All smaller political parties seek to be in a position of influence, ideally through coalitions or support agreements – but there are risks
Opinion: Over recent weeks, the Greens, Te Pāti Māori, and ACT have all suggested they may not go into a coalition with either Labour or National after the election, but sit instead on the crossbenches, voting on each issue on a case-by-case basis. This would mean a minority government, where the largest party in the House would form a government but would need the support of one or other parties to get anything done. For his part, the Prime Minister is not ruling out running a minority government if he thinks the demands of the smaller parties are too great.
At first glance, minority government sounds like an attractive proposition. After all, since the arrival of the Mixed Member Proportional voting system, no smaller party, having supported a government, either in coalition or on confidence and supply, has grown its support at the next election. The Alliance imploded in 2002. New Zealand First narrowly survived in 1999 after the break-up of its coalition with National in 1998. It was voted out of Parliament altogether in 2008 and again in 2020, after being first a confidence and supply partner and then in coalition with Labour. UnitedFuture and Te Pāti Māori lost their seats in Parliament in 2017 after being confidence and supply partners for National.
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A common complaint of all those parties was that the major party they were supporting was loth to give them sufficient credit for the positive contribution they made to government, but was far less reticent when things did not work out quite as intended in laying the blame at the feet of their support partners.
I well recall National's attempts to reform the Resource Management Act in 2014-17. It assumed from the outset that its support partners (ACT, Te Pāti Māori and UnitedFuture) would simply fall into line with its plans. It showed no real interest in negotiating changes with those parties – in fact, its minister went so far as to tell me he would only talk to me if I could assure him in advance we would reach an agreement! Yet all the while, it blamed its support partners for its failure to make progress.
But this type of situation is not limited to multi-party government in New Zealand. I remember a conversation with Sir Nick Clegg, Deputy Prime Minister, in Britain's 2010-15 Conservative/Liberal Democrat coalition government in which we both checked off similar experiences in dealing with major parties in government.
During my time in Parliament I was privileged to negotiate five confidence and supply agreements (two with Labour and three with National) over a 15-year period – more than any other political leader. Uppermost in all those agreements was ensuring stable government and certainty, alongside agreed specific policy objectives to be advanced. Voters do not like uncertainty and political instability, and experience from other countries suggests the political blame is usually attached to the smaller parties, who are punished accordingly at the next election. The risk for all small parties in any governing arrangement is “damned if you do, damned if you don’t”, which has been borne out by New Zealand’s experience so far.
Threatening to sit on the crossbenches if the major parties are not willing to negotiate fairly in the government formation process might appear as a noble, principled stance, but is, in reality, no more than a plea to be taken seriously
So it not surprising that minority government with smaller parties sitting on the crossbenches has some superficial appeal. From the larger parties’ point of view, leading a minority government would enable them to get on with governing without having to worry about the day-to-day demands of support partners, especially if they could reach agreement with a smaller party to abstain on confidence votes so the government would not be threatened. The crossbench parties would be able to hold firm to their own policy positions without the required compromise of being part of the government, and the government would have to talk to them to get their support for any legislation it wished to pass.
However, it is not quite as simple as that. Though a minority government would still need to negotiate with other parties for support on legislation in pretty much the same way as now under standard confidence and supply arrangements, the annual Budget process would almost certainly have to change. Currently, the Budget is prepared by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Cabinet and support party ministers, but with little political discussion beyond that tight circle. Government backbenchers are normally advised of the Budget’s contents only about an hour before it is presented in the House.
Under a minority government scenario, potential crossbench support partners would need to be brought into the Budget process from the outset to ensure support when the Budget is presented to the House. Though this greater transparency is no bad thing in itself, it is fraught with risk, especially for the crossbench parties the government is looking to for support. The biggest risk would be that the government cannot put a Budget together because of lack of support from the crossbench. The political instability that would cause would almost certainly precipitate an early general election at which the crossbench parties would likely be punished for their intransigence.
In that context, Prime Minister Chris Hipkins’ recent warning to the Greens and Te Pāti Māori to be careful their policy demands do not rule them out of contention for a governing arrangement assumes a deeper meaning. He is also warning them that sitting on the crossbenches could be to their longer term political detriment, especially if that forces the government to an early election.
All smaller political parties seek to be in a position of influence where they can implement key aspects of their policies, ideally through coalitions, or support agreements. Sitting passively on the sidelines is very much a secondary option. So, threatening to sit on the crossbenches if the major parties are not willing to negotiate fairly in the government formation process might appear as a noble, principled stance, but is, in reality, no more than a plea to be taken seriously.
As Gough Whitlam said: “Only the impotent are pure.”
