Prominent Conservatives openly view Greece’s self-described “strict but fair” migration policies as a model to emulate. The former home secretary Priti Patel told MPs in March that “we would not be in this current situation” had she been allowed to replicate “Greek-style reception centres”.
British interest in the Greek model dates back to May 2021, when the former immigration minister Chris Philp made an “urgent” – as internal documents seen by the Guardian called it – trip to Greece. This was followed by an official visit by Patel in August 2021, who toured a newly constructed Greek camp, went out on patrol with the Greek coastguard and spoke of working “closely with Greek partners” on migration.
The illegal migration bill making its way through parliament has a stated purpose to deter asylum seekers entering the UK “illegally” and “via safe countries” in part by removing the right to asylum – for those arriving on small boats, for example. Echoes of Greek policy are apparent within the bill and the debate surrounding it – and while their legality and effectiveness are questionable, their political rationale is clear. The Conservatives and the Greek centre-right government, which faces elections in May, are banking on tough migration policies being a vote-winner.
As two reporters who have covered migration in Greece for years, we have witnessed the legal, moral and political ramifications of laws and policies already applied in Greece and now being debated in the UK.
These include using disused military bases to house asylum seekers. The immigration minister Robert Jenrick recently called this practice a “success” in Greece. This may come as news to Greek authorities, which acknowledged the inhumane conditions at sites such as the infamous Moria camp on Lesbos, a former barracks that burned to the ground in September 2020.
In both countries there is a veneer of humanism justifying tough policies. The Home Office and the Greek government state that their policies are aimed at protecting the lives endangered by crossings in flimsy boats.
But while such journeys are undeniably dangerous, and often prove lethal, “stopping the boats” does not necessarily mean lives are saved. In Greece, 326 asylum seekers were recorded as dead or missing by the UN’s refugee agency, UNHCR, in 2022, a year of fewer than 20,000 arrivals. Death and disappearance was 20 times more likely in 2022 compared with the peak of refugee arrivals in 2015.
“Pushbacks”, another deterrence practice at Greek borders that is well documented but consistently denied by the authorities in Athens, was seriously examined and still has supporters in the House of Commons. We have both investigated and reported on solidly evidenced cases of law-enforcement officers summarily and illegally sending asylum seekers back to Turkey, documenting how the Greek coastguard routinely leaves people at sea in engineless rafts.
Tackling the lucrative smuggling business is put at the top of the Home Office’s agenda in the new bill, but the Greek experience is again telling. Evidence suggests heightened deterrence typically makes people more desperate – and boosts smugglers’ profit margins.
There has been a growing trend of boats attempting to bypass Greece taking the far more dangerous sea route to Italy and two consecutive shipwrecks recently claimed dozens of lives. According to court documents we have seen, smugglers charge each person as much as €9,000 (£7,900) for these riskier routes in unseaworthy vessels often carrying as many as 100 people.
Figures from Greece further suggest tough migration policies do not actually discourage people – another stated goal of the UK bill. According to the Greek prime minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, 250,000 crossings were “prevented” at the land border with Turkey in previous years, even though aspiring asylum seekers know they are likely to be denied their legal rights, suffer violence and ultimately end up back in Turkey.
Meanwhile, the “legal, safe routes” touted by London and Athens, are often restricted or nonexistent. There is no opportunity, for example, for a Syrian in danger in Turkey – designated a “safe third country” by Athens – to request protection at a Greek consulate, since they must be physically present in Greece to apply for asylum.
The UK makes no provisions for claiming asylum from abroad either. While some politicians from the UK and Greece insist asylum seekers request protection in the “first safe country” they reach, legal experts have pointed out there is no obligation – and often no opportunity – for them to do so. In Greece’s case, Turkey has been demonstrably shown to be unsafe, not least because of regular forced returns of refugees to Syria.
Orderly returns, also central to the UK bill, are notoriously difficult to enforce. With France, there is no such agreement, which could mean thousands remain stuck in the UK in a legal limbo. In the case of Greece, although Turkey is theoretically obliged to take back migrants reaching the Greek islands under an EU-Turkey deal from 2016, Ankara has not accepted a single one since March 2020.
Financial figures do not suggest the process is cost-effective either – some estimates for the UK suggest the bill would cost billions of pounds. In Greece, the numbers seeking asylum have fallen, but deterrence costs remain high – hundreds of millions of euros of Greek and EU taxpayers’ money is spent on items such as new vessels for the coastguard, hiring more border guards, new camps or extending a steel wall at the land border with Turkey, a project the EU refuses to sponsor, calling it a “pointless … short-term measure”.
“Stopping the boats” is the de facto policy in Greece, but the Greek example touted by politicians in London reveals the legal, practical, financial and moral pitfalls of a policy that makes deterrence its overarching goal.
