In Pakistan, where three As – Allah, Army, and America – have long dictated the country's power structures, the current reality under US President Donald Trump remains a bit more complicated.
Historically marked by oscillations between strategic cooperation and mutual distrust, US-Pakistan relations are likely to face further turbulence given Trump's transactional approach to foreign policy, which tends to prioritise short-term agreements over long-term strategic interests.
During the early years of Trump's first term, relations plummeted significantly with the US suspending 1.3 billion USD in security aid to Pakistan in 2018, citing concerns over the latter's support to militant outfits. Prior to that, Trump fiercely reprimanded Pakistan on Twitter (now X) for "lies and deceit," suggesting limited returns from Islamabad in exchange for US aid. However, these tensions eased in the remainder of Trump's first term, with him holding multiple engagements with ousted Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan, including a meeting at the White House. In 2020, Trump even called Khan a "good friend."
Back then, this newfound affinity for Khan could be tied to Trump’s own style of populist politics and strongman leadership, marked by an emphasis on nationalism and anti-elitism. From his foray in politics in the mid-1990s, Khan maintained a moralist narrative against the alleged “corrupt elites” represented by Bhutto and Sharif political dynasts of Pakistan. For Trump, this pro-populism signalling was also demonstrated in his reference to Chinese leader Xi Jinping as a "strong and powerful man" and claim that he would “get along very well” with Russian President Vladimir Putin, during his first tenure.
The commonalities in the rhetoric of Khan and Trump was befittingly underscored by political satirist Trevor Noah in 2018, who noted their common backgrounds of privilege and fame, shared disdain for traditional political elites, adoption of conservative politics, and even similarity in their respective political slogans of "Naya Pakistan" (New Pakistan) and Make America Great Again.
However, Khan's position on US influence in Pakistan saw a quick reversal following his ouster from power in April 2022. He persistently accused the US of orchestrating his removal, citing an alleged diplomat cable as proof of interference. Yet, by 2023, Khan's stance softened as he expressed a desire for "good relations" with the US and claimed to have moved on from the conspiracy allegations, thereby indicating a pragmatic recalibration of his approach.
That said, Trump’s support for Khan, who is allegedly facing political persecution and a lengthy prison sentence, has been absent from the US President’s stated list of foreign policy priorities, as yet. Despite occasional advocacy from within Trump's circle for Khan’s release, any consequential diplomatic influence on this matter remains largely muted. In retrospect, Trump's populist agenda was seemingly driven by the US strategic need for Pakistan to facilitate talks with the Taliban to enable the departure of US-led Western forces in 2021. With Washington’s focus largely shifted to regional conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, Pakistan is not expected to be high on Trump’s priority list. Moreover, Pakistan’s economic constraints and deepening ties with China will restrain Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif-led administration’s ability to engage meaningfully with a Trump-led US.
In recent years, Pakistan has deepened its partnership with China, particularly through investments linked to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and increased defense cooperation. While this partnership provides economic benefits, it is liable to complicate Islamabad’s relationship with Washington, which views Pakistan increasingly through the prism of its rivalry with Beijing. If Sharif fails to meet Trump’s demands, Pakistan could face reduced US humanitarian assistance, stricter conditions for securing loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), sanctions on Pakistani security entities, and a potential diplomatic snub. While Islamabad is expected to maintain a conciliatory approach toward Washington, given the country’s economic and security imperatives, any meaningful engagement beyond military-to-military contact remains unlikely.
The US’ haphazard withdrawal in 2021 from Afghanistan effectively detached a crucial point of convergence between Islamabad and Washington. With Afghanistan no longer occupying centrality to US foreign policy, Pakistan will find it difficult to fit itself into Trump’s strategic priorities. To counter its declining relevance in Washington, especially in light of the growing partnership between US and India, Islamabad is expected to bring up security threats emanating from Afghanistan to gain greater attention from the US; Islamabad has already criticised the increasing use of 7 billion USD worth of US-left military equipment in Afghanistan by anti-Pakistan militant groups, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its aligned factions.
Pakistan has long leveraged jihadist networks to advance its foreign and security policy, particularly vis-a-vis Afghanistan and India. Although the degree of complicity has varied over time, Pakistan’s deep state continues to maintain ties with certain militant factions as proxies, despite widespread international criticism. Given the current security vacuum in Afghanistan, there remains a possibility that Pakistan may revert to using these strategies to attract US attention and counterbalance India’s rising influence in the region. By highlighting security risks emanating from Afghanistan, Islamabad could position itself as an indispensable partner in the West’s counter-militancy objectives. However, with the direct threat posed by Afghanistan-based transnational factions like Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and al-Qaeda currently limited for the US, it is unlikely that such a strategy will gain significant traction in American policy circles. According to the US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) quarterly report published on January 30, the ISKP’s operational sphere extends from Afghanistan to Iran, Russia, Pakistan, and Turkey. In the immediate term, the current dormancy in ties is expected to sustain with focus on military-to-military engagements with economic and diplomatic relations unlikely to witness a significant transformation under Trump.
For India, this presents both opportunities and challenges. Trump’s inclination toward strongman leaders and individual diplomacy over institutional engagements suggests that he will continue to view India as a preferred partner in the Indo-Pacific. Meanwhile, his unpredictability and trade-related irritants in US-India ties are bound to create uncertainties for New Delhi. As such, New Delhi will have to navigate a US policy that could oscillate between deepening US-India cooperation and sporadic shifts in US-Pakistan security engagement, shaped less by institutional framework and more by Trump’s personal diplomacy.
The writer is a research analyst for Pakistan studies at Takshashila Institution, an independent centre for research and education in public policy.
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