After a week of frenetic activity on the war front, there has been a welcome return to peace – if only the idea of it. High-level meetings in London and Brussels have served to clarify a few basics.
Military leaders met behind closed doors in London for what was billed as operational planning for Sir Keir Starmer’s “coalition of the willing”. EU leaders, meanwhile, thrashed out preparations for closer defence cooperation and the eventuality, however distant, of peace in Ukraine; Volodymyr Zelensky reported from Norway on his recent “friendly” phone call with Donald Trump.
With much of the recent action happening between Washington and Moscow, and with diplomatic meetings taking place in Saudi Arabia, it has been all too possible to neglect the role that could and should be played by Europe and the Europeans. Here was an illustration of why they matter.
The separate tracks of European and US approaches to ending the Ukraine war have barely been clearer. Exemplifying the high ground that the prime minister has taken since Mr Trump re-established ties with Moscow, Sir Keir set the tone – before visiting Barrow-in-Furness and laying the keel for the next generation of UK nuclear-armed submarines. There, he made clear that nuclear deterrence was both necessary and effective.
Vladimir Putin, he said, feared Britain’s nuclear weapons as a “credible capability”. In other words, there was no reason for either the UK – or, by extension, the European members of Nato – to be intimidated by Russia. Or, he might also have said, by the United States threatening to leave Europe to rely on its own resources.
The British prime minister’s moral clarity on support for Kyiv, and the need for it to continue, has been quietly appreciated by his fellow European leaders, and more loudly by Ukraine. It has also contributed to a sense of European solidarity as the United States has increasingly seen to be on a different track.
It does not cancel out some of the very real complexities that remain in the European camp, however. The coalition of the willing, which some prefer to call a “reassurance force”, is still at an embryonic stage. It is unclear which countries would be prepared to commit troops. Quite a few fervent supporters of Ukraine – such as Poland, the Baltic States and perhaps Finland – see the defence of their own national borders as coming first.
It remains unclear, too, whether the envisaged force would be deployed for a ceasefire, or only with a durable peace. Nor is it clear whether the commitment to such a force might be contingent on a US “backstop” or other guarantee – a prospect that seems ever-more remote. Europe, including the UK, has to recognise that the US refusal to provide military support is probably real.
For its part, the EU has its own disagreements and shadings of commitment, from Hungary, Slovakia and Croatia at one end, to France at the other. Any moves towards the EU becoming a credible force in defence, incorporating its own defence industries and perhaps an extension of the French nuclear umbrella, seem far off in the fast-moving conditions of today.
The UK’s relationship to an EU defence also remains in question, following its exclusion from a shared arms industry endeavour. The mismatch between the European pillar of Nato and an EU defence capability remains unresolved, and needs to be resolved as a matter of urgency. Sir Keir may be saying many of the right things, but not everything is up to us.
As Mr Trump’s bilateral diplomacy – separately, with Russia and Ukraine – seems to veer between different objectives, what increasingly stands out is the unwavering support of Europe for Ukraine on the principles of not rewarding unlawful aggression and upholding national sovereignty and what would appear to be more mercenary considerations behind the stance of the United States.
First, it was Ukraine’s rare earth minerals that Mr Trump had his eye on. With an agreement apparently in the bag, he has now advised Mr Zelensky that Ukraine’s nuclear power stations would be safer in US hands – although why and to what end are unanswered questions. It is hard to imagine anything more dangerous than a US-Russia contest for control of Ukraine's nuclear power generation.
Ukraine cannot – and must not be expected – to exchange its crudely violated sovereignty for something less than full jurisdiction within its own borders (even if those borders might temporarily shrink). Washington’s cynical use of the on-off switch, whether for deliveries of military supplies, intelligence sharing or humanitarian aid cannot but be contrasted with the sincere efforts of Europeans, as they scramble in their ill-coordinated organisational forums to replace Ukraine’s US supplies.
This difference offers the best proof to Ukraine of who its real friends are, and of who will still be there to advocate for, and then help to guarantee, a just peace. The UK and Europeans must bury their differences, enhance their defence capacity, and stay the course.
