germany to leapfrog Britain and France to become a more dominant influence in the defence of Europe.
Earlier this month, Germany's first-ever National Security Strategy committed Germany to more "robust defence", increased "resilience" -- including improving its own energy security -- and "sustainability", defining Russia as the "greatest threat to peace and security in the Euro Atlantic area".
This month has also seen an announcement that Germany's Rheinmettal will work with US counterpart Lockheed Martin on a German equivalent of the US Himars long-range missile.
Germany was also the first country to publish its "offer" to Nato's New Force Model, offering to provide 30,000 troops, 65 aircraft and 20 naval vessels within 30 days of any major conflict.
Like the Lithuania troops announcement, these are all significant developments. Germany is also seen as having done a solid job hosting Nato's AIR DEFENDER exercise this summer, described as one of the largest since the Cold War.
For all that, however, critics say much remains unclear about how a more militarily assertive Germany will choose to act. This isn't a new question -- how to integrate first West Germany and then its reunified successor into the defence of Europe has long been a contentious issue.
Throughout the Cold War and beyond, successive generations of German political leadership walked an uneasy line between demands that they do more militarily and lingering foreign and domestic discomfort over the Nazi past.
In the Balkans in the 1990s and Libya in 2011, successive German governments have been amongst the most cautious in Nato over their forces conducting direct lethal strikes.
In Afghanistan, Germany was amongst the largest contributors of troops -- but its focus was always much more on reconstruction than the "kinetic" anti-Taliban offensives favoured by the Americans and British.
'BEST TANK IN THE WORLD'
German civilian and military officials describe the style of German leadership and military thinking as "different", in part a legacy of Allied efforts to de-Nazify their country in the 1940s and 1950s, producing a military force -- the Bundeswehr -- renowned for the quality of its planning and commitment to democratic oversight.
Just as unnerving, at least in the eyes of some others in the alliance, has been the habit of successive German governments to maintain outreach to those in power in Moscow, including building energy and trade links. Following the invasion of Ukraine last year, Ukrainian and eastern and central European states also criticised Germany heavily for its perceived slowness in agreeing its Leopard tanks and other weaponry could be exported to take part in that fight.
German officials tend to reject that criticism, often pointing out that the German-built Leopards -- "the best tank in the world" -- still reached the front line before US M1 or British Challenger 2s. They also point to Germany's dramatic success in weaning itself off Russian energy last winter. Not only did Germany manage to find alternative gas and energy sources, but its industry was able to reduce energy consumption without the country falling into recession, as some feared.
Nevertheless, some contrast Germany's still relatively vague approach to long-term defence with that of eastern neighbour Poland, which says it will spend 4% of GDP this year on defence and has dramatically reconfigured its army with equipment from South Korea and elsewhere.
Germany's industrial strength, most experts say, is arguably its greatest asset when it comes to building defences -- although experts say its military still has some significant deficiencies, including in communications technology and logistics. The National Security Strategy published this month also contained significant gaps, including details on exactly when defence spending will increase or what it might be spent on.
The answers to those questions may shape how Europe is defended for decades to come. REUTERS
Peter Apps is a Reuters columnist writing on defence and security issues.
