The Contender
Third time's a charm for AMLO who has worked in the government and its bureaucracies ever since he finished his first university degree (in public administration and political science). Both in his home state of Tabasco and then in Mexico City, AMLO's career path has been one of steady ascent. He joined the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) early, raised hell, and eventually split off its left wing to form the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD). In 2000 he was elected Head of Government of the Federal District; in essence, the Mayor of Mexico City. His tenure was marked by increased welfare payments to the sprawling city's destitute; the poor, the elderly, and single mothers.
A campaign to strip him of immunity from prosecution while in office came close to toppling him; but before AMLO could be jailed, the plot was revealed to be purely political and the would-be hatchet-men (including the Attorney General) were exiled from power. Moments like these have reinforced AMLO's image as someone who will cleanse Mexican politics of the corrupted and the schemers.
In 2006 AMLO made his first tilt at the presidential palace, Los Pinos. His vote fell agonisingly - 0.56% - short of Felipe Calderón's. The vanquished wished it were not so and challenged the result at the election tribunal and on the streets. AMLO's supporters flooded Mexico City, blockading arterial roads and shutting down the centre as embittered allies in parliament proclaimed him the "legitimate president". But he was NOT the legitimate president, and the episode has coloured opinions of him ever since. In the following election he moved from the centre-left to the centre right, although this did him no favours. 2012 would be another disappointment for AMLO; in an election that focused heavily on the widening drug war he lost the popular vote to Nieto by 7%. This defeat became the catalyst for him to start his own party, MORENO.
The Challenges
AMLO's victory now closes the door on six-years of largely-forgettable steerage by Peña Nieto. Not only did
Nieto's technocrats fail to institute their promised reforms; the murder rate climbed, governmental corruption metastasised and economic growth stagnated.
Murder rate: Over the last 10 years more than 200,000 Mexicans have been murdered and a further 35,000 have disappeared. The true cost of America's voracious appetite for cocaine, amphetamines and heroine is measured in lost lives, not only in the US but also in Mexico. The cartel drug wars have claimed more souls than even some conventional wars. In 2017 the number of
known murders was 23,450; 2018's toll looks set to pass 30,000. If it does this will be the most murderous year in Mexican history. It is yet to be seen whether AMLO's policy of "a
brazos, no balazos" ("hugs, not bullets") can put a dent in this figure.
Corruption: Nieto's Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) exemplified all that is
worst about politics. By that we mean they looked for bribes in every handshake, made short work of weak electoral guidelines and enriched themselves at the public's expense. Little wonder then that AMLO's promise to eradicate (not just minimise) corruption amongst the political elite had such strong resonance.
Economic inequality: The image of Mexico preferred by Nieto's party was that of a rising power: an internationally-connected country with a rising middle class and a renewed manufacturing base. In reality this middle-class is
largely non-existent; more than 60% of the country is employed in the informal economy. The real value of Mexicans' take-home pay has plateaued for decades, only the upper echelon have enjoyed the country's significant increase in wealth.
Business reform: Challenging Carlos Slim's vice-like grip on the telecommunications sector has long been a pipe-dream for Mexican leftists; AMLO's election may be a chance to finally break up the monopoly. He has similarly promised to foster
increased competition in the ossified energy industry. These are powerful promises, but powerful enemies too.
Neighbours: The North American Free Trade Agreement is in the
midst of renegotiation yet the talks have stalled. Keeping Washington (and its volatile populist leader) on side at a time of overblown migration fears will be a serious challenge for AMLO. For his part he's made it clear he will pursue warmer relations with Trump.
Chávezista or Trumpian?
Depending on which political columnists you read AMLO is either Mexico's very own Donald Trump or an acolyte of Hugo Chávez. Both comparisons miss the mark; he actually has a coherent philosophy undergirding his politics and at least at this stage conveys no sense of becoming an oil-derrick-snatching-socialist. MORENO may be a party of left-wing populists but the new cabinet are centrists and pragmatists through and through. AMLO's praxis is multi-faceted and at times difficult to pin down. As the de facto mayor of Mexico City he extended the social welfare net while simultaneously encouraging huge construction projects and the gentrification of many suburbs. He even brought in the reviled ex-Mayor of New York, Rudy Giuliani, to build robust criminal justice reforms.
As a candidate for high office he's moved all over the place. At the last election his economic policies read were typically right-wing: no new taxes, reduced governmental spending, job creation and enhanced competition. Yet his sharp critique of Calderón's security policy included an end to America's cross-border cartel raids and militarisation of law and order (distinctly leftist notions).
Throughout his long career one issue has remained central to his platforms: the protection of
Mexico's indigenous cultures. From his early days as an advocate for the native people of Tabasco, AMLO has fought (literally) to safeguard the country's heritage. In 1996 protestors railed against the state energy company's encroachment onto indigenous land. Violent clashes broke out between demonstrators and the police; afterwards AMLO calmly gave an interview on national television, his shirt soaked in blood.
