With the capture of Luhansk by Russian forces, the war in Ukraine enters a new phase, the third since the invasion on February 24th, and perhaps the longest and most deadly. For Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky and his commanders, it is still a fight for survival. A new defensive line is being built across the west of Donbas, based on the hub of Kramartosk and Slovyansk.
The Ukrainians have suffered – with well over 20,000 soldiers killed and a quarter of the population at least forced to leave home. On the battle front the Russians are battering their way forward by the sheer quantity as much as quality in their artillery and forces.
The 2022 Ukraine war is now entering its third, most protracted and uncertain phase. There is little prospect of a ceasefire, let alone peace talks, reasonably soon. There have been feelers through Turkey and Indonesia, but these have got nowhere. Putin still wants war in Ukraine, and is threatening to spread conflict to the Nato countries in the neighbourhood – the Baltic States, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria, candidate members Finland and Sweden, and Norway – which has just sustained a major cyber-attack.
It is not evident exactly what Putin wants. His rhetoric is imperialist – alluding to the Russian wars of expansion of Catherine and Peter the Great. The war that started as a battle for Ukraine is looking more like a campaign of Putin’s imperial fantasies.
Western powers, led by the US and Britain, are already committed to Ukraine’s survival. As Phase Three of the war opens, that commitment will need to be deeper and more costly if Putin’s imperial fantasies are to be contained, and prevented from becoming a difficult and threatening reality. For Britain, Ukraine has to be part of its defence planning assumptions for the next four to five years, at least.
For Western allies, the first problem is the shortage of sophisticated weapons, rockets, artillery, electronic warfare equipment, drones and ammunition. Nato’s own stocks in Europe are now being depleted critically. Britain is under pressure to help with training new Ukrainian recruits, and providing expertise in logistics and intelligence management.
This is also in Britain’s interest. The Ukraine war has highlighted deficiencies in UK, and Nato allied, planning and thinking. New tactics and methods, as well as upgrades to weapons and systems are needed to match what Russia is beginning to deploy in the Ukraine theatre of operations. A new arms race in 21st century hybrid warfare is on.
There are lessons to be learned from the Ukrainian forces themselves in their initial success in holding out against a bigger Russian force for so long. Their adroitness in blending amateur local defence forces with professional units, and giving authority and command at the lowest level are now being written into the tactical text books.
Despite the superiority in artillery firepower, the Russian forces are facing difficulties – which are redounding on for Ukraine’s civilian populations, too. They are drawing on old stocks of ammunition and weaponry. The KH-22 anti–ship missiles that hit a shopping mall in Kremenchok, killing more than 20 and wounding scores last week were of 1960s vintage, launched from the old Tupolev 22M3 bomber, another Cold War veteran, from somewhere way back over Russia. Deficient and ageing guidance systems means wild inaccuracy. Another KH-22 hit and killed 21 people in a residential block in a resort south west of Odesa – hardly a military target.
One of the biggest strains is in manpower – Russia lacks quality forces ready to go to the Ukraine front. Putin seems to be doing anything to avoid a general mobilization. Lately mercenaries from Africa have been recruited and according to intelligence reports sailors from the Arctic Fleet have been formed into a Naval Brigade for Ukraine.
The immediate needs of Ukraine’s forces have been spelled out in a brilliant report from a very recent field visit by Dr Jack Watling of the Royal United Services Institute. A first priority, he writes, is that the UK and its allies must do more to help thwart Russia’s dominant artillery, and must provide new electronic warfare facilities for targeting and surveillance, including anti-missile defences. The allies must aim to build a new manoeuvre army, capable of sustained counter attack by next spring.
This must now be part of a strategic plan agreed by Britain and friends; something more coherent and practical needs to emerge from last week’s orgy of summitry. Collective security in the wider Euro-Atlantic is an imperative, and with it the managing the growing challenge to food and energy supply.
Facing the widening challenges from Ukraine requires tough and timely decision making – qualities largely absent in Whitehall thinking these past twelve years - a national strategy of driven by realism, courage and imagination.
