High-level peace talks took place in August 2024 to negotiate a much-needed ceasefire in Sudan. Unfortunately, nothing tangible came out of the talks held in Switzerland and co-hosted by the US and Saudi Arabia.
There have been previous efforts to bring Sudan’s main warring parties – the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces – to the negotiating table and stop the war. A major effort in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, negotiated short-lived ceasefires a month into the start of the April 2023 conflict, but registered few other successes.
In the meantime, the fighting continues. Eleven million people, out of a population of about 50 million, have been displaced. Half of the population is in acute hunger. Philipp Kastner, an international law and peace scholar who has analysed several different peace negotiations and agreements, explains the obstacles in Sudan’s path to a peace deal.
Why do peace talks fail?
Negotiating peace is incredibly complex, and there are many reasons why talks often fail.
First, the conflict parties sometimes simply don’t come to the negotiating table because they are not convinced that they can benefit from talks. This is what happened with the Switzerland peace talks on Sudan. While the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces did send a delegation, the other main conflict party, the Sudanese Armed Forces, did not.
Second, support by external actors of negotiations and pressure on the parties to try to resolve their conflict peacefully are often insufficient. In the case of Sudan, major international players, including the United States and the United Nations, as well as several regional powers did officially support the most recent talks. But the reality is that many of these actors pursue competing interests. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, in particular, consider this war as a chance to increase their dominance.
Given their significant influence on the Sudanese army and the paramilitary forces, these powers could and should try more proactively to mediate between the conflict parties. This would signal that the suffering in Sudan is taken seriously by the international community. In fact, the current humanitarian catastrophe should be a red line. As a minimum, all military support to the warring parties should end.
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Moreover, the expertise of specialised non-governmental organisations, which do not have any specific geopolitical interests, has not been relied upon enough. Such NGOs have helped mediate in conflicts all over the world, including in Mozambique, Ethiopia and the Indonesian province of Aceh. Such impartial expertise is essential to manage complex situations like the one in Sudan.
What needs to happen in Sudan?
Negotiating peace is not a matter of following a simple recipe. It is rarely a linear process that goes through well-defined stages.
For instance, and contrary to what is often assumed, a ceasefire does not necessarily need to be the first step. Many peace negotiations, from Bosnia-Herzegovina to Colombia, actually took place while the fighting continued and did lead to the conclusion of a substantive agreement.
It’s also important to understand that it is not sufficient to focus only on high-level talks. Peace needs to be built on the ground too. Civil society, including women, cannot be left out. And in Sudan, the situation is becoming increasingly fragmented, as the Sudanese army and Rapid Support Forces do not have centralised control over their broad coalitions. Local agreements can greatly increase the security of the population in a particular area. Such agreements can also be an opportunity for some fighters to demobilise and move back to civilian life, which contributes to building peace sustainably.
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Instead, ethnic tensions have been exploited and aggravated because of the ethnically based recruitment of fighters. Moreover, the alleged perpetration of war crimes and crimes against humanity, including indiscriminate killings and rape, brings to mind the genocide in Darfur 20 years ago.
This suffering, along with the complexity of the conflict, means that the international community cannot afford to wait for the “ripe moment”, when the warring parties agree that it is better to negotiate than to fight. It is a common mistake to hope for such ideal conditions for negotiations. Instead, actors with some influence on the parties must constantly try to create entry points for negotiations and opportunities for peace. Every small gain is a success.
The fighting parties need to agree to cessations of hostilities and to humanitarian corridors to allow aid organisations to do their work and save lives. Instead, they have chosen to continue the war and block humanitarian access, with disastrous consequences.
What other obstacles stand in the way?
Factors that fuel the conflict need to be tackled, too. One of the obstacles to achieving peace in Sudan is that both the Sudanese army and paramilitary troops have substantial financial means, especially because of the gold trade. This allows them to sustain the war. It would therefore be crucial to implement international sanctions to dry up this source of revenue.
Second, the current UN arms embargo on Sudan is too limited and poorly implemented. The easy availability of weapons and military equipment in the region is symptomatic of an international system that privileges the profit of arms manufacturers and traders over the security and life of people. The international community can and must do more to counter the militarisation of whole societies and to promote peaceful methods of resolving conflict.
In other words, building peace involves working on several levels. And although we can learn from past successes and failures, it is vital to go beyond national peacemaking processes and to think creatively about peace. This may be arduous and take time, but it can lead to more sustainable peace. The people affected by war and its terrible consequences, in Sudan and elsewhere, would need this commitment.
Philipp Kastner does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
