An ability to surprise is not, perhaps, the first thing people typically associate with Germans. But looking at the direction our country has taken since Russia launched its war of aggression against Ukraine, maybe we Germans have managed to surprise even ourselves.
Only two years ago, billions of cubic metres of gas arrived from Russia to Germany through Nord Stream 1 and other pipelines. Russian fossil fuels made up a large share of our energy consumption. Today, we’ve cut this down to zero.
Only two years ago, the idea of Germany delivering tanks, air-defence systems and howitzers to a war zone would have seemed far-fetched, to say the least. Today, Germany is one of the leading arms suppliers for Ukraine’s self-defence.
Not only is there a sea change in how my country perceives the threats to its own security, but also in how we understand our responsibility in today’s world: as a leader our partners can rely on.
After the horrors of the second world war, unleashed by Germans, our country’s foreign policy was driven by the premise that war should never again emanate from German soil. In a first phase of foreign policy, after 1945, my country sought to regain former enemies’ trust. We are forever grateful that they extended their hand to us, readmitting us into the global fold.
The following decades’ developments are too complex for justice to be done to them here. Certain markers stand out for me, however. For decades, German governments pursued what came to be known as “chequebook diplomacy” – the belief that our cash rather than our soldiers should help resolve conflicts.
The 1990s brought a third phase, gradually first through participation in UN-led missions and then – driven by the unbearable images of the Balkan wars – much more robustly through Germany’s active involvement in the Nato-led force in Kosovo. It was not despite our country’s history that this decision was important, but because of it. As the then foreign minister Joschka Fischer pointed out: Germany’s responsibility for the Shoah meant not only a commitment to “never again war”, but to “never again Auschwitz, never again genocide”. A commitment to the values of the UN charter, as well as to international criminal law, meant that Germany has supported its partners in UN missions across the globe. After 9/11, Germany stood with the US and its partners as it deployed the Bundeswehr to Afghanistan.
What I believe has fundamentally changed in the face of Russia’s onslaught on Ukraine, however, leading to a fourth phase of foreign policy, is the way we perceive threats to our own security, at the heart of Europe. Our security is not a given. For too long, we did not listen to the warnings of our eastern neighbours who urged us to take the threats emanating from Russia seriously. We learned that “hoping for the best” is not enough when dealing with an increasingly autocratic leader. Besides all our efforts to construct a European security architecture with Russia, our economic and political interaction also did not sway the Russian regime toward democracy.
Just after the outbreak of the war, a schoolgirl in Vilnius, Lithuania, who lives only a short drive from the Russian and Belarussian borders, asked me: “Can we count on you?” I wholeheartedly answer: you can. We Germans will never forget that we owe our freedom in a reunited country also to our allies and our eastern neighbours. Just as they were there for us, we will be there for them now, because the security of eastern Europe is Germany’s security.
We know that for the foreseeable future, President Putin’s Russia will remain a threat to peace and security on our continent and that we have to organise our security against Putin’s Russia, not with it. In Germany’s first-ever national security strategy, we lay out how we seek to assume our responsibility in this new phase of foreign policy, in Europe and beyond, through an integrated security policy.
First of all, that means stepping up our commitment to our Euro-Atlantic family. We are strengthening Nato as the guarantor of our collective security. We are beefing up our military capacity with an unprecedented €100bn (£86bn) package and committing to Nato’s defence spending target. We are building a geopolitical European Union that is opening its doors to new members, such as Ukraine, Moldova, the western Balkan countries and, in the long term, Georgia.
We learned painfully that security means not only protection from war and crises, but also from economic vulnerabilities. Decisions on where we buy our gas, oil, or technology carry security implications. We therefore prepare not to repeat past mistakes. Systemic rivals are seeking to expand their spheres of interest by using their economic clout. While we believe that decoupling from China is not an option in a globalised world, we strive to de-risk and to reduce our vulnerabilities. Diversification is an investment in security.
We are therefore strengthening our strategic global partnerships. And if we want our common rules – based on the UN charter – to govern our world in the future, we have to prove their worth, advancing solutions that serve our partners’ needs – on questions of security, trade and the fight against the climate crisis. If we fail in that, others, who do not share our firm commitment to international law and human rights, will step in.
Russia’s war of aggression has marked a rupture in the world. For my country, it has opened a new chapter, redefining how we seek to promote peace, freedom and sustainability in this world: as a partner that embraces its leadership.
To some, that may be surprising. More importantly, I believe, it is a question of responsibility.
Annalena Baerbock is Germany’s minister for foreign affairs
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