Russia’s military command had anticipated Ukraine’s incursion into its Kursk region and had been making plans to prevent it for several months, according to a cache of documents that the Ukrainian army said it had seized from abandoned Russian positions in the region.
The disclosure makes the disarray among Russian forces after Ukraine’s attack in early August all the more embarrassing. The documents, shared with the Guardian, also reveal Russian concerns about morale in the ranks in Kursk, which intensified after the suicide of a soldier at the front who had reportedly been in a “prolonged state of depression due to his service in the Russian army”.
Unit commanders are given instructions to ensure soldiers consume Russian state media daily to maintain their “psychological condition”.
The Guardian could not independently verify the authenticity of the documents, though they bear the hallmarks of genuine Russian army communications. In late August, the Guardian met the Ukrainian special operations team who seized them, hours after they had left Russian territory. The team said they had taken Russian interior ministry, FSB and army documents from buildings in the Kursk region and later provided a selection to view and photograph.
Some of the documents are printed orders distributed to various units, while others are handwritten logs recording events and concerns at specific positions. The earliest entries are dated late in 2023, while the most recent documents are from just six weeks before Ukraine launched its incursion into the Kursk region on 6 August.
The documents mostly come from units of Russia’s 488th Guards Motorised Rifle Regiment, and in particular the second company of its 17th Battalion.
Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk took Kyiv’s western partners and many in the Ukrainian elite by surprise, as planning had been restricted to a very small number of people. But Russian military documents contain months of warnings about a possible incursion into the area and an attempt to occupy Sudzha, a town of 5,000 residents that has now been under Ukrainian occupation for more than a month.
An entry from 4 January spoke of the “potential for a breakthrough at the state border” by Ukrainian armed groups and ordered increased training to prepare to repel any attack. On 19 February, unit commanders were warned of Ukrainian plans for “a rapid push from the Sumy region into Russian territory, up to a depth of 80km [50 miles], to establish a four-day ‘corridor’ ahead of the arrival of the main Ukrainian army units on armoured vehicles”.
In mid-March, units at the border were ordered to boost defensive lines and “organise additional exercises for the leadership of units and strongpoints regarding the proper organisation of defences” in preparation for a Ukrainian cross-border attack.
In mid-June, there was a more specific warning of Ukrainian plans “in the direction Yunakivka-Sudzha, with the goal of taking Sudzha under control”, which did indeed happen in August. There was also a prediction that Ukraine would attempt to destroy a bridge over the Seym River to disrupt Russian supply lines in the region, which also later happened. The June document complained that Russian units stationed at the front “are filled only 60-70% on average, and primarily made up of reserves with weak training”.
When the Ukrainian attack came on 6 August, many Russian soldiers abandoned their positions, and within a week Ukraine had taken full control of Sudzha. “They ran away, without even evacuating or destroying their documents,” said a member of the special operations team who seized the files.
During Moscow’s chaotic retreat, Ukrainian forces captured hundreds of Russian soldiers, many of whom were conscripts, who are not generally expected to face battle. The parents of one conscript soldier from the second company, featured in the documents, recorded a tearful video appeal in August, identifying him as their 22-year-old son Vadim Kopylov, saying he had been taken prisoner near Sudzha and calling on Russian authorities to exchange him.
The documents give an insight into Russian tactics over the past year, in one case speaking of the need to create decoy trenches and positions to confuse Ukrainian reconnaissance drones. “Models of tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery launchers should be created as well as mannequins of soldiers, and they should be periodically moved around,” reads one order.
It adds that a few soldiers should be sent to the decoy positions to light fires at night and walk around with torches, and that Russia should create radio chatter about the decoy positions, with the aim of having it intercepted. It is unclear if such positions were ever created; members of a Ukrainian unit flying reconnaissance drones in the area in recent weeks told the Guardian they had seen no evidence of such positions.
In March, the Russian documents note that there were increasing incidents of Ukrainian sabotage groups disguising themselves for work behind Russian lines by wearing Russian uniforms. “To prevent enemy infiltration into our combat formations … commanders are to implement the use of identification marker variant n6, made from materials 8cm wide, to be attached using invisible tape,” reads an order from that month.
Buried in the dry, meandering official language are signs of serious problems with morale at the front. “The analysis of the current situation regarding suicides shows that the issue of servicemen dying as a result of suicidal incidents remains tense,” reads one entry. It recounts an incident that reportedly took place on 20 January this year, when a conscript soldier entered the summer washing area at a guard post and shot himself in the abdomen.
“The investigation into the incident determined that the cause of the suicide and death was a nervous and psychological breakdown, caused by his prolonged state of depression due to his service in the Russian army,” reads the handwritten report of the incident.
To prevent further such incidents, unit commanders are instructed to identify soldiers who “are mentally unprepared to fulfil their duties or prone to deviant behaviour, and organise their reassignment and transfer to military medical facilities”.
Further instructions on keeping up morale come in an undated, typed document that explains that soldiers should get 5-10 minutes a day as well as an hour once a week of political instruction, “aimed at maintaining and raising the political, moral and psychological condition of the personnel”.
