The ambiguous and often tumultuous relations between Uganda and neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) have made headlines in recent months. In a July 2024 report, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC stated that Ugandan army and intelligence officials were providing active support to the M23 rebel group.
The group, which is active in eastern DRC, was first defeated in 2013. But it has resumed hostilities in the vast area since 2021.
The UN report also found that Uganda was tolerating the group’s activities on its territory, with supplies and recruits coming through the country. M23’s key demands are an end to violence and discrimination against Congolese Tutsi, and a safe return to the DRC for its members.
Uganda has denied the claims of the UN report, calling them “laughable, baseless and illogical”. It wants to safeguard its relations with Kinshasa.
I have studied conflict and rebel movements in the DRC and Uganda for close to two decades. In my view, Uganda’s main interests in the DRC are economic, but these are closely connected with political and security interests. Understanding them is key to the conflict in the region.
1. Economic incentives
Central to understanding Uganda’s interests in eastern DRC is the second Congolese war (1998-2003).
The war broke out in 1998, after Rwanda helped bring Laurent-Desiré Kabila to power in the DRC in 1997. Uganda was one of the countries drawn in to the conflict. Rwanda’s and Uganda’s interest in natural resources, such as gold and timber, as well as the illicit regional trade in these goods, played an important role.
In 2022, the International Court of Justice ordered Uganda to pay the DRC US$325 million for looting gold, diamonds and timber during the war.
That has influenced the way Uganda is perceived by Congolese and international observers. These commodities remain important for Uganda.
A recent investigation, for example, documented the ongoing smuggling of Congolese timber to Uganda and other parts of east Africa. But it is gold which is particularly important. Uganda exports far more gold than it produces: in 2021, for example, it produced 2.9 tonnes and exported 30.2 tonnes.
It is widely accepted that most gold exported as Ugandan is smuggled from the DRC.
Since 2016, gold has been Uganda’s most important export product. The latest available data for the financial year of 2023 shows gold brings in US$2.7 billion in revenue, or 37% of Uganda’s export earnings.
The DRC is also important in another way for Uganda: as an export market. In June 2024, Uganda exported US$60 million more than it imported, with the DRC as its largest market.
2. Political interests
All of this has important political meaning for Uganda at national and regional levels.
First, the economic importance of the Congolese market has strong political significance for the Yoweri Museveni regime. The president has been in power for close to 40 years, and his basis of legitimacy is waning – particularly for the “Museveni babies”, the large proportion of the population born under his rule. They want public services and jobs.
The regime fears the prospect of youth protests. A taster of this was given in 2011 during “walk to work” protests. The recent Kenyan protests are a reminder of what can happen when economic stability is lacking.
The Congolese market is seen as key. It explains why Uganda is co-financing the construction of 223 kilometres of roads in eastern Congo. The project was launched in June 2021, and has been defended by Museveni as holding major economic benefits for Uganda.
Second, access to the Congolese market underlies regional geopolitical tensions.
Rwanda has comparable economic interests in eastern DRC, particularly when it comes to gold. Similar to Uganda, Rwanda has little domestic gold production, but is a major exporter of the commodity: since 2016, gold has been its most important export product. Gold export earnings have risen to US$882 million in 2023 and it’s widely accepted that most is smuggled from the DRC.
Both Rwanda and Uganda have in recent years signed mining contracts in the DRC. These common interests are a source of regional geopolitical tensions. Studies have found that the re-emergence of M23 in November 2021 was a direct result of these tensions.
The expansion of Ugandan interests in eastern DRC – through the road works and the redeployment of Ugandan troops there in November 2021 – was seen as a direct threat to Rwandan interests in the area.
The more M23 expanded its zone of influence in eastern DRC throughout 2022 and 2023 – directly supported by Kigali – the more Kampala saw M23 as a threat to its interests. Or, to be more precise, an M23 which was solely under the influence of Rwanda.
Uganda has had fluctuating relations with Rwanda. The Museveni government was initially close with Rwandan president Paul Kagame and the Rwandan Patriotic Front. But they have had ups and downs.
Regional influence has been a major point of contention. In this context, Museveni cannot allow Kagame to have sole control over eastern DRC. And Kampala also wants to protect its economic interests in the area.
3. Security
Security is closely intertwined with economic interests.
A clear example of this is Operation Shujaa – Uganda’s military operation in eastern DRC.
The operation, in collaboration with the Congolese army, was launched a month after a series of suicide attacks in October 2021 in Kampala by the Allied Democratic Forces rebel group. The group is active in the North Kivu and Ituri provinces of eastern DRC.
The Ugandan army wants to weaken the rebel group. At the same time, this military operation also serves economic functions: the road works in eastern DRC are explicitly part of the military operation.
The operation also intends to protect its oil infrastructure. Uganda has important oil deposits in its western region, which borders the DRC. This promised oil revenue is important for the Museveni regime.
The balancing act
In sum, Uganda has a multitude of related interests in eastern DRC. During periods of upheaval, such as the current M23 crisis, Uganda tries to protect these interests. This is a difficult balancing act.
M23’s presence in the region forces Kampala into action to protect its interests. Leaving eastern DRC or M23 only under the influence of Rwanda is seen as a threat to these interests. But Kampala doesn’t want to upset Kinshasa – it wants to keep its access to the Congolese market.
The recent findings of the UN Group of Experts report therefore suggest some kind of compromise. The report indicates largely passive support for M23, suggesting that Uganda is achieving some leverage over M23 while retaining relations with the DRC.
The crisis in eastern DRC cannot be understood in isolation. Neigbouring countries are involved in a variety of ways. Understanding, or solving, the conflict needs to involve these countries.
Kristof Titeca does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
