Traditionally, Britain was regarded as the class society. And class was pre-eminent among the factors used to explain political party allegiance. In broad terms, working-class voters chose Labour, the party set up to represent them. Middle-class voters chose the Conservatives, the party that represented homeowners and business owners.
Since the 1960s, there has been a decline in class-based voting. Our social background is no longer such a good predictor of our party.
That may be because there are more parties to choose from, or because the big two have changed their offering to appeal to a wider audience, but it’s also about class-based abstention. In the 1960s, most working-class people voted in elections, and when they did so they tended to vote for Labour. Now, many more working-class people do not vote at all. And when they do, they are less drawn to any party in particular.
Class differences with respect to turnout have thus become greater than class differences with respect to vote choice. Or put another way, class is now more important as a participatory divide than it is as a partisan divide.
According to the long-running British Election Study (BES), the difference in reported turnout between people with working-class occupations and middle-class occupations was less than 5 percentage points in 1964. In 2024, it was 16 percentage points.
Put into context, the difference in reported turnout between the under-30s and the over-60s in 2024 was 20 percentage points. This age gap is the subject of great concern and much discussion. We worry a lot about why young people are not voting. Numerous initiatives have been launched to try and get young people more involved in politics. Yet the class gap, of a very similar magnitude, has received almost no attention at all.
BES data over the years shows us that the working class has generally been somewhat less likely to vote than the middle class. But from 1964 to 2001, the difference in turnout rates was fairly modest. Turnout bumped along, up and down, but the relative difference did not change much, and turnout among both groups tended to increase and decrease in tandem.
However, since 2001, the turnout patterns between the two classes have sharply diverged. In the election of 2001, overall turnout was the lowest since 2018 at just 59.4%. The middle-class vote bounced back after that nadir but the working-class vote did not, remaining instead at historically low levels. Before 2001, the average class gap in turnout was 6 percentage points. So today’s 16 percentage-point gap is nearly three times greater than the pre-2001 level.
The widening class gap in turnout, 1964-2024:
The chart below shows how the size of this class gap on turnout compares with the size of the class gap on support for Labour, the party which was originally founded to represent working-class interests.
In 1964, among people with working-class occupations, 11% did not vote, 55% voted for Labour, and the remaining 34% voted for the Conservatives or another party. Among people with middle-class occupations, 7% did not vote, just 18% voted for Labour, and the remaining 75% voted for the Conservatives or another party. The class gap on turnout was therefore just 5 percentage points, compared with the class gap on Labour support of 37 percentage points.
The class gap in turnout has overtaken the class gap in support for Labour, 1964-2024:
Over time, Labour has become a less distinctively working-class party. This has particularly been the case since the New Labour period, when Tony Blair famously rebranded the party to project a more middle-class image.
The result has been that the size of the class gap on Labour support has declined, while the size of the class gap on turnout has increased – to the point in the early 2000s where class differences on turnout overtook class differences on support for Labour.
These findings have important implications. There is a widespread belief that class has become less important in British politics, and so does not merit as much attention as it once did. This belief is false.
While it is certainly true that class divisions are not as evident as they once were in terms of structuring vote choice, this is because class has been pushed outside the political system. Whereas previously the middle class and working class were divided on who to vote for, now they are divided on whether to bother voting at all.
The authors do not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and have disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
