Photograph: Anton Shynkarenko/Reuters
The western strategy towards supporting Ukraine is dominated by concerns about potential nuclear escalation and the possibility that Russia’s invasion could trigger a third world war. It is clear that no democratic state, including Ukraine, wants to see such an outcome. However, over-cautious preventive measures that allow Russia to prevail in its aggression could themselves become escalatory. Excessive apprehension may inadvertently provoke the very outcome the west seeks to avoid.
A current topic of global discussion is whether President Joe Biden will approve Ukrainian strikes on military targets within Russian territory using US-supplied weapons. The UK government is waiting for Washington’s decision before taking further action. Yet the length of this debate points to a deeper issue: the absence of a unified strategy between Ukraine and its allies for achieving victory and ending the war. The western coalition, led by the US, continues to prioritise avoiding escalation, even if this slows down Ukraine’s defence efforts.
There is no doubt that western assistance has been crucial in helping Ukraine survive and the support is deeply appreciated. However, this aid is not tied to a cohesive strategy or coordinated campaign plan, which weakens its effectiveness. Western support has become a tool for sustaining Ukraine’s resistance for as long as possible, rather than a means to secure a victory.
Prolonging this war results in higher Ukrainian casualties, more lost territory and the further exhaustion of its troops, who are already severely worn down. Beyond the moral hardship of these losses, the harsh reality is that the numbers do not favour Ukraine. Additionally, even small, incremental Russian gains allow Moscow to project a sense of success, which spreads doubt among Ukraine’s allies.
While the prospect of nuclear war is undoubtedly far worse, the key question is whether the west’s concerns about escalation are reasonable. These concerns are not new or exclusive to the question of using western-supplied weapons on targets within Russian territory. And so we can look at recent decisions to inform us. The fear of escalation led to significant delays in providing Ukraine with critical weapons systems, for example. From man-portable air defence systems in early 2022, to howitzers, multiple rocket launchers, ground-based air defence systems, tanks, fighter jets, and tactical ballistic missiles – each of these decisions was postponed for months, some even for years. Yet when these weapons were finally supplied, none of them triggered the feared escalation. Delaying such decisions was therefore unnecessary. Although nuclear escalation might have seemed a real threat at the time, enough evidence now exists to show that many of these concerns were overcautious.
Ukraine has already taken bold actions that many thought would provoke a severe Russian response: it attacked Crimea, destroyed a large part of Russia’s navy, and recently conducted operations in Russia’s Kursk region. Yet no nuclear retaliation followed. Instead, Putin downplayed these events in front of the domestic audience, demonstrating that his nuclear threats were bluster rather than a genuine response.
This suggests that it is time to seriously reconsider the theory of nuclear escalation and deterrence. Today, a wide range of experts and policymakers argue that the chances of Russia using nuclear weapons are practically zero. One of the main reasons for this is the unified global message sent to Putin that nuclear escalation is simply not an option. Putin’s regime cannot exist in complete isolation, and he has been forced to comply with this reality. It seems that, collectively, the world has been able to silence Putin’s nuclear sabre-rattling – not because of the west’s delay in sending weapons, but in spite of it.
Furthermore, the overcautious approach prolongs the war by delaying the prospects of negotiations or even a suspension of hostilities. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the option to negotiate is not always available when the war goes poorly. The Kremlin is not interested in real negotiations because it sees better options, such as seizing more of Ukraine, exhausting the country and outmanoeuvring the west. To bring Russia to the negotiating table, Putin must be convinced that Russia is losing. This requires a clear, unified resolve from the west to provide Ukraine with the necessary resources and demonstrate faith in a Ukrainian victory. Today, however, western hesitation only fuels Russia’s hope for victory and emboldens further military action.
The precedent set by this war is crucial – not just for Ukraine’s sake, but for the future of the world. Should Russia emerge victorious, the risks of future wars expanding into even greater conflicts will rise sharply. Failing to contain Russia now will multiply threats posed not only by Moscow but by other potential aggressors. If Russia successfully weaponises the fear of nuclear escalation, we could see a new era of global nuclear proliferation. In this sense, the west’s overcautiousness and its reduction of Ukraine’s chances for success carry significant escalatory risks of their own.
It is true that Putin’s grand objective has failed – Ukraine survives, with the vast majority of its territory still under its control. But this achievement should not lead to complacency. Putin will not stop unless he is forced to. He is willing to sacrifice hundreds of thousands more Russian soldiers, adding to the already staggering numbers of those killed or wounded, which now exceed 600,000. He is prepared to destroy villages and towns in Ukraine, turning them into rubble if it means capturing more territory. To bring an end to this war even through negotiations or an armistice, Putin must first experience full operational defeats. He must see that his efforts are futile and his prospects grim. Only a clear, resolved strategy from the western coalition – one that shows an unwavering commitment to victory without restraint – can secure this cause and save the world from a much larger disaster.
Andriy Zagorodnyuk is a former Ukrainian defence minister and chair of thinktank the Centre for Defense Strategies in Kyiv
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