The death of Iran’s president, Ebrahim Raisi, in a helicopter crash last month was a shock. The 63‑year‑old hardliner was not only expected to run for a second term, but to be part of the looming transition: the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, is 85 and has health problems. Some had even thought Raisi might succeed him.
Yet the repercussions have been muted. The first round of the presidential election is scheduled for 28 June, but no one expects Raisi’s replacement to bring significant political change. The regime’s priorities are continuity and stability. It knows it may soon have to reckon with the hostility of a second Trump administration and it faces widespread discontent at home, following the suppression of the massive Woman, Life, Freedom protests. The evidence of recent years suggest that it is more worried about conservative consolidation at the top than legitimacy from below.
In the last race, the Guardian Council – a Khamenei-appointed elite body which vets candidates – banned all reformists. This time, one has made the cut. Masoud Pezeshkian is a doctor, MP and former health minister whose father was Azeri and whose mother was Kurdish. Cynics assume he has been picked precisely because he is unlikely to win, seeing the parliamentary speaker, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, as the likeliest victor of the six men running. Saeed Jalili, a former national security adviser known for his hardline religious views, is an alternative contender.
The last presidential election, in 2021, saw the lowest ever turnout, with only 48% of electors bothering to cast their vote. So the regime needs to look credible, and to re-engage at least parts of the public. Reformists had threatened an election boycott if none of their candidates were allowed to run. Some also think that the supreme leader may hope to curb the factionalism and infighting in conservative ranks. But the widespread assumption is that Mr Pezeshkian is permitted to take part because Iran’s powerbrokers are confident that he will not win. Ali Larijani, a moderate conservative who was blocked, might have posed more of a threat as a heavyweight figure. In the past, Hassan Rouhani rode to the presidency on the back of former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani’s support; Mr Pezeshkian does not have such a powerful patron. In the unlikely event of him winning, those at the top will still be confident he will not pose a problem.
Mr Qalibaf, who has repeatedly faced corruption allegations and who helped oversee violent crackdowns on students as a general and as a police chief, is seen as the consensus candidate for Iran’s two most powerful forces: the office of the supreme leader and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, with whom he served and retains close ties. Analysts suggest he might steer Iran to what they regard as perhaps its inevitable future: dominated increasingly by the military rather than the clerical establishment. He is also a former mayor of Tehran with a reputation as a technocrat, causing some to hope that he might effect some improvement in living conditions. A more competent conservative government than Raisi’s might also improve relations with the west to some degree.
But the chasm between the priorities of the Iranian regime and the aspirations of those it rules over, who want not only better economic prospects but social and political freedoms, has never been greater. This election is unlikely to see any real progress in bridging it.
