The military putsch in Niger on 26 July, which ousted the democratically elected president Mohamed Bazoum, is a pivotal event with local, regional and global consequences. Immediately, of course, it matters most in Niger itself and to its estimated 27 million inhabitants, whose average income per capita is among the lowest in Africa. Nevertheless, in an unstable multipolar world in which geopolitics and natural resources are umbilically linked, and in which climate damage and migration are intertwined too, Niger is inescapably also a pawn on larger boards.
Mr Bazoum, who was elected in 2021, had achievements to his name. The economy is growing by 6% this year. Girls’ education has been promoted. Fatalities from Islamist violence have fallen. His Niger was also a key western ally in the Sahel region, providing a base for campaigns against Islamist fighters and receiving around $2bn annually in development aid. Both France, the colonial power until 1960, and the US had more than 1,000 troops in Niger; Germany and Italy had smaller numbers. The US had a drone base near the Libyan border in the north.
Even so, the trigger for the putsch seems to have been an old-fashioned palace power battle between the president and senior military leaders. Mr Bazoum had recently dismissed the army chief of staff and had forced other military chiefs into retirement. The head of his presidential guard, Gen Abdourahmane Tchiani, was reportedly next. Little surprise, perhaps, that since 26 July, Gen Tchiani has emerged at the head of the junta that overthrew his former boss.
Nigerien popular response to the putsch is hard to gauge accurately. There have been anti-French and pro-Russian placards in demonstrations on the streets of the capital Niamey. Anti-French sentiment is undoubtedly a factor, and has dismayed policymakers in Paris. But the international response has also been clearcut. The UN security council, with Russian and Chinese support, denounced the putsch. Aid programmes have been suspended.
Nevertheless, the regional response may matter most. The Niger putsch was part of a dangerous and destabilising trend. In the past four years, new regimes have also been established at gunpoint in Mali, Burkina Faso and Guinea – more than once in some cases. Other governments in the region see their stability threatened too, as does the 15-strong Economic Community of West African States.
Ecowas faces a major test. The organisation has a long record of trying to uphold democratic norms in the region. Its role is helped by the fact that it is currently chaired by Nigeria, the regional superpower. Nigeria’s new president, Bola Tinubu, who was himself forced into exile by a military coup in his youth, has led the response to the putsch, saying a line must be drawn in the sand. Under Mr Tinubu, Ecowas has made itself the focus of attempts to oust the putschists. It has set this weekend as the deadline for a return to civilian rule. “Ecowas is very determined to make an example of Niger,” a senior official told a Chatham House thinktank podcast this week.
This tough regional response is significant. It is also the best and most effective way for the putschists to be defeated and for democracy to be restored quickly. These are urgent and desirable aims. A battle of principles is taking place in the Sahel. The putsch must be overturned. Wisely, neither the western nor the regional powers want to see a western-led intervention. But that does not mean nothing can be done. Ecowas’s efforts to turn the screw on Gen Tchiani and his gang seem to be working; power cuts in Niamey show how effective they can be. Western backing for a strong Ecowas response is the wisest course on all counts.
