A month after Putin’s “special operation” in Ukraine began, the Levada Centre, a non-governmental polling organisation, carried out a survey to gauge public attitudes towards the conflict. The results were awaited with some trepidation. Some thought they would show public dissatisfaction with the leadership and that the president’s ratings would fall. Others demurred.
There were precedents. After Russia’s short war with Georgia in 2008, Vladimir Putin’s approval rating shot up to 88%. In 2014, after the annexation of Crimea, the same thing happened: the proportion of people who said they approved of his leadership once again rose to the same figure.
In both instances, negative global reaction merely served to strengthen the Russian belief that they were right. Sanctions did little damage.
This time, it’s different. Military action is proving to be neither quick nor bloodless. Everyone understands that, even those who only listen to the voices coming out of their TVs. This time, there is a broad, anxious expectation of lean times, of economic blockade.
There is a school of thought that hails from Soviet times that the refrigerator is more powerful than the TV. Could that be right this time?
So far, the signs are mixed. Just as in 2014, there has been a rise in the approval rating of the operation and its commander in chief. Once again, Putin is polling at above 80%, 12 points higher than in February. The government and prime minister are also polling well. Even the state Duma, which normally languishes in negative territory, is basking in positive ratings.
But it’s not all positive news for Russia’s political class: an absolute majority, 55%, expects an improvement in political life over the coming months. They cannot be disappointed. This will have to be created – if not in real life then in the virtual world.
And for those who look at the 80%-plus ratings and declare that the TV has finally triumphed over the refrigerator, we must say no. Everything is a little more nuanced.
In the survey, we asked Russians the question: what kind of emotions does the military operation in Ukraine evoke in you? Just 2% could not answer, while 8% said they had no particular feeling at all about it. The other respondents chose from a multitude of words to describe their feelings.
These words broadly fell into four categories – either positive or negative, and either political or apolitical. So the positive political emotion could be described as national pride; the negative political emotions were more like anger and shame; the positive apolitical words covered emotions such as joy and excitement; the negative apolitical emotions were fear, anxiety, horror and shock.
If we look broadly at the percentage of positive versus negative emotions, it is neck and neck – 51% versus 49%. But within these numbers lie interesting breakdowns: the positive emotions mostly comprise people expressing national pride (40%). Only a few (11%) expressed positive apolitical emotions like joy and satisfaction.
Among negative feelings, the split was roughly reversed. Just 10% felt negative political emotions like anger, disgust and shame about the Ukraine assault. A full 39% reported emotions of worry, fear, shock.
From these numbers, you have to conclude that the support the Russian public has for the army and its leadership coexists alongside a great anxiety.
When you look at generational breakdowns, moreover, it’s clear that these events are being perceived differently by young and old people. Negative feelings predominate in those under 35. Only 33% feel national pride, while 37% feel anxious and fearful.
Those over 65, on the other hand, are far more positive, with a 90% approval rating for Putin and few expressions of fear or anxiety.
Young and old also differed dramatically in their assessment of what motivated the anti-war protests that we saw in the weeks after 24 February. Older people tended to favour the explanation that people were paid to protest. Younger people were more likely to put the protests down to genuine outrage over events.
Alexei Levinson is a sociologist and senior researcher at the Levada Center, Russia’s leading polling organisation
Today on Russia’s Victory Day, the Guardian and other European news organisations are publishing articles by the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta
