Thailand’s Constitutional Court has dissolved the country’s largest opposition party and official winner of the 2023 general election, Move Forward. The same court has now dismissed Thailand’s prime minister, Srettha Thavisin, in an ethics case for appointing a cabinet minister who was once jailed.
The dissolution of Move Forward was widely expected. Thailand’s conservative royalist-military establishment has dominated the country’s politics for more than six decades. And Move Forward’s progressive political agenda had been a thorn in the establishment’s side since 2018, when the party’s predecessor, Future Forward, entered politics.
Future Forward was dissolved by the constitutional court in February 2020, less than a year after it placed third in the 2019 general election. The disbanding of the party triggered a wave of unprecedented pro-democracy protests throughout 2020 and 2021.
These protests, which were led by the country’s youth, called for wide-ranging political reforms, including to the previously sacrosanct monarchy. They fed into the popularity of Move Forward, whose victory in the 2023 election shocked the royalist-military establishment.
Compared to Move Forward’s dissolution, the court’s ruling against Srettha was more surprising. This was reflected in the close nature of the ruling, in which only five of the nine judges were in favour of Srettha’s dismissal. The closeness of this call makes any interpretation of its meaning more difficult.
In more ways than one, Srettha’s premiership was a political compromise that went against the will of the Thai electorate. He was one of three prime ministerial candidates representing Pheu Thai, the party that placed second in the 2023 election.
Pheu Thai initially pledged to honour the results of the election and joined Move Forward in attempts to forge a pro-democracy coalition government. But, when the military-appointed Senate blocked Move Forward’s charismatic leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, from becoming prime minister, Pheu Thai’s de facto leader, Thaksin Shinawatra, struck a deal with the royalist-military establishment.
The aim of this deal was to prevent Move Forward from taking power. And Srettha was the most palatable choice to head a pro-establishment governing coalition for all involved. In exchange, the establishment allowed Thaksin to return to Thailand after spending 15 years in self-imposed exile after he was ousted as prime minister by a 2006 military coup.
His eight-year prison sentence for corruption and abuse of power was commuted to one year, and he was allowed to spend the first six months in a police hospital until he was released on parole. He avoided spending even a single night in prison.
Thaksin presented his return to Thailand as that of a retired, doting grandfather who would not seek to reestablish himself politically. But, as soon as he was released, he began touring the country, which raised questions about who the real prime minister was.
On the one hand, the constitutional court’s recent ruling could be seen as a possible warning to Thaksin about his political overreach. It may even signal the impending breakdown of the political compromise he forged with the conservative elite.
On the other, it might be an opportunity for Thaksin to reset politically and install his daughter, Paetongtarn Shinawatra, as Thailand’s next prime minister.
Paetongtarn was one of Pheu Thai’s prime ministerial candidates in 2023 and has since become the party’s official leader. Thailand’s governing alliance has already announced that it will nominate her for prime minister in a parliamentary vote scheduled for Friday August 16.
Paetongtarn’s election would officially reinstate the Shinawatra surname to the helm of power. But, as Thaksin himself knows, this can be a double-edged sword.
His premiership and that of his younger sister, Yingluck Shinawatra (2011–2014), ended in military coups. This might be the reason why another candidate, Chaikasem Nitisiri, was initially tipped as the preferred prime ministerial choice.
Either way, one thing is clear: electoral results still do not decide who gets to govern in Thailand. The constitutional court, alongside other unelected watchdog agencies such as the Election Commission of Thailand, continue to call the shots on behalf of the royalist-military elite.
An immovable obstacle to democracy
Since Thaksin completed his first term as Thai prime minister in 2005, not a single elected political leader aligned with him has managed to do the same.
Thaksin’s Thai Rak Thai party was dissolved a year after he was ousted from office. And the constitutional court has since removed two more Thaksin-aligned prime ministers from office (Samak Sundaravej in 2008 and Yingluck Shinawatra in 2014).
It also dissolved two major Thaksin-aligned parties, the People Power party and Pheu Thai’s sister Thai Raksa Chart party in 2008 and 2019 respectively.
The dissolution of Future Forward and Move Forward continued the trend of politically motivated party dissolutions. Each dissolution was also accompanied with a blanket politics ban for all party executives of either five or, more recently, ten years. The bans have resulted in more than 100 politicians being unable to run for office over the years.
When all else failed, there has always been the option of staging another military coup, as happened in May 2014, or blocking parties that have won an election from taking power. In 2019, for example, Thailand’s election commission made sure that Pheu Thai would not be able to forge a coalition government by tinkering with the proportional seat allocation formula.
The result of these interventions has been chronic political instability, interspersed with periods of political protest and violence.
So long as the royalist-military establishment is unwilling to give up power, and unable to mount a viable electoral challenge, Thai politics will probably continue its now familiar pattern of military coups, hollowed-out elections, controversial court rulings and popular protests.
Petra Alderman does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
