The Gregg Berhalter era began in the desert with a 3-0 friendly win over Panama in January 2019 in front of 9,040 people in Glendale, Arizona.
The journey to Qatar has spanned 56 matches: a sometimes thrilling, occasionally dreary trip from the cacti and air-conditioned sprawl of the oblivious Phoenix suburbs to the dense skyscrapers and ignoble stadiums of the peninsula hosting the globe’s highest-profile sporting event.
Here, in another arid region known more for sand than soccer, come three or more games that will define Berhalter’s tenure as head coach of the US men’s national team – and, if things go horribly askew, probably end it. Given the immense scrutiny the Americans will face as co-hosts in 2026, Berhalter cannot afford to acquire a reputation as a tactician who shrinks under the spotlight.
But adjudicating what would constitute success or failure in Qatar is tricky since this is a new and green group of players, only one of them – DeAndre Yedlin – with prior World Cup finals experience. There is relief that the US made the tournament at all following the 2018 qualifying debacle and a tremulous 2022 campaign that saw Berhalter’s side finish behind Canada and Mexico, securing the third and final automatic place on goal difference on the last day.
The man who took the US to the 2014 tournament, Jürgen Klinsmann, told Sports Illustrated in 2018, “you build a new skeleton between World Cups”. There’s not much flesh on the bones. But we’re about to learn plenty about the heart, soul and mind of an American generation often touted as the most talented the nation has ever seen.
Asked on ESPN about expectations, Berhalter spoke about style rather than results: “I think it’s important that we go over to Qatar and we represent our identity as a team. It’s not time to change who we are. We’re an aggressive team, a high-pressing team, we want to use the ball and we’re going to find out if we can be successful doing it.”
Executing the gameplan flawlessly but finishing outside the top two in Group B, which also includes Wales, Iran and England, would not reflect well on the plan. It would also be a below-par outcome. Reaching back to Italia ’90, the US have reached the knockout stages in four of their past seven finals, including their last two campaigns, in 2010 and 2014. But the only victory after the group phase came in 2002, when Bruce Arena’s side beat Mexico in the round of 16 (and then lost unluckily to Germany in the quarter-finals).
A conclusion in Qatar that’s in line with history and reasonable expectations, then, looks like a battling defeat in the round of 16 with Berhalter able to argue that his squad has banked valuable experience that will serve them well for 2026, when most of his core players should be at their peak. Anything more would be a bonus; anything less a disappointment. But luck will play a role.
The group and knockout stages are “literally two different tournaments,” the 49-year-old said. “Anything can happen on any given day. All you want to do in the knockout tournament is play your best possible game. And if you happen to go out and you play your best possible game, you go out with your head held high.”
Still, such an exit would make it harder to assert that the USMNT have made significant progress in the eight years since the 2014 side did their best and lost, reaching the round of 16 but going out to a superior Belgium after extra-time despite the heroics of Tim Howard in goal. By the key metric for casual observers – how far did you get in the World Cup? – it would indicate stagnation.
The 2022 side is obviously weaker at striker and goalkeeper than 2014, when the US boasted Clint Dempsey and Howard; in other positions it is potentially more dynamic, especially on the flanks. Plenty of the current crop are at large or medium-sized European clubs, but the 2014 vintage had steady veterans such as DaMarcus Beasley, Michael Bradley, Geoff Cameron and Jermaine Jones, who also spent time in major European leagues.
“On paper they are the most talented US men’s national team we’ve ever had,” says the former striker Herculez Gomez, who played for the US in the 2010 World Cup finals and will be in Doha to host a show on ESPN+. Compared to previous generations, “This team is a lot younger, a lot faster, better in transition, individually better, technically better.”
However, he adds, they lack the veteran knowhow of the 2010 and 2014 sides, which had “guys that were a bit nasty, who played with a chip on their shoulder” and were not daunted by tough assignments away from home.
