The U.S. Navy is struggling to keep up with China’s massive investment in new warships.
Although American warships are more capable and American sailors are better trained, if current trends persist sheer numbers will eventually make Beijing the dominant maritime power in the Western Pacific.
It doesn’t help that China’s Navy will be operating close to home while America’s will be thousands of miles from its closest domestic bases.
Against that backdrop, it is vital that the U.S. Navy not repeat the missteps seen in its shipbuilding program since the new century began.
Those missteps, which involved three new classes of surface combatants—all of which went awry—wasted time and money at a moment when the full extent of the Chinese maritime challenge was becoming all too clear.
So it is little wonder that Congress is resisting plans for yet another new surface combatant—a next-generation destroyer dubbed DDG(X)—that clearly isn’t ready for primetime.
This week I joined a small contingent of think-tank types in a visit to Bath Iron Works, a Maine shipyard that builds existing destroyers and would likely have a hand in constructing whatever successor emerges.
When you view the Navy’s proposed approach to modernizing its surface combatants from the deck plates of an Arleigh Burke destroyer being built at Bath rather than from Washington, the gaps in Navy plans are hard to miss.
Here are seven reasons the Navy needs to rethink its latest bright idea until it has a firmer grasp of where it is going, and why.
The existing Arleigh Burke class of destroyers is the most successful surface warship in modern history. The Burke class, referred to in naval nomenclature as DDG-51, is by far the most capable surface combatant in the world.
The latest version, called Flight III, can simultaneously conduct land attacks with long-range cruise missiles, antisubmarine warfare, sea control with anti-ship weapons, air and missile defense, and networked collection of reconnaissance.
The vessel’s capabilities have been continuously evolved as new technology became available, and as a result the Navy today operates nearly 70 of the most fearsome surface combatants ever built.
Washington should think long and hard about ending this highly successful program, given how half-baked some of the Navy’s more recent ideas for new surface warships have turned out to be.
The timing is wildly out of sync with unfolding geopolitical challenges. The current, aggressive schedule for DDG(X) calls for completing the last Burke-class warship in 2027 and then beginning construction of the next-gen destroyer the following year.
This is, unfortunately, the precise timeframe in which the outgoing commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command predicts China might move to occupy Taiwan.
Successful Chinese occupation of the island nation would transform the strategic balance in the Western Pacific to the detriment of U.S. forces.
Terminating a successful destroyer construction program and commencing a new, unproven successor in this timeframe is dangerous. U.S. production of surface combatants would hit a low ebb just as the threat in the Pacific reached its zenith.
The rationale for a bigger warship is largely speculative. The Navy says it needs a hull 30% bigger than the Burke class to host (1) bigger, hypersonic missiles, (2) directed-energy weapons like lasers, and (3) a more capable radar.
These are, at best, guesses about what future naval warfare might require. Hypersonics are the current flavor of the month in military circles, but they are hyper-expensive and there are many ways to deliver them. It is not clear that such weapons would need to be carried on most future destroyers.
The future of directed-energy weapons at sea is similarly uncertain. Despite their manifest advantages (cheap, speed-of-light kills), their utility in a maritime environment is not proven after decades of research.
The radar being installed on Flight III Burkes, devised by Raytheon Technologies
Many details of DDG(X) are just warmed-over features of the Burke class. To avoid the risks of developing all-new technology, the Navy says it will adapt the hull, radar, combat system and weapons on the Burke class for use on the next-generation destroyer.
But if those capabilities are already resident on the current warship, where’s the value-added in building a bigger and more expensive successor? Especially when the items not resident on the Burke class may not be widely used in the future fleet?
Some of what the Navy needs can be had by just modifying Flight III Burkes. The DDG-51 destroyer has evolved throughout its history. There is no reason why that process cannot continue to provide greater range, power, cooling and volume for weapons—perhaps by installing an extension of the hull.
That approach would be intrinsically less risky than developing a new hull to host additional capabilities. Flight III warships already host the most advanced air and missile defense radars ever conceived thanks to a rearrangement of on-board systems, so what would a modest plug in the hull permit designers to do?
The DDG(X) schedule would further complicate a shipbuilding plan already fraught with uncertainty. The Navy currently is engaged in building a new class of submarines, a new class of aircraft carriers, a new class of frigates, and a multitude of unmanned warships. It also is making major modifications to existing classes, such as increasing the cruise missile load on Virginia-class attack subs.
Is it really necessary to inject additional complexity into this very demanding agenda? Commencing yet another warship program in the midst of so much budgetary, technological and geopolitical uncertainty seems like asking for trouble.
The Congressional Budget Office has warned that each ship in the Constellation class of frigates will likely cost 40% more than the Navy is planning. That money will have to come from somewhere. Further burdening shipbuilding accounts is not indicated.
The DDG(X) plan would devastate the shipbuilding industrial base. Transitioning from the current class of destroyers to a new generation would result in massive layoffs at both Bath Iron Works and the Ingalls shipyard in Mississippi. It would be difficult to sustain all of the skill sets required to build a modern warship in the absence of serial production.
This point has been made numerous times by congressional committees. There is not much left of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and the Navy’s plan for DDG(X) would further depress the sector. Industrial policy concerns are not the Navy’s strong suit.
For all of the above reasons, the recent proposals floated on Capitol Hill to draft another multiyear contract that would keep Burke-class destroyers in production through the end of the decade seem eminently sensible. With further design modifications of the Flight III version, the Navy might discover it doesn’t even need a successor class.
Several companies with a stake in naval shipbuilding programs contribute to my think tank, including Bath Iron Works owner General Dynamics
