The recent protests by young people in Kenya and Uganda have highlighted a form of corruption that is difficult to deal with: political corruption.
Compared to its cousin, administrative or bureaucratic corruption (such as a civil servant soliciting a bribe to provide a public service), political corruption is much more difficult to fight. This is because it is perpetrated by people who hold political power and influence. This class can fight back. Corruption gives them both the incentive and the means to hold on to power.
Political corruption takes place at the highest levels of the political system. It involves decision-makers who have the power to define the “rules of the game” and to make the laws. They include politicians elected (or nominated) to parliament, government ministers and politically nominated senior civil servants.
It is political corruption when people in high office abuse their public power for private benefit. It is political corruption when they divert public money for personal use, accept money in return for government contracts, and exert their influence in favour of private businesses (and businesses in which they have a stake).
Less well-known and less studied is the corrupt use of the ill-gotten proceeds and state funds to preserve or extend power of those in high office. It includes practices such as buying the support of individuals and businesses, capturing institutions of oversight and control, and using state resources to win elections.
This abuse of power can also be accompanied by violence, intimidation, threats and manipulation of elections.
The most detrimental impact of political corruption is that it destroys the power holders’ incentives to curb corruption. Political corruption persists because it serves a function beyond greed and personal enrichment. It keeps the regime together and afloat.
I am a political scientist focusing on democratic institutionalisation, political economy, political corruption and natural resources. My previous research on political corruption has covered several African countries, Palestine and Bangladesh. I draw my analysis from these and also the 2019 book Political Corruption in Africa, which I edited.
In my view, the mass protests against power abuse in Uganda and Kenya lately are good for two things: they shed light on the problem, and they put pressure on the power holders. The Kenyan president, for instance, has announced legal and administrative reforms to address charges of political corruption.
But this is rarely enough. Corrupt power holders have a strong tendency to fight back. They can even hijack the anti-corruption agenda and turn it into another tool for holding on to power.
The anti-corruption trap
In the book that I edited, we outlined the two processes of political corruption – extractive and power preserving – in a number of African countries. The authors presented well documented cases, including:
vote-buying and clientelist tactics in Kenya
exceptions (leniency, pardon) given to corrupt people when joining the ruling party in Nigeria
military corruption integral to the survival of the political system in Uganda
both extractive and power preserving political corruption in Ghana
the “secret loans” affair that ravaged the economy in Mozambique
campaign financing and vote buying in Malawi
“state capture” in South Africa.
Africa is not unique. Political corruption is a widespread problem which has also driven people to the streets this year in Slovakia, Albania, Hungary, and Iraq.
At the same time, democracy in the world is in retreat.
World Bank data on the extent to which citizens in sub-Saharan Africa are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media, have shown little improvement. This is a pointer to lower accountability to the public. Also data on control of corruption, which captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, remains poor.
This is a strong indication that political corruption is holding back democratic development. In many African countries, extractive and power preserving political corruption go hand in hand.
The recent protests offer an opportunity to examine what the African anti-corruption movement is up against. Anti-corruption is politics. Illiberal leaders can use it to target political opponents and rivals as well as the media, civil society and activists. Anti-corruption can be used to bolster the legitimacy of corrupt leaders by “frying some small fish”, like the lower bureaucracy or certain socio-cultural groups.
Anti-corruption has sometimes been redefined to focus on the business dealings of power holders’ rivals. Corrupt practices are tolerated when carried out by or serving the interests of the power holders. These include gift-giving, vote buying or handouts, special remuneration and advancement for loyal bureaucrats. The list also includes capital flight and secret contracting.
Anti-corruption institutions (like commissions) and the government institutions of oversight and control can also be politicised and disabled. Regime loyalists may be nominated to head them, or they can be starved of funding and competence. All of this protects corrupt power holders.
Then what?
Where corruption is politically embedded, anti-corruption efforts are resisted or made ineffective.
To avoid these risks, my co-researcher David Jackson and I have suggested a two-pronged approach. It involves direct anti-corruption interventions and indirect accountability and democracy reforms.
Direct anti-corruption is tailor-made for local conditions. Efforts should be made to counter both extractive and power preserving practices of the power holders as these are played out here and now. This requires a good analysis of the political economy of the regime: how does it get the money in, and how exactly is it reinvested in power?
Indirect anti-corruption sits within a broader framework of building accountability and democracy. Corruption is but one form of power abuse. Anti-corruption should therefore be seen as one – but important – element in the fight for democracy, equality and justice.
Inge Amundsen does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