In 2014 the US sauntered to Brazil, winning the Hex qualification stage with seven victories and one defeat over 10 games for an 11-point cushion over fourth-placed Mexico, who progressed via the inter-confederation playoffs.
For the 2022 cycle the US won only once on the road and scored 21 goals in 14 games, most of them close-range tap-ins or simple headers. A typical goal came from the defence failing to clear a cross and an American pouncing on the loose ball. No goals were scored from outside the penalty area and there were only two golazos: a Christian Pulisic pirouette against Panama and a rocket against Costa Rica from Sergiño Dest.
Aside from age, perhaps the biggest difference from eight years ago is not the calibre of those in the squad but the quality of those who aren’t. The talent pool now is far deeper and there are many more Americans at foreign clubs – learning each day, as Gomez points out, from some of the planet’s finest coaches. In contrast, most of the 2010 roster spent their late teens playing at American universities.
Berhalter had enough options to almost completely reinvent the team. Only four of the players who lost the fateful 2017 qualifier to Trinidad & Tobago are in the squad for Qatar.
The coach trialled dozens of up-and-comers in their teens and early 20s, many playing in the top two divisions in leading European countries. He’s used 91 players – three more than England’s Gareth Southgate, who’s overseen 20 more fixtures. Some of the players Berhalter has used most frequently – Paul Arriola, Sebastian Lletget, Gyasi Zardes, Reggie Cannon, Zack Steffen – didn’t even make the final 26.
Other names that Berhalter has discarded or ignored imply the luxury of choice. The teenaged attacking midfielder Julian Green, shockingly named in the 2014 squad by Klinsmann, scored with his first touch against Belgium. Now 27, Green made 24 Bundesliga appearances last season for Greuther Fürth but no one seriously expected him to be invited to Qatar. He hasn’t made a single appearance under Berhalter.
Of the 26 in Qatar, nine are at MLS clubs and the other 17 ply their trade in Europe. But Berhalter (a former MLS player and coach) could easily have picked a comparably gifted roster with only three MLS-based players, Walker Zimmerman, Kellyn Acosta and Jesús Ferreira. Klinsmann, meanwhile, selected 10 MLS players for his 23-man squad despite his aversion to the league, which he saw as substandard. And the level in MLS has improved since 2014, when there were only 19 teams; this season there were 28.
Klinsmann, for all his grand long-term schemes to rebuild the pipeline from top to bottom, was fired when it looked doubtful that the senior team would reach Russia. Given the extreme importance of the World Cup to the profile of American soccer his departure wasn’t surprising.
The 2014 group game between the US and Portugal attracted about 25 million viewers on ESPN and Univision. The US’s final warm-up game before Qatar, a goalless draw with Saudi Arabia, drew an audience of 226,000 on FS1.
The Black Friday clash with England is a big opportunity to attract attention, though the summer tournament in Brazil became a mainstream cultural moment that will be hard to repeat in 2022 given the early kick-off times for US residents and the alternative temptations of the festive season, with football, basketball and hockey in full swing.
Still, there are gains that can’t be as easily measured as viewing figures or the results of a month-long tournament. Some are Klinsmann’s legacy: intensive recruitment of dual nationals, the conviction that the US should adopt a more complex and attractive style, an emphasis on youth development, and encouraging players to move to Europe.
In 2014 there were growing pains. Klinsmann deployed criticism as motivation but it was sometimes hard to tell whether he was being demanding or demeaning. One New York Times headline read: How Jurgen Klinsmann Plans to Make US Soccer Better (and Less American). The vision was bright but blurry.
When Berhalter talks about his team’s identity he’s discussing tactics, not inviting agonised introspection about what it means to be an American soccer player.
Eight years on from the US’s last World Cup finals there is a stronger domestic league and a deeper well of global talent. Tactical debates, not an identity crisis. A coach not a psychodramatist. And the promise of greater things in three-and-a-half years’ time. It would be optimistic to expect the US to take a giant step forward in Qatar but there is little doubt the path leads upwards.
