When the 27 EU heads of government convene in Brussels in December, they will face one of the most momentous decisions in the history of the European Union: whether to start membership negotiations with Ukraine. The European Commission’s recommendation this week that talks begin means that the European Council will almost certainly give the green light, but this doesn’t imply that Ukraine will be allowed to join any time soon. In fact, the war-torn country may well find itself trapped in negotiations that go nowhere.
Nato’s reluctance to make good on its promise of membership for Ukraine is one reason to expect protracted talks between Brussels and Kyiv. Eleven out of the 16 countries that have joined the EU since 1995 did so as Nato members – a status that helps to protect states such as Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania from Russian aggression. The EU’s security and defence policy is too weak to match these security guarantees and its mutual defence clause, which offers aid and assistance to member states that are the victims of armed aggression, is untested.
Even if Ukraine manages to join Nato or find alternative security assurances, the challenges that would arise from admitting Europe’s poorest country and one of the world’s largest agricultural exporters will take time to work through. Economic issues can be just as contentious as questions of war and peace, as Ukraine is about to find out.
Agriculture could be the most sensitive subject in EU-Ukraine negotiations, and a potential flashpoint. More than half of the country’s land is arable, compared to a quarter in the EU. A majority of Ukraine’s farmable land is made up of chernozem, a richly fertile black soil that gives farmers enormous advantages in grain production. EU membership for Ukraine would mean permanently lower prices for Spanish shoppers, who bought 430,000 tonnes of sunflower oil from there in 2021, but also tougher competition for farmers in Slovakia, Poland and Hungary. These countries have recently banned Ukrainian grain imports in defiance of Brussels, and in protest at a glut that was depressing prices paid to their producers.
EU farmers currently receive at least €200 in income support each year per hectare farmed. Given its abundance of arable land, Ukraine could be eligible for up to €96.5bn in agricultural payments over seven years, according to a recent study. Add to this investment in road, rail links and environmental projects from the EU’s Cohesion Fund, which helps the poorest member states catch up, and the total cost of admitting Ukraine could be as high as €186bn, which is greater than the EU’s entire annual budget.
Financial support on this scale would not only mean less money for other countries in the union, but require them to make bigger budget contributions. The EU has already agreed to lend €18bn to Ukraine to help its wartime economy, despite the significant risk of default on these loans. Yet it is implausible that current EU members will choose to give more and get less in perpetuity. Membership negotiations will surely stall without a new long-term deal to limit expenditure on agricultural and regional aid. This agreement is unlikely to be in place before 2030.
In applying to join the EU, Ukraine isn’t just seeking subsidies. It wants to turbo-charge its economic development. An insight into Ukraine’s vision for its postwar future can be found in its National Recovery Plan. This asks for investment not only to repair the indiscriminate destruction caused by Russian forces, but to build a tiger economy that could grow by 7% a year and reach the world’s top 20 for human capital. Volodymyr Zelenskiy’s ambition to leapfrog Ukraine’s prewar economic model won’t come cheap, requiring at least €700bn between now and 2032. The EU isn’t going to send blank cheques to Kyiv, but it will be expected to raise significant sums for reconstruction, on top of the costs of enlargement.
A third reason why Ukraine faces lengthy and potentially inconclusive talks with the EU is that existing members will have ample opportunity to change their minds. Even after the green light for negotiations is given, it can take months or years before talks begin, as Albania and North Macedonia have discovered to their disappointment, and as Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina soon could too.
When negotiations start, they can easily break down, as Turkey has found out on multiple occasions since 2005. After negotiating chapters have been closed, all EU member states must ratify the resulting accession treaty. Given the high stakes surrounding Ukrainian accession, it is conceivable that one or more countries will hold a referendum. As Brexit illustrates all too clearly, EU referendums are inherently unpredictable.
Zelenskiy can labour under no illusions about how difficult it will be for his country to join the EU. Yet he continues to describe Ukraine’s place as being in a “free and united Europe”. The EU is content, for now, to play along, but it remains to be seen how committed it truly is to this imagined future. As governments wrestle with the high politics of sharing sovereignty with a country fighting for its survival and the low politics of who will foot the bill for such solidarity, Ukraine should celebrate the opening of membership negotiations, but not count on their successful conclusion.
Dermot Hodson is the author of Circle of Stars: A History of the EU and the People Who Made It
