The White House meeting between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy will be remembered as far more than just a diplomatic disaster. It marked the end of international politics as we know it, and was a harbinger for the sunset of Pax Americana. Zelenskyy, reeling from the meeting, arrived in London on Saturday to attend a defence summit with other European leaders. Thanks to Trump’s performance, those leaders now have clarity on where the US government stands on the war in Ukraine – and, more broadly, on how US foreign policy may look in future.
It is hard to overstate what a departure this is. Since the end of the second world war, the US has been the primary architect and guarantor of an intricate network of global institutions anchored by Nato, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund. Together, these partners crafted a security umbrella whose benefits far outweighed its expense. It produced political stability and provided US and European companies with unrivalled access to markets and resources. The US was all too happy to share the gains of this order with its allies, and, to a lesser extent, with its rivals and adversaries.
True, the US reaped the greatest benefits: it set the terms of trade and projected its influence on to the globe. But the order was inclusive, since its institutions were designed to deliver benefits that everyone could enjoy, even if access was unequal. It had plenty of critics, drawing envy and ire from adversaries such as Russia and China, whose leaders regularly grumbled about unfairness and demanded their seats at the table. Over time, the US and its allies grew accustomed to the status quo, comfortable and complacent to the point of letting their military stockpiles deplete and degrade. By contrast, Russia and China cultivated networks of propagandists, corrupt officials and saboteurs, who shared a common goal: to identify the west’s weak points, amplify political instability and undermine western unity.
They could hardly have hoped for a more vulnerable and divided west. From the United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union, to rising nationalist movements across Europe and, most consequentially, Trump’s ascendance to the presidency, the last decade has been marked by events that have weakened transatlantic ties and eroded security arrangements. Trump’s criticisms of Nato and other longstanding alliances have helped to convince American voters that US allies are more of a burden than a benefit.
In this context, the meeting with Zelenskyy, when Trump told the Ukrainian leader “make a deal or we’re out”, was not entirely surprising. The president has consistently framed foreign policy in transactional terms, prioritising one-time payouts over the long-term dividends that arise from international stability and cooperation. His approach reflects a total indifference to defending democratic principles or countering authoritarian influence, whether in Russia or elsewhere. His foreign policy is defined by unpredictability, quick gains and self-interest.
Trump is also uninterested in confronting aggressors. In fact, he’s not averse to trading other’s security for his own gain. As Zelenskyy pointed out, the US is shielded from Russian aggression by an ocean, a luxury that Europe does not enjoy. Trump appears content to let Europe manage its own security, ignoring the reality that European stability is intrinsically linked to US economic and strategic interests. In his willingness to work with Vladimir Putin, he is ignoring the fact that the existing international system has overwhelmingly benefited the US. Ironically, the world order that Putin advocates for – one shaped by imperial spheres of influence, rather than collective security – would come at significant costs to the US.
In his exchange with Zelenskyy, Trump invoked a metaphor of a card game. Yet his own cards are spread across the table. He will probably use the fallout from the meeting to convince domestic Republican holdouts to halt sending decommission-ready military equipment to Ukraine and lift sanctions against Russia. He and Putin will probably extol the dubious economic opportunities that America could seize in Russia, trading secure and lucrative European markets for the higher risk, smaller Russian market, which his Maga-aligned elites may embrace.
Europe can either stand back, accept this new reality, and hope that Russia’s imperial ambitions stop at Ukraine. Or it can adapt to a world without US support, where it has to take a more assertive role in its own defence and strategic decision-making. Historically, cohesion across the continent has been difficult to achieve. The stakes are now higher than ever.
For Ukraine, the path forward remains difficult. This meeting did not cost it US support – that was set in motion by Trump’s re-election. Zelenskyy was right not to be bullied into a ceasefire on Russia-dictated terms. Without security guarantees, such an agreement would be disastrous for Ukraine. Trump would claim an easy diplomatic victory, using it as a justification to cut military aid and lift sanctions on Russia. But as Zelenskyy noted, Putin has a history of breaking ceasefires. With sanctions eased, Russia would simply rearm and prepare for another offensive against a weakened Ukraine. By resisting Trump’s pressure, Zelenskyy may still face the same outcome, but at least Ukraine remains unshackled from a one-sided truce.
Even without US support, Ukraine is in a stronger position militarily and diplomatically than it was in early 2022. As dire as things look at the moment, international politics is rarely static, and Trump himself is known for reversals. It remains possible that he could again shift course, signing the minerals deal with Ukraine and mending relations with European allies. There is always a small chance that the meeting was just an embarrassing and emotional mishap. But with its sovereignty at stake, chance is not something Ukraine can count on.
Olga Chyzh researches political violence and repressive regimes. She is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Toronto
