The dilemma facing Luís Montenegro of Portugal’s Social Democratic party (PSD) will be familiar to a growing number of Europe’s centre-right parties: if the shortest and surest route to power means working with the populist far right, should you take it?
Montenegro’s electoral alliance with two smaller conservative parties finished first in Sunday’s ballot, winning 79 seats: two more than its Socialist party (PS) rival, but a very long way indeed from a majority in the country’s 230-seat parliament.
In third place, multiplying its seat count by four to 48, was Chega (Enough), a far-right, populist party headed by a former TV sports commentator, André Ventura, regularly accused by his opponents of xenophobia, racism and demagoguery.
Repeatedly on the campaign trail and again on Monday, Montenegro ruled out a formal coalition, or even a loose confidence-and-supply arrangement, with Chega – but some kind of deal with the far-right party might prove his only path to a stable majority able to actually pass legislation.
There would be enormous pressure to form a right-wing government, said Vicente Valentim, a political scientist at the University of Oxford and author of a forthcoming book on the normalisation of the far right.
Montenegro would “try all he can to avoid working” with Chega, he added, but “his problem is that his aim in the short term is to be prime minister. If he can’t form a stable government, what are the possibilities? An internal fight inside the PSD, fresh elections – or, perhaps, some kind of very informal deal with the far right.”
It is a choice others have faced before him, and more could soon be confronted with. Far-right populists lead a coalition with the centre-right in Italy, are core members of another coalition in Finland, and are lending support to a rightwing government in Sweden.
In the Netherlands, fraught coalition talks hinge on how far – and under precisely what conditions – the centre right is ready to back Geert Wilders’ far-right Freedom party (PVV) and its smaller populist ally, the Farmer-Citizen Movement (BBB).
In Spain, the conservative People’s party (PP) first tried to outflank, then denounced, the far-right Vox – but did deals at the regional level, and was ready to do one at a national level, until the Socialists (PSOE) did unexpectedly well in last July’s election.
Meanwhile, Austria’s far-right Freedom party (FPÖ) is set to win elections there this autumn and will seek a deal with the conservative Austrian People’s party (ÖVP), while Germany’s AfD and France’s National Rally (RN) are at or near historic highs.
A range of factors is driving their advance. If opposition to immigration, Islam and the EU were for a long time the far right’s principal causes, a more recent focus on culture wars, minority rights and the climate crisis has chimed with many voters.
Their appeal has been further enhanced by the cost of living crisis triggered by pandemic recovery and Russia’s war on Ukraine, and by a mounting mistrust of mainstream politicians whom many voters see as having failed to address central issues, such as housing, that populists have successfully linked in many voters’ minds to immigration.
“In an increasing number of countries, the far right is now scoring 15% to 20% or more,” said Valentim. “That means it’s becoming increasingly hard to ensure alternating governments without including them.”
To a certain extent, said Catherine Fieschi of the European University Institute in Florence, it was inevitable that the increasing fragmentation of Europe’s political landscape – in terms of parties as well as voters – would make populist parties kingmakers.
“The weakness and exhaustion of mainstream parties, their failure to tackle key problems, their implication in scandals, is also incentivising voters to try something new,” she said. “And it’s mainly the far right that’s gathering momentum.”
The challenge that momentum posed for the centre right was critical, Fieschi said: “It’s important they hold the line. Where they haven’t, they’ve legitimised these parties. What were basically protest votes have been transformed into something else.”
The increased mainstreaming of far-right parties “bakes them into the landscape”, she said. “The media access, cooperation in government … They become normalised. Once the ‘cordon sanitaire’ is broken, it becomes much harder to vote them out.”
The catch is that the alternative can lead to months-long coalition talks, unstable minority governments, repeat elections – and a further weakening of mainstream parties, risking a further reinforcement of the extremist vote.
“There are really only two options,” said Valentim. “Either centre-right parties include the far right in some form of rightwing bloc, or – as in Germany – the centre right and the centre left come to some kind of agreement to always exclude the far right.”
What happens in Portugal over the next few weeks, as Montenegro tries to form a government that can be sure of support in parliament, would be crucial, Valentim said, because “what happens now will be locked in. It’ll become the default.”
The role played by the Socialists in that process would be equally significant, he added: “Ultimately, the centre right can only make a government without the far right work if the centre left decide to support it. The president might even intervene on that point.”
For Fieschi, Portugal was “not a Netherlands redux. The two mainstream parties – representing two-thirds of voters – do not want to work with the far right. Portugal isn’t so far down the populist, anti-immigration road as some other places.”
The problem, Valentim said, was that while the evidence showed centre-right parties that adopted far-right policies did not benefit, and that far-right parties in government led to bad democratic outcomes, “short-term, politicians want to be prime minister”.
