Why does Qatar mediate in so many conflicts?
Many countries in the Middle East aspire to the role of mediators – Egypt, Oman and Kuwait among them – but Qatar presents itself as the region’s primary problem solver and advocate of dialogue. It has been active in Ukraine, Lebanon, Sudan, Iran, Afghanistan and Gaza, in the process hosting the leadership of the Taliban and the political wing of Hamas among others.
Observers say Qatar takes on this role since as a small but fabulously wealthy country built on vast supplies of liquid gas, it needs to make itself indispensable to the international community and protected from unwelcome interventions by its larger neighbours, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The 2017-2021 boycott of Qatar led by Saudi Arabia showed it has good reasons to be fearful.
Is there opposition to its role in the Israel-Hamas conflict?
Yes, on the American right and in parts of Israel. The North Carolina Republican senator Ted Budd said on X this week: “For weeks, Qatar’s foreign ministry has claimed to ‘be close’ to negotiating a deal for the release of hostages held by Hamas – including American hostages. How long will Qatar continue to host terrorists with American blood on their hands?”
Gershon Baskin, an Israeli hostage negotiator who has dealt directly with Hamas, challenged Qatar at a recent Middle East Institute seminar. “In my mind, Qatar is a state that supports terrorism and they need to be called to order,” he said. Noting that the largest US military base in the region was in Qatar, he said: “The Americans need to tell Qatar: if you don’t force Hamas to release hostages, you are going to exile them from Qatar.”
Baskin is one of those who think Egyptian intelligence has better lines into Hamas than Qatar, and Qatar does not have the same lines into Israeli intelligence. Such criticism puts a lot of pressure on Qatar to deliver, both to show its independence from Hamas and its effectiveness. Indeed, the surprise statement on Sunday by the Qatari prime minister that Qatar was close to a deal may have reflected a need to challenge the gathering scepticism of Qatar in the US Congress.
Qatar argues that some its critics misunderstand why it hosts Hamas’s political leaders – which is not so much out of ideological sympathy but because the US has asked it to.
It is argued that its role is distinct from the technical role that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) can undertake and the message-carrying role that Switzerland undertakes for the US in Tehran. It requires a degree of political trust, knowledge and political sensitivity. Just as the US does not mount much public criticism of Israel, neither does Qatar of Hamas. The precondition of influence sometimes is discretion.
Where does Qatar stand on the conflict?
Qatar does not endorse the Hamas attack on Israel on 7 October but says the responsibility lies with Israel due to the occupation. At a recent Organisation of Islamic Cooperation summit, it was arguing for tougher messages than condemnation of Israel, and since then it has accused Israel of genocide, breaches of the Geneva conventions and massacres. It has also laid into what it sees as double standards on the part of some in the international community.
Qatar has tried to influence Iran not to escalate the conflict. If there has been a common denominator in Qatar’s stance, it has been one of de-escalation.
Why are hostage talks proving so difficult?
At one level this is a technical exchange of political prisoners and as such a routine confidence-building measure in a conflict. The identity of those being swapped, the criteria, location and method of transfer have to be agreed. In this instance, it has been agreed for more than two weeks that women and children will be the first released on both sides. The lists are compiled by the ICRC.
But this is more complex because it is linked to a humanitarian pause that requires discussion about the number of border crossings opened, the aid that will be permitted to enter, the conduct of Israeli checkpoints, coordination of aid and the level of military deconfliction. As Baskin points out, for Israel this is an unusual kind of negotiation since it is negotiating indirectly with the people it has said it intends to continue fighting. Since the outcome of this conflict could determine the future of the Middle East for generations to come, no one wants to give premature ground.
What about the other hostages?
Even if the deal happens, Hamas will retain as many as 150 hostages and it will want another pool of its prisoners held in Israeli jails released. About 7,000 Palestinians are imprisoned, 559 of these serving life sentences for murdering Israelis. In addition there are roughly 130 of the terrorists who were caught inside Israel on 7 October. A third of the prisoners are members of Hamas, and only about 400 of the 7,000 come from Gaza, with the vast majority coming from the West Bank. The majority are serving sentences for things like belonging to a terrorist organisation or throwing stones or molotov cocktails. Or they are administrative detainees – in other words, they were arrested by Israel without charge and imprisoned without trial.
Securing their release, and the release of the remaining Israels, will be much harder.
