Thai politics will finally reach its climax with a parliamentary vote for the next prime minister on July 13 and the emergence of a coalition government soon thereafter. How things pan out will depend on the extent of "what you see is what you get" or otherwise.
The interim period since the poll on May 14 has been marked by daily squabbling and petty manoeuvres for the upper hand among junta-appointed senators, outgoing government leaders, and the presumptive coalition government-in-waiting, comprising eight parties and 312 MPs out of the 500 in the lower House, led by the Move Forward Party (MFP) with 151 and Pheu Thai with 141.
The fact the two most successful parties in the general election -- led by the MFP -- could not agree on one of their own as speaker of the lower House, who would automatically become the president of parliament, portends much tension ahead.
While the compromise candidate proved to be the widely respected Wan Muhamad Noor Matha of the Prachachat Party, a junior partner in the tentative coalition government-elect, this was the most fiercely contested lower House speakership in Thai political history. Traditionally, the speakership is not a coveted position because it does not come with the resources and opportunities offered by cabinet portfolios.
But this time, there are high stakes on two fronts. The post will have the authority and latitude to nominate the prime minister to be voted for and, more importantly, to coordinate, prioritise and set the legislative agenda in the lower House, the primary lawmaking chamber of the bicameral parliament. The main reason the speakership has suddenly become so sought after is due to the MFP's transformative agenda to reform old institutions, namely the military, monarchy, bureaucracy, and business oligopolies.
The most salient of these reform proposals is the amendment of the much politicised lese majeste law, or Section 112 of the Criminal Code, barring insults against the king, queen, crown prince, and regent, with stiff penalties of a jail term of up to 15 years per conviction. According to the largest-winning and reform-driven party, this law has been manipulated and abused with political motivations, thereby undermining the monarchy itself.
Suspense and anticipation now characterise the political scene. Pita Limjaroenrat, the MFP's leader and sole candidate for prime minister, is due for a vote next week in the bicameral parliament. Because the 2017 constitution was rigged after the May 2014 coup to empower 250 military-appointed senators to be able to choose the prime minister on an equal footing with the MPs elected by the people, it is commonly known that the coalition led by the MFP and Pheu Thai need 64 senatorial turncoats to come up with a parliamentary majority of 376.
MFP leaders have been saying they have this level of Senate support to enable Mr Pita to win the premiership. That the MFP won the election and its alliance with Pheu Thai and smaller parties in forming a majority in the lower House should already qualify Mr Pita as prime minister. But the unelected Senate stands in the way of such a democratic nod.
If things pan out as the MFP optimistically hopes, we will get what we see, namely a democratically elected coalition government according to the popular will. Even if Mr Pita does not secure enough Senate votes on the first ballot, the MFP appears to believe he will get through on a second or third vote because public pressure will mount on some of the senators to do the right thing and abide by a pro-democracy outcry.
But in view of the power plays that have unfolded so far, such as the legal charges being filed against Mr Pita, including his recent attendance at a national women's volleyball match on an alleged complimentary ticket, powerful forces are arrayed against the MFP because of its reform programmes.
After an earlier accusation against his tiny ownership of shares in a defunct media company suddenly faded because of discrepancies in the allegation, other charges have come up.
The most serious for Mr Pita is that he ran for office knowing he owned media shares in violation of the charter, with a potential jail term of up to 10 years and a ban from running for office for 20 years.
Out of the blue in the midst of the post-election government formation, the Constitutional Court wrote to ask the Office of the Attorney General to decide in 15 days whether it would prosecute Mr Pita and the MFP for trying to amend Section 112, which could result in the party being dissolved for trying to overthrow the country's governing system. This appears to prove the point that this law has been deployed for political purposes.
So even if Mr Pita gets through to the premiership, some charge or other could still bring him down, not to mention his party as well.
Contrary to the MFP's straightforward approach based on its democratic mandate, it appears there is a concerted campaign to deny Mr Pita and the party the speakership, the premiership, and even a coalition government partnership, relegating it to the opposition.
Such an outcome is less likely but still possible.
The senators, for instance, owe their allegiance to the coup regime and its backers. A handful may respect the democratic way, but most probably will not. If most do not vote for Mr Pita, or even Srettha Thavisin of Pheu Thai, unless the party splits from its larger partner, then the prime ministerial vote could be drawn out.
If Pheu Thai betrays the MFP, it is expected to pay a high price in the next poll. But here is where the next power manoeuvres will come into play.
What we are seeing from this election and its aftermath is that Thai politics is now all about the proposed reforms of the established institutions that hold real power in this country.
They and their myriad appendages, beneficiaries and vested interests are unwilling to concede or compromise without a fight, through and through and time and again.
