The violence wrought by the Rwandan-backed rebel group M23 Movement is often narrowly framed as intended to control eastern Democratic Republic of Congo’s resource-rich mining sites. The rebel group launched its most recent offensive in 2021 and currently controls vast territories in the south-east of North Kivu province, surrounding and cutting off the main city of Goma.
Eastern DR Congo mines produce crucial raw materials such as tin, tantalum and tungsten, as well as abundant quantities of gold. It therefore seems logical to reduce explanations of conflict to the ambition by M23, and Rwanda behind it, to control the mines directly.
We belong to a team of researchers who examine the various dimensions of conflict from different perspectives. Our findings, based on fieldwork and conducted in collaboration with in-country experts, show that this popular analysis does not paint the full picture.
Conflict analysis often ignores historical and local dimensions. Our investigation with the Goma-based civil society organisation Association pour le Développement des Initiatives Paysannes therefore explored the local stakes and impacts of the M23 crisis. We interviewed more than 55 people in North Kivu (DR Congo), including members of M23, as well as soldiers and armed groups fighting them, local chiefs, state agents, teachers, taximen, traders and farmers who live on the frontline of the conflict.
Our research reveals that M23 employs a more profound strategy to boost its position and military strength (through Rwandan support) in local struggles over land, authority and rents. M23’s disruptive strategy aims to replace Congolese authorities and overhaul local governance in areas it controls in eastern DR Congo. Key to this strategy is:
undermining and replacing local (customary) authorities
taking over strategic trade routes
the installation of an elaborate taxation regime.
These strategies also allow M23 – and Rwanda – to generate revenues from the local economy, including rents from DR Congo’s mineral wealth, without necessarily directly controlling mines.
Historical struggles over land
Interviewees attached great importance to the historical context of the M23 conflict, explaining how struggles over land date back to independence in 1960. Going back to the 1930s and 1940s, the Belgian colonial administrators already organised large movements of migrant workers from Rwanda to work on plantations in DR Congo. The Rwandophone migrants and their descendants settled in North Kivu, becoming part of the local population.
After independence, Hutu and Tutsi (Rwandophone) communities began to jostle for control over North Kivu’s fertile farmland with the Hunde and Nyanga communities there. As grievances over access to land and property rights increased, Rwandophone communities were stigmatised as “non-indigenous” and their land claims as illegitimate.
As the Congo Wars broke out in the 1990s, people began seeking recourse to armed groups to settle land conflicts. Before the rise of M23 in 2012, two other groups (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie and later Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple) rose to protect the Rwandophone population in eastern DRC. They also grabbed and sold vast concessions of land – held by the state or other communities – to allied farmers and business people. These were typically from the Tutsi community.
Given the country’s complex and under-enforced land laws, land claims became exceedingly difficult to verify or prove. This has strengthened the belief that the only way to secure access to land is by resorting to armed groups. Thus, M23 is perceived as the guardian of the Tutsi community’s access to land.
This perception is well illustrated by a testimony of a local leader in Masisi territory:
The wars of the last three decades have been motivated by a struggle for control over land … Indigenous people are driven out, dispossessed of their land in favour of others who are considered foreigners and refugees. … the M23 is made up of (Tutsi) pastoralists … and there are fields that their rivals had seized … it was one of their (M23) first concerns to start exploiting them.
Most Congolese Tutsi have not asked for this “protection” by M23. But the ensuing grievances and ethnic tensions will haunt the relations between communities for years to come.
Struggles over customary authority
In DR Congo, customary chiefs play an important role in local land governance. They also adjudicate conflicts, bind people together through rituals, and represent the symbolic claim by a specific community to a given place.
Many Congolese we spoke to perceive M23’s main aim to be control of power at the local level — undermining the existing authorities. The group has indeed sought to replace customary authorities with M23-appointed ones, at times assassinating Congolese chiefs. Local sources said M23 even burnt chiefdom archives, destroying evidence of claims to customary authority.
M23’s economic grip
Wherever M23 has a foothold, it installs an elaborate taxation regime. This involves checkpoint tolls, household taxes, dues on business, harvest taxes and forced labour. In doing so, the group generates the revenues to sustain the conflict. But this also strengthens its politico-administrative hold on the population, as taxation is a symbolic interface of public authority.
Local armed groups that joined with the Congolese army to combat M23 deepen the problem. Called wazalendo (“patriots”), they are often unpaid and therefore rely on payments from the population to sustain their counter-offensive. As a result, taxation in eastern Congo has become heavily “militiarised”. Taxed by government forces, wazalendo and M23, civilians pay a heavy toll.
The military nature of local governance could jeopardise future efforts to bring peace to eastern DRC.
What about minerals?
M23 has an impact on all aspects of local governance in eastern DR Congo. It has found ways to control and profit from the local economy in North Kivu, including mineral supply chains. It operates checkpoints along arteries and taxes minerals smuggled to Rwanda, alongside other trade flows.
Having M23 control strategic trade routes in DR Congo, including those crossing into Uganda, is a benefit for Rwanda. From Kigali’s perspective, the resurgence of M23 in 2021 came at a perfect time to block Uganda’s efforts to improve the road network in eastern DR Congo towards its own territory. Rwanda and Uganda are locked in intense competition for Congolese informal trade, re-exporting its timber and minerals as their own, gaining taxes and foreign earnings that ought to benefit the Congolese treasury and population.
What must be done?
DR Congo’s resources play a large role in the M23 conflict, but our study underscores the historical roots of the conflict and its profound local impacts. These findings should inform locally meaningful and sustainable conflict resolution strategies.
Since the M23 revival, land access, trade and security have become increasingly mediated by armed actors. Even after a possible M23 defeat, it will take years of local dialogue and mediation to undo this involvement of militia in local governance, resolve land issues, repair inter-community relations and remake customary authority. But that’s the only way to reach sustainable peace in North Kivu.
Ken Matthysen works for the International Peace Information Service (IPIS)
This publication has been produced with the financial assistance of the Belgian Directorate-General for Development Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid (DGD). The contents of this document are the sole responsibility of IPIS and can under no circumstances be regarded as reflecting the position of the Belgian Development Cooperation.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
