The ANC’s loss of its majority in the recent election, and President Cyril Ramaphosa’s formation of a government of national unity, have been interpreted by some commentators as indicating the end of the ANC as a “dominant party”. That is, one which recurrently wins elections and hence dominates a political system.
Their argument, and it is not unconvincing, is that the ANC vote share has consistently fallen since its high point in the 2009 election, when it won 66%, to its new low of 40%. This is taken to indicate an inexorable decline which the ANC appears unlikely or unable to reverse.
However, there is a counterargument, by Oxford Analytica, the global geopolitical risk analysts, which needs exploring. This suggests that the unity government may allow the ANC to continue its dominance of the country’s political system within the framework of a multi-party coalition. This narrative cites the ANC’s continued ultimate control of the key levers of power by its retention of the presidency, with its extensive powers of appointment and agenda setting, and key ministries.
I have researched South African politics extensively, and am finishing co-editing a new book about the 2024 elections and path to a coalition government. I recognise that South Africa is entering a new, uncertain era in its politics, with different potential outcomes. One is that the unity government may facilitate the continuation of ANC dominance.
The unity government certainly opens up new possibilities for South Africa. Most immediately, these revolve principally around what many observers, including the much-cited “business community”, view as the enhanced prospects for the government to implement “structural reforms”. These include a concerted tackling of the energy and logistical constraints which have hampered the economy, providing for a sustainable higher rate of growth.
Politically, too, the potential of the unity government is far reaching. One possibility that has been touted has been its potential for bringing about a realignment of political parties. This would see the Ramaphosa wing of the ANC combining with the more liberal elements of the Democratic Alliance (DA) to form a new centre-right party in opposition to a (self-proclaimed) radical left combination of what remains of radical economic transformation of the ANC, the Economic Freedom Fighters and uMkhonto we Sizwe Party. Yet this is all speculation, perhaps even pie in the sky.
Although the statement of intent signed between the ANC and DA around which the government hangs provides “modalities” for resolving disagreements between the parties within the cabinet, these can never guarantee that major differences will be overcome. Much danger remains that the ANC will use its disproportionate representation within the cabinet to get its way.
The ANC’s disproportionate weight within the unity government
Although the unity government is constructed around an axis of an ANC coalition with the centre-right DA, Ramaphosa faced down the latter’s demand for proportionate representation in the cabinet. Having won over half as many votes as the ANC, the DA wanted half as many seats in the cabinet, but after testy negotiations, had to settle for just six ministerial positions out of 32. The ANC bagged 20, the rest going to smaller parties.
Furthermore, while the ANC was allocated 33 deputy ministerships, the DA received only six, reinforcing its image as the junior partner. Much credit was given to Ramaphosa’s negotiating skills, but these were backed by his holding the best cards. As president, he had the ultimate power over who got what in the cabinet.
Whereas the DA had wanted to take control of one or more of the ministries in the economics cluster – principally, finance, electricity and energy, mining, and trade and industry – and was initially in line to be awarded the last of these, Ramaphosa deferred to opposition to this from within the ANC. Instead, the DA settled for agriculture. Not unimportant, for sure, but not a post where it was likely to unsettle strategies, such as the ANC’s vigorous pursuit of black economic empowerment, which it holds dear but which the DA strongly opposes.
Democratic Alliance dilemmas
Meanwhile, the DA’s entry into the government may mean it is facing a Catch 22. Its election campaign saw it fighting to “rescue South Africa” from the prospect of an ANC “doomsday” coalition with the populist Economic Freedom Fighters. This it saw as likely to condemn South Africa to further economic decline, hurtling it ever faster towards becoming a “failed state”. In contrast, the DA views a successful unity government as guiding the country back to sustainable higher growth. But would that necessarily work to the DA’s benefit?
The statement of intent agreed between the ANC and DA provides for “sufficient consensus” (agreement between these two parties) to prevail where there is disagreement within the multi-party cabinet. However, it is more vague about how major disagreements between the parties would be resolved. All coalitions require a willingness to give and take if they are to survive. But what if the DA were to feel that its views were being serially ignored?
The problem for the DA is that the unity government remains ANC-led. If it leads South Africa back to happier times, that is more likely than not to work to the benefit of the ANC, as the largest party in government, more than that of the DA.
True, the DA is in charge of a number of important portfolios, notably Home Affairs. If if it runs these well, it will be able to claim convincingly that it has helped improve many South Africans’ lives. However, this does not ensure that it will receive proportionate credit among an African-dominated electorate among which it has consistently failed to win much backing. On the other hand, if the unity government fails, and the economy continues to falter, the DA will have to share its portion of the blame.
Uncertainties ahead
Much remains uncertain about the multi-party government. For the moment, it is constructed around a Ramaphosa presidency, but what happens in December 2027, when the ANC is likely to hold its next national conference? This will probably lead to the election of a new party leader. If precedent is anything to go by, this will lead to Ramaphosa’s early replacement as state president before the 2029 general election.
What will happen to the unity government at this point? Is it conceivable without Ramaphosa, the reconciler, at its head? Or even if he survives to the end of his presidential term, is the unity government likely to survive his eventual departure?
And then there is the whole question of what happens in the 2029 general election. The most likely prospect is that the multi-party government will dissolve at that point and its constituent parties will again find themselves competing electorally.
As noted, for the DA, the major problem is that if the unity government has succeeded in returning South Africa to sustainable growth, and has tackled its numerous other problems reasonably ably, the ANC will claim the major portion of the credit. And if it does this successfully, it is not at all inconceivable that it will reclaim its popular majority, and henceforward again run South Africa on its own. Even if the DA will say it has “rescued South Africa”, it may only have done so to see itself once again sitting on the opposition benches.
The DA’s high stakes gamble
The Democratic Alliance will hope that by playing its cards skilfully within the government of unity, it will help convince voters that it has “rescued South Africa”, and that it will pick up increased support. It may well do – but equally, so may the ANC. However, few should doubt that the DA is engaged in a high stakes gamble. It could win, but equally, it could well lose its wager.
Although the unity government demands of its constituent parties that they cooperate, this does not mean that they will not seek to further their own advantage within the coalition government. And it is the ANC which is likely to hold the aces.
A pig with lipstick is still a pig, and the unity government may well turn out to be a continuation of ANC dominance in disguise.
Roger Southall does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
