At the weekend, Kosovo’s prime minister, Albin Kurti, spoke despairingly in relation to a decade of talks about normalising relations with Serbia, which continues to refuse to recognise his country’s independent status. In an interview with the Guardian, Mr Kurti claimed that the negotiations, mediated by the European Union, were in danger of reaching a dead end. Shortly after publication, there was ominous confirmation that a nadir has indeed been reached. In a serious escalation of tensions, five people, including a Kosovan police officer, were killed after an ambush by unidentified armed men near the Serbian border.
For the EU and its foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, the ramifications of diplomatic failure stretch well beyond the fate of the northern tip of Kosovo, with its majority Serb population. In the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the EU has redoubled its efforts to anchor the western Balkans within its orbit and combat Moscow’s influence. But Sunday’s shootings indicate that in this Balkan hotspot, its approach isn’t working.
An apparent breakthrough agreement last spring obliged Serbia to recognise Kosovo’s nationhood in exchange for semi-autonomous powers for the Serb-majority municipalities in the north. Serbia’s president, Aleksandar Vučić, has shamefully still not signed the deal and has publicly bragged about this. In April, his government opposed Kosovo’s bid for membership of the Council of Europe. Mr Kurti has not delivered political self-management in majority Kosovo Serb areas. He has antagonised locals through the deployment of special police units and presided over failed local elections there, in which a boycott led to a 4% turnout.
An elaborate diplomatic dance is thus in danger of tipping into serious violence. But for that, Mr Borell may also need to take some responsibility. Mr Kurti maintains that the collapse in trust on the Kosovan side has resulted from “lost neutrality” on the part of the EU’s special envoy, Miroslav Lajčák. This summer, a group of senior western politicians made much the same point about the west’s “Belgrade-centred policy for the Balkans”.
Brussels and Washington appear to have prioritised the need to keep Mr Vučić onside, given the country’s regional influence and significant ties to Russia. In doing so, they risk neglecting the need to protect Kosovo from the machinations of a bullying and much larger neighbour that believes it has no right to exist. Given the circumstances, and recent history in Ukraine, it is hardly surprising that Mr Kurti should harbour misgivings about handing greater power to separatist-leaning Kosovo Serbs in the north. Meanwhile in the background, Russia has done its best to foment and exploit the instability, while the Serbian president habitually manipulates the crisis to shore up nationalist support at home.
Some EU states point out that Mr Kurti has made mistakes too. He has unwisely fuelled resentments in the north, where greater autonomy will inevitably be part of any successful settlement. But this is a final-status issue that should go hand in hand with real moves from Belgrade. The EU also has to get its own house in order. Five EU members have so far not recognised Kosovo because of a false equivalence between the circumstances of its independence and their own minority issues. A more united Europe would be a more authoritative and effective mediator in a troubled and vital region.
