The reality is that the war in Gaza has already spread through the region. The question is how far it extends and how intense it grows. Those involved are calculating and calibrating; they have in mind small blazes, rather than a regional conflagration. But their confidence that they can take containable risks may prove misplaced. Crises are feeding into each other, and the likelihood of missteps is rising.
Thursday night’s US and UK strikes on Houthi positions in Yemen were taken after diplomacy and threats failed to halt sustained attacks on commercial vessels in the Red Sea and the naval taskforce protecting them. They were not token measures – the US says it launched 60 strikes at 16 locations, the UK that it hit two – but were intended to re-establish deterrence and degrade military capability rather than destroy the Houthi threat. The US blames Iran – which supplies and enables but does not control the Houthis – for assisting the Red Sea attacks. But neither Washington nor Tehran wants direct conflict. For Iran, it’s better to allow the rest of the “axis of resistance” to advance its position at minimal cost.
Both Washington and London presented the military action solely in terms of protecting international shipping, with Rishi Sunak’s visit to Ukraine framing a broader narrative of moral strength in upholding security. But the Red Sea crisis cannot be separated from the war in Gaza. The Houthis claim – others disagree – that they are only attacking ships with links to Israel. They are positioning themselves as the foremost champions of Palestinians. There are plenty in Yemen and the region who detest their ruthless and authoritarian record, but will still view the US and UK as fighting for Israel – or at least as prepared to ignore (and even provide arms for) Israeli strikes killing thousands of children in Gaza, but quick to defend their own economic interests.
Direct confrontation with the US consolidates the Houthis’ power domestically and boosts recruitment, while raising their status regionally. No surprise that they have already vowed retaliation, perhaps targeting US military assets. The US and UK, in turn, will surely feel required to hit back. When parliament debates this action, critical questions include how far the UK is prepared to go, and what alternative means it can pursue.
The Houthis appear only strengthened by the long years of war which saw Saudi Arabia drop billions of pounds worth of bombs on Yemen. They have been accused of being at best indifferent to civilian costs. It is hard to believe that these much more limited strikes will have significantly reduced their capacity or will to fight. On the verge of legitimising their de facto political authority they will not want to risk the gains they have made at home. But their success against Riyadh may well have bred hubris.
Meanwhile, there is a growing danger that pro‑Iranian militias in Iraq and Syria may step up attacks on US forces. Hezbollah in Lebanon is deeply angered by Israel’s assassination of a Hamas leader in Beirut. Others are capitalising on the crisis: Islamic State has claimed responsibility for last week’s bombing in Iran. So far, the rising tensions on each front have been contained. But they will not calm while bombs are still falling on Gaza. A ceasefire and release of all hostages is needed for the whole region.
