There have been numerous reports of arrests of al-Shabaab insurgents, the dismantling of an al-Shabaab terrorist network and interception of arms in Ethiopia in 2024. Reports have also suggested that al-Shabaab is seeking to establish “an active combat presence” in the Bale mountains.
These reports have led to mounting fears that the terror group could seek to establish a presence in Ethiopia, as it has in Kenya.
The Somali jihadist group is active in Kenya. It targets civilians, security officers and telecommunication infrastructure. Its 2011 kidnapping of a Frenchwoman contributed to Kenya’s invasion of Somalia. The subsequent hostilities led to terrorist killings at a Nairobi mall in 2013 and a public university in 2015.
The Ethiopian fears are being driven by examples of terrorist groups making inroads when governments are weak. My own research documented the rise of African jihadist organisations such as Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam waal-Muslimeen ( JNIM) in Mali and Burkina Faso and Mashebabo in Mozambique for this very reason.
But as a researcher and author who has studied Islamism in the Horn of Africa and the al-Shabaab group, I hold a different view on Ethiopia’s vulnerability.
It is true that Ethiopia’s government led by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed is weaker than it’s ever been. This is mainly due to armed conflicts within its borders. These include the now ended conflict in Tigray. The conflict created tensions among the Tigrayan leadership.
There’s active conflict in Amhara and Oromia in addition to numerous pastoral conflicts.
It is also true that Ethiopia’s previously highly professional army is weaker than before. This follows the purge of Tigrayan officers and men before and during the Tigray war. A number of senior intelligence and counterintelligence officers were also purged.
However, these developments shouldn’t lead to the conclusion that al-Shabaab is poised for major gains in Ethiopia. My view is that recent developments might allow for small-scale terror operations in the Somali regional state which borders Somalia. This may extend into the Oromia region and the capital, Addis Ababa. However, the possibilities for a larger presence are limited.
There are two main factors that disadvantage al-Shabaab. The first is clan-based animosities between al-Shabaab and parts of the Somali population in Ethiopia. These stem from old conflicts over Kismayo port over 15 years ago, which alienated the Shabaab from major parts of the Ogadeen clan, the clan that make up a majority of the inhabitants of the Somali national state in Ethiopia. The second is the terror group’s poorly developed propaganda strategy. It has failed to win support in Ethiopia.
Al-Shabaab’s propaganda in Kenya and Tanzania has focused on specific minorities. But in Ethiopia its messaging portrays the whole Ethiopian population as al-Shabaab’s enemies.
Al-Shabaab and Ethiopia
The militant group Harakat al-Shabaab, as it refers to itself, arose out of Ethiopia’s Somali regional state 18 years ago. With a strength recently estimated at between 7,000 and 12,000 soldiers, it has carried out deadly attacks in Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya and Uganda. But it has failed so far to successfully launch terror attacks in Ethiopia.
Al-Shabaab’s involvement in Ethiopia is not new. The first failed attempt to establish itself in Ethiopia was made in Somali state – which is populated mainly by ethnic Somalis. The newly formed jihadist group attempted to establish a permanent presence there.
However, the relationship between al-Shabaab and the Ogadeen clan – who comprise 40%-50% of the state’s population – soured rapidly in 2008-2010 over the profitable control of Kismayo port in southern Somalia. The Ogadeens have a presense in Somalia, Kenya and Ethiopia. These animosities persist until today.
The Somali regional state is a natural stepping stone for al-Shabaab attempts at infiltrating Ethiopia, mainly because of its ethnic affinity to Somalia. However, the unfriendly relationship between the Ogadeen and al-Shabaab limits this potential.
Al-Shabaab has been more successful at recruiting Ethiopian Oromos, the country’s largest ethnic group. The Oromos have a long history of anti-government insurgency. But Oromo fighters within al-Shabaab have never enjoyed the status or media reputation that for example the Kenyan foreign fighters had in their leader Imam Ali. Moreover, there are also reports of Oromo foreign fighters in the al-Shabaab being treated badly.
All these combine to undermine al-Shabaab ambitions in Ethiopia.
Why propaganda strategy is a drawback
Propaganda is an important tool for the Harakat Al Shabaab. In other countries, the group often strives to generate distrust between parts of the local population and their government. It plays on grievances of the marginalised and on religious animosities.
Al-Shabaab propaganda targeted at Ethiopia has tended to focus on the historical rivalry between Ethiopia and Somalia, which dates back as far as the 15th century. The propaganda projects Ethiopia as the Christian eternal enemy.
This has the effect of depicting Ethiopia (and its population groups) as one entity working against Somali interests. The propaganda often serves Somali nationalistic narratives dressed in Islamist rhetoric. It tends to conflate “Somali interests” with “Muslim interests”, neglecting other “Muslim interests” in the Horn. For instance, a majority of the Oromo in Ethiopia are also Muslim.
Propaganda efforts targeting potential non-Somali recruits in Ethiopia, such as Afars and Oromos, are weakly developed.
What next?
Ethiopia may be politically and militarily more weakened, but it’s not yet an easy target for al-Shabaab. This is partly because of al-Shabaab’s lack of strategies to take advantage of Ethiopia’s current problems.
Stig Jarle Hansen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
