Ayman al-Zawahiri was a low-key but effective leader of al-Qaida whose death will cause the terrorist organisation some short-term turbulence but is unlikely to cause any major long-term problems.
A decade ago, killing Zawahiri would have made a major difference. Now, though the nature of his death demonstrates the US’s continuing ability to strike individual enemies even in hostile environments and raises questions about the Taliban’s relationship with extremist groups, it is unlikely to weaken al-Qaida significantly.
Zawahiri, 71, was seriously ill and many key tasks are likely to have been handled by others for several years. One of these younger men will now take on the leadership role. Despite significant attrition in recent years of potential successors, there are several capable candidates.
The favourite to take over is Mohammed Salah al-Din Zaidan, better known as Saif al Adel, a 60-year-old Egyptian-born veteran of Islamic extremism who has long been considered a capable organiser by western security services. He is in Iran, however, with no ability to travel and his communications monitored.
Others touted as possible successors include Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi, the director of al-Qaida’s media campaigns, Abu al-Walid al-Falastini, a senior Syria-based ideologue, and several leaders of local affiliated organisations, such as Yazid Mebrak of Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb and Ahmed Diriye of Al-Qaida in East Africa.
Whoever takes over, his strategic decisions will be important. Though al-Qaida was known for its innovative empowerment of local cells, the man at the top of the hierarchy has real authority. An oath of loyalty is sworn not to the group, but to the individual.
This is one reason Osama bin Laden, al-Qaida’s founder and leader, was able to overrule senior aides who objected to his chosen strategy of striking the “Far Enemy”, the west. If he had not, the 9/11 attacks of September 2001 in which nearly 3,000 people died could not have taken place.
When Zawahiri became leader after Bin Laden’s death in a US special forces raid in Pakistan in 2011, he turned al-Qaida away from spectacular long -range attacks, believing they were counter-productive. In his last days, Bin Laden had directed meticulously planned ambitious strikes against oil tankers, believing these would cripple the US economy. Zawahiri cancelled the plot. Instead, links with groups around the world were reinforced and efforts made to expand through gradually winning support from communities on the ground.
This did not always bring success, and al-Qaida suffered significant setbacks in Iraq and Syria during the 11 years Zawahiri was in charge. The rise of a rival in Islamic State, which swept through these two countries and set up a new “caliphate”, led to a loss of profile and influence in a key region as well as competition elsewhere. The limited achievements of its affiliate in Yemen, once seen as a major potential threat to the region and the west, must have been a disappointment.
But in the long run, Zawahiri’s tortoise looks set to beat the IS hare, and al-Qaida has managed to maintain or increase its presence through sub-Saharan Africa, in parts of south Asia and in other parts of the Middle East. Zawahiri’s personal decision to strengthen ties with al-Shabaab, the extremist movement in Somalia, has paid dividends with the group so secure that it now contributes millions of dollars to al-Qaida’s central treasury, according to recent intelligence reports. Zawahiri also appears to have managed relations with the various factions of the Taliban well. He died standing on the balcony of a house in the Afghan capital belonging to an aide of a hardline Taliban leader.
But what will be the strategy of the new leader? Whoever takes over has multiple options – but no easy ones. He has to stay alive, communicate despite considerable logistic challenges, deal with regimes like the Taliban and formulate a clear idea of what his subordinates should be doing.
Attempts to launch long-range attacks on the west should be practically possible, even if they might be thwarted by much improved defences. Al-Qaida may not have mounted a significant strike on such a target for a decade but analysts believe that the organisation could build the networks and skills necessary to mount such an operation without great difficulty.
A United Nations report, based on intelligence from member states, pointed out last that al-Qaida thrives because of instability and violence in the sort of places that appear remote from London, Paris or Washington. Unless such conflicts are brought to a successful resolution, “one or more” such places “will incubate an external operational capability for IS, al-Qaida or a related terrorist group”, it warned.
