While Russia continues its nuclear sabre rattling, with renewed threats to use its arsenal if attacked, fighting on the frontlines in Ukraine and in Russia’s Kursk region remains intense. But the diplomatic centre of gravity of the war recently shifted to New York and Washington.
Discussions at the UN and meetings scheduled between the Ukrainian president, Volodymyr Zelensky, the US president Joe Biden and vice-president Kamala Harris are by no means unimportant for the outcomes of the conflict. But it is unlikely that they will constitute the pivotal moment in accelerating the pace towards a Ukrainian victory that Zelensky might envisage.
At meetings at the UN general assembly and security council, Zelensky appealed to world leaders to support his country and force Russia to make peace with Ukraine. His vision to achieve this is via a second global peace summit. This time he wants Russia to participate after the first effort in Switzerland in June achieved very little.
Read more: Ukraine summit fails to provide a path to peace for Kyiv and its allies
But with Zelensky continuing to push his ten-point peace plan and Putin insisting on Ukraine recognising Russia’s annexation of Crimea and four regions on the mainland, the two sides are as far apart as ever. So prospects of any meaningful negotiations virtually non-existent.
This has not deterred Zelensky from promoting to Ukraine’s allies what he is calling his “victory plan”.
The plan “envisages quick and concrete steps by our strategic partners … from now until the end of December”. These concrete steps are likely to include more western military support and the permission to use longer-range western weapons against targets deeper inside Russia.
This latter point is something on which the western alliance is divided – and the US sceptical on its strategic value. Putin’s insistence that Russia will respond by using its nuclear arsenal if it detects any western missiles crossing its border will have added to this uncertainty.
Even if more decisive western support were suddenly forthcoming, it is unlikely that it would offset other disadvantages that Ukraine and its allies are facing on the battlefield and beyond. Russia has consolidated its alliances with Iran, North Korea and China. All of these countries have supplied mission-critical ammunition and equipment that has enabled the Kremlin to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.
Russia, so far, has also maintained its advantage in numbers. It appears to be determined to push this even harder following Putin’s order to increase the number of combat troops of the Russian army by another 180,000 soldiers.
Meanwhile, a relentless Russian air campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure has also caused lasting damage, especially to the country’s energy supply network. This is likely to have a particularly adverse effect on Ukraine’s civilian population. It is likely to seriously dent morale during the coming winter.
Other plans (and priorities)
As discussions at the UN this week have underlined, there is also some diplomatic momentum building up behind a joint proposal by Brazil and China that was initially launched in May. Brazil’s president, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, pushed the plan during his speech at the UN general assembly on September 24, as did China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi.
Like previous proposals from China and Brazil individually, as well as from Indonesia, a group of African states and Saudi Arabia, the joint Brazilian-Chinese plan calls for a ceasefire along the current frontlines. Negotiations would then follow.
Ukraine fears, rightly, that this would entrench the status quo and effectively amount to Kyiv giving up territory illegally annexed by Russia. It would not guarantee any fruitful negotiations but give Russia time and space to regroup and rebuild its armed forces for a likely future escalation. None of this is acceptable to Ukraine and its allies as Zelensky made clear in his speech at the UN.
China’s previous effort to promote this joint initiative with Brazil just before the peace summit in Switzerland last June, did not go very far. It may not go much further this time either.
But attention and resources are now much more focused on the Middle East and – to a lesser extent – the civil war in Sudan. So the very fact of this plan’s resurrection may be enough for Russia and its allies to prevent the rest of the world from uniting behind the western-backed Ukrainian proposal for a second global peace summit.
This is clearly a concern for Ukraine. Zelensky, with a clear eye on countries in the global south, not only rejected the proposal but also argued that forcing Ukraine to make territorial concessions to Russia would be akin to reimposing a version of the brutal colonial past of the Soviet era on his country.
Will Zelensky be Trumped in November?
While the stars are thus hardly aligning in Ukraine’s favour at the UN in New York, things did not go much better as far as US domestic politics is concerned ahead of presidential elections in November. Questioning whether Donald Trump really has a credible plan to end the war, Zelensky triggered the notoriously short-fused Republican contender into lashing out at him at campaign rallies.
Trump is both accusing Zelensky of refusing to make a deal and expressing doubts about Ukraine’s ability to win the war. Meanwhile, a recent opinion piece penned by Robert F. Kennedy Jnr and Donald Trump Jnr for The Hill, an influential political newspaper, urges that Ukraine be pushed to make a deal with Russia to prevent nuclear escalation.
And Trump’s running-mate J.D. Vance has made clear his opposition to the US continuing to supply aid to Ukraine if elected in November. So it’s pretty clear that there is a very real prospect that Washington may soon cease to be Kyiv’s most important global ally.
All of this explains the urgency behind Zelensky’s push for more and more decisive western support in the coming months, and his pleas to the wider international community to back efforts for a just peace for Ukraine. But it also indicates that Russia and its allies have, for now, done enough to further frustrate any progress towards a Ukrainian victory both on the battlefield and at the negotiation table.
Stefan Wolff is a past recipient of grant funding from the Natural Environment Research Council of the UK, the United States Institute of Peace, the Economic and Social Research Council of the UK, the British Academy, the NATO Science for Peace Programme, the EU Framework Programmes 6 and 7 and Horizon 2020, as well as the EU's Jean Monnet Programme. He is a Trustee and Honorary Treasurer of the Political Studies Association of the UK and a Senior Research Fellow at the Foreign Policy Centre in London.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
