Twenty-five years ago, on May 11 and 13, 1998, India carved out a new future for itself. No other event — save the fall of Dhaka in 1971 — did more for India’s self-esteem and its place in the world, and no other policy decision had greater consequences for its national security. In the previous two decades, the military aspects of India’s nuclear policy and programme were shrouded in a veil of ambiguity and opaqueness. There had been little reliable information available since May 18, 1974, the day India conducted its first nuclear test and termed it a “peaceful nuclear explosion.”
On May 11, 1998, the veil was finally lifted. After conducting three underground tests at Pokhran, followed by two more on May 13, the Government of India was unusually candid in its statements. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was explicit: “Our intentions were, are, and will always be peaceful but we do not want to cover our action with a veil of needless ambiguity. India is now a nuclear weapons state...”
Also read | The meaning of Pokhran and Chagai
The consequences
The 1998 tests unleashed a fury of events and catapulted India into probably its worst confrontation with the United States. On May 13, Washington imposed sanctions against New Delhi under the Glenn Amendment; Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests on May 28 and 30; and China castigated India for what it saw as an “outrageous contempt for the common will of the international community.” Domestically, the Congress and the Left criticised the decision to test.
But in 2023, it is evident that the nuclear tests reflected a moment of profound epiphany: an awakening of India’s self-confidence and an awareness of its potential. India’s status, security, and ability to influence the international system received arguably the greatest fillip then, since independence, and unarguably the strongest boost since the end of the Cold War.
Dispelling three beliefs
Moreover, the nuclearisation of India, subsequent events, and declassified sources dispelled, if not destroyed, three beliefs. First, that the decision to conduct the tests was taken by a BJP government out of tune with public opinion. While the Vajpayee government may have taken the decision to test, virtually every Prime Minister since independence is “implicated” in the development of India’s nuclear weapons programme. Even Jawaharlal Nehru, whose commitment to disarmament is considered unassailable, was conscious of the potential security benefits of India’s nuclear programme. He argued that by not having developed steam power and having thus missed out on the industrial revolution, India become a slave country and therefore must develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. But he went on to add, “Of course, if we are compelled as a nation to use it for other purposes, possibly no pious sentiments will stop the nation from using it that way.”
It was during Lal Bahadur Shastri’s premiership, after the nuclear test by China at the Lop Nor test site in 1964, that Homi Bhabha, ‘the father of India’s nuclear programme,’ is believed to have received the green signal to pursue India’s nuclear weapon option, and a small group was set up to study Subterranean Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes.
Also read | The status of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
It is well known that Indira Gandhi sanctioned the first nuclear test in May 1974. Although it was termed a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” the architect of the test, Raja Ramanna, revealed that it was a weapon that was tested. Less well known is that in 1988-89, Rajiv Gandhi gave the go-ahead to the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Defence Research and Development Organisation, to begin creating an Indian nuclear deterrent. By 1990, India had a fully developed nuclear weapons programme, which every subsequent Prime Minister had approved of. The Vajpayee government must, however, take credit for the historic Shakti tests.
The second was the myth that India would be isolated and its economy would collapse under the weight of sanctions and international opprobrium. However, beginning with the dialogue between Jaswant Singh and Strobe Talbott, it became clear that democratic India, with its blemish-free non-proliferation record, was too big and important to be marginalised. Instead, the U.S. took the first steps to mainstream India, treating it as an exceptional case, which culminated in the India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2005.
The third was the ethnocentric myth perpetuated by non-proliferation absolutists of the West that India and South Asia could not be “trusted” to manage nuclear weapons, and the logic of deterrence that had prevented a major war between the Soviet Union and the U.S. could not be applied to the sub-continent. In reality, whether it be in terms of a well-thought-out nuclear doctrine, C4I (command, control, communications, computers and intelligence) structures required to manage nuclear weapons, deterrence and the escalation ladder and to ensure flexibility of response, India has far more sophisticated measures in place than the U.S. and the Soviet Union had 25 years after acquiring nuclear weapons. Deterrence has worked well in South Asia, not just at the strategic or conventional level, but increasingly at the sub-conventional level as well.
As Ukraine, which renounced nuclear weapons, faces nuclear threats and ‘blackmail’ from Russia, India must celebrate the wisdom and sagacity of its leaders (political and scientific) who refused to capitulate under pressure, and helped to develop a credible nuclear deterrent against fierce odds.
