The tragedy discovered amid the rubble of Bucha and Borodianka overshadowed any jubilation that Kyiv had defeated Russian forces that had spent a month trying to envelop the capital and snuff out the Ukrainian nation. Nevertheless, the defeat of Russian forces in the north marks a turning point in the war. For the medium term, Ukraine will now survive. But for its soldiers there is no respite, for having had its first objective denied Moscow has turned its gaze on the Donbas, where a major offensive is imminent.
The Donbas has been at war for eight years. More than 90 Ukrainian soldiers were killed in 2021 defending the line of contact. Since late February Ukrainian positions have come under regular artillery fire, with mobilised civilians from Russian-occupied Donetsk and Luhansk pushed into attacks on the Ukrainian trenches. The aim of this Russian activity was to fix the 40,000 Ukrainian troops in the Joint Forces Operations (JFO) area, preventing them from impacting the fights for Mariupol, Kharkiv or Kyiv.
In the coming days the JFO is destined to become the focus of Russian attention. Having seized a land corridor from Rostov to Kherson, Russian forces are preparing to punch northwards to cut off lines of supply to Donetsk. Further Russian units – some newly formed and some repositioned – are forming up to push south around Luhansk from Kharkiv to complete the encirclement.
The battle will be very different from the advance on Kyiv. Russian units at the beginning of the war were not ready or supplied for heavy fighting. Now the Russians appreciate what they are up against and with only two axes to support can concentrate their supplies. Russian air defences have good coverage over the Donbas and they will likely be able to bring significant air power to bear. Combined with their advantage in artillery, and the fact that the fighting will be in the countryside rather than into urban centres, Ukrainian troops will need to manoeuvre to survive.
At the same time the Russians face a serious challenge. Ukrainian forces in the JFO comprise some of the country’s most professional and best-motivated units. The Russians have an advantage in firepower but will be fighting at close to numerical parity. If their plan is to encircle the JFO they will need to defend the cordon from both sides, and while Russian soldiers are now better prepared, morale remains a problem in many Russian units.
Having committed the majority of his forces, President Vladimir Putin must hit his objectives before the Victory Day Parade on 9 May or else face a steady decline in Russian combat power through exhaustion. This is likely to encourage the Russians to apply many of their most devastating weapons systems. But if Putin fails he will then face a choice: to seek an exit or to move Russia on to a war footing and mobilise reserves. That would mean abandoning the fiction that the war in Ukraine is merely a “special operation”.
For the Ukrainians the next month will be costly but potentially decisive. If Russia seizes the Donbas it can go firm and can pause while it brings up reserves for a summer offensive. On the other hand, if Russia fails to hit its objectives then many of its units will find themselves thrust forwards and exposed, at risk of persistent attrition like the troops who recently retreated from Kyiv.
For the Ukrainian military the priorities for the battle in the Donbas differ slightly from what was needed for the urban defence. A consistent supply of anti-tank missiles and man-portable air-defence systems will remain invaluable. But the force will also need loitering munitions to target Russian air defences and artillery, creating opportunities for Ukrainian helicopters to resupply isolated units. They will need protected mobility to move their troops safely to new defensive positions. They will need a considerable quantity of artillery ammunition.
For Ukraine’s allies there has been a persistent tension between providing military assistance that is immediately usable to stave off defeat, and systems that come with an associated training burden. The rate of Ukrainian equipment loss in the Donbas is likely to be higher than in the first phase of the conflict. If Ukraine is to be ready for the battle beyond the Donbas it will need to reconstitute some of its units. Now is the time, therefore, to begin supplying longer-term aid to regain the initiative.
Dr Jack Watling is senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI)
