US President Donald Trump’s pivot toward Russia amid its war in Ukraine has collided with the stance of Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government, which has always shown unwavering support for Kyiv as well as loyalty to Washington. When Trump came to power, Meloni wanted to appear connected to his administration, hoping to play the role of a bridge with Europe while France and Germany were in unfavourable political cycles. Trump’s pivot led to a revival of France’s role in Europe, while Germany emerged from its electoral period with its likely next chancellor, Friedrich Merz, calling for European defence’s “independence from the USA”.
Meloni’s position is not only weakening within the European context, where France, Germany and the UK play leading roles, but also in Italian politics, as US policy has created rifts within the three-part governing coalition. Meloni’s party, Fratelli d’Italia, supports Ukraine and Europe, as does Forza Italia. But the leader of Lega, Matteo Salvini, has come to embody Trumpism in Italy, taking an openly pro-Russian position and opposing European rearmament. If a break with Lega were to occur, it could call into question the viability of the government, as it would no longer hold an absolute majority in parliament.
Anti-French rhetoric
For her part, Meloni always tends to push back against any “European-only” defence solution proposed by France. This position is a way for Italy to avoid facing the fact that NATO has weakened. It also reactivates an anti-French rhetoric that is a classic refrain among Italian nationalists. Salvini has recently accused French President Emmanuel Macron of being “crazy” and calling for Europe to prepare for nuclear war.
However, Macron has not made any significant missteps toward Italy. Since the first informal emergency meeting in Paris after Trump’s policy shift toward Ukraine (a gathering that included the UK, Germany, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain and Poland), the Italian government has always been involved. Moreover, Macron’s policy convergence with UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer has dulled criticisms, because Rome is traditionally close to London.
Both Meloni’s government and the opposition have put forward complicated if not unrealistic proposals for the war in Ukraine, such as a UN peacekeeping mission after a ceasefire, and repeatedly reaffirmed their commitment to NATO. In terms of public opinion, a poll published in mid-February – two weeks before Trump scolded Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky during a White House visit – found that 69 percent of Italians “are favourable toward a common European army”.
There is also a growing debate in Italy on nuclear deterrence. This issue had been taboo until now, with Italy benefitting from an arrangement in which US nuclear bombs are stored in bases on Italian soil. While Germany and Poland have expressed interest in an expansion of the French nuclear umbrella, Italian media and policymakers are also beginning to discuss it. The discussion may reflect doubts about US reliability within NATO, including Washington’s commitment to the alliance treaty’s Article 5, which holds that “an armed attack” on one member “shall be considered an attack against them all”.
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Defence ties to Europe
There are also significant signals coming from Italian industry. While, in recent months, the Italian government appeared to want to use the telecommunications services of Starlink, the satellite network created by Elon Musk, for its defence needs, a contract no longer seems to be on the agenda. Musk’s fluctuating stance about the Starlink service provided to Kyiv, as well as the US decision that temporarily cut aid to Ukraine, introduced questions about reliability. This explains how, in just a few weeks, the French company Eutelsat, which owns the OneWeb constellation, has seen a resurgence of interest, as many countries assess its services as alternatives to Starlink. Following this turmoil, the Italian company Leonardo recently announced that it is planning to launch a constellation of 18 telecommunications satellites for defence purposes.
These developments also tie into Italy’s industrial position in aerospace and defence, because Leonardo and Fincantieri, another large, publicly owned company, do not limit their markets to the Italian armed forces. As part of a European strategy, Leonardo concluded an agreement with the German company Rheinmetall in 2024 to jointly produce battle tanks, and recently announced an agreement with the Turkish company Baykar to produce drones. Leonardo is part-owner, along with French defence company Thales, of Telespazio and of Thales Alenia Space, and is also in discussions with Airbus to form a European satellite production group. In the missile sector, Leonardo’s participation in European joint venture MBDA allowed Italy and France to produce the SAMP/T anti-missile system, which could lead to further developments for the European missile-defence network. In shipbuilding, Fincantieri has expressed interest in merging its activities with the German group Thyssen Krupp Marine Systems. And in aircraft, Italy is participating in the Global Air Combat Programme, which includes the UK and Japan in the production of fighter jets. These examples show that Italian aerospace and defence development is intrinsically linked to European collaborations and export markets.
Both in terms of industrial interests and politics, Italy is firmly anchored in the European camp. The positive stance that the Meloni government took toward Washington does not mean Rome is considering an alternative to EU affiliation. Italy is also facing continuous cyberattacks from Russian groups, which feeds a clear threat perception. The prime minister has stressed her differences with France and the UK during the recent European security summits, but while Italy may be reluctant to deploy peacekeeping troops in Ukraine, it cannot distance itself too much from the future defence architecture of Europe.
Jean-Pierre Darnis ne travaille pas, ne conseille pas, ne possède pas de parts, ne reçoit pas de fonds d'une organisation qui pourrait tirer profit de cet article, et n'a déclaré aucune autre affiliation que son organisme de recherche.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
