Many prime ministers at some point find themselves in a situation where nothing they do seems to go right. It happened to Jim Callaghan in the late 1970s, to Gordon Brown in the 2000s and to every Conservative prime minister since 2019.
After barely 100 days in office, there are troubling signs that Keir Starmer’s government may be in this situation. This is a strange fate for an administration that is still meant to be in its honeymoon phase, having won a huge majority in 2024.
While pensioners protest that cuts to their winter fuel payments could shortly leave them without the wherewithal to stay warm, we hear about Starmer and others living it up, with £4,000 worth of Taylor Swift concert tickets, expensive designer glasses and fancy clothes that many Labour supporters could not hope to afford. The party’s poll ratings have plunged and Rosie Duffield has quit as a Labour MP, complaining about the “freebies” scandal.
After being out of office for 14 years, has Labour forgotten how to govern?
One peculiarity to this story is that it involves a struggle between backroom figures who, in normal times, the public would be unaware even exist.
Sue Gray, Starmer’s chief of staff, has resigned and been replaced by Morgan McSweeney, the man who directed Labour’s extremely effective electoral campaign in the summer. It follows reports of a power struggle between the two.
Special advisers in Number 10 were furious because their salaries were cut while Gray earned a salary of £170,000 (£3,000 more than Starmer). This was also a higher salary than any previous person in the role earned and looked bad at a time when many people are having to make sacrifices. Morale in Downing Street reportedly plummeted.
What is striking about the Sue Gray affair is that she was brought in to signify that the grownups were in charge. As an experienced civil servant, it was thought she’d help the party make the transition back into government (an important task, as many of the new ministers have not served in cabinet previously). Gray was known for her understanding of the civil service machine.
When Starmer appointed her to his team before the election, it was considered a signal that she would bring efficiency and high ethical standards into government. How could this have gone wrong in such a spectacular way? The press not only ran stories about Gray’s toxic relationship with McSweeney.
There were also reports of a conflict over the media grid in No 10 – the strategy for releasing information and announcements to the media. This was apparently being controlled by Gray, whose experience is far more with managing government departments than with public relations. It’s said this explains the government’s poor communication since coming to office and failure to make an impact with positive stories – as well as to recover from negative ones.
Gray, fairly or unfairly, has been blamed for many of the government’s failures in getting a clear message across to the electorate. We should, however, view her resignation in a wider perspective.
The political machine at No 10 has often been difficult to control, especially in recent years. There have been successes in the role such as Jonathan Powell, who worked for Tony Blair through the whole of his time in office. Powell was brought back in recently by Starmer to help with Chagos Island sovereignty talks.
By contrast, Boris Johnson managed to get through no less than five chiefs of staff during his brief administrations. Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill, joint chiefs of staff to Theresa May, had to take the fall and resign after her disastrous election result in 2017.
Prime ministers (even those blessed with large majorities) struggle to implement their will across government partly because the bureaucracy there to make it happen often fails. When things go wrong, it is easier to blame the chief of staff than really probe where the problems lie in the government machine. Gray fits the pattern.
Blame within No 10 is also being directed at the head of the civil service, Simon Case. There have been allegations that he has been the source of leaks about the fractious relationship between Gray and McSweeney. Case has now announced that he will leave his role on health grounds. The decision about his replacement will be one of the most important that Starmer will take over the next year.
McSweeney is a very different figure from Gray, not least because he is not a civil servant. His appointment signals the coming of a more focused political agenda, one that may particularly appeal to “red wall” voters (constituencies in northern England, north Wales and the Midlands that traditionally voted Labour). Expect more on workers’ rights, economic intervention and Labour’s patriotism so as to keep the 2024 electoral coalition together.
This is particularly important as the freebies row has reinforced the popular view that politicians are all the same and just out for themselves. Labour, which had staked its moral authority on doing things differently, is diminished. This taint is not going to go away soon.
McSweeney knows the beneficiary could prove to be Reform UK. One should not read too much into council byelection results but it is notable that, in the wake of the Labour freebies scandal, Blackpool elected a Reform UK councillor for the first time (taking the seat from Labour by a significant margin).
Is it all over for Starmer? No, of course it isn’t. A government with a huge majority and almost five years to work with before it has to call an election has time to turn things round.
Tony Blair survived the allegations of corruption around Bernie Ecclestone’s donation to the party at the beginning of his administration. Labour will need to focus on delivery. McSweeney will now try to steady the ship but, as we have seen, recent history suggests he may struggle with the task of producing effective government. It is, however, up to Keir Starmer to make the difference at a time when the government lacks clarity. The buck always stops with him.
Rohan McWilliam is affiliated with the Labour Party (member) and is co-Director of the Labour History Research Unit, Anglia Ruskin University,
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
