By announcing in July that he would not seek a second term, President Joe Biden inadvertently revived an American tradition many experts had deemed dead for a half-century: exciting national party conventions. The last-minute switch of the lackluster Biden with his electrifying Vice President, Kamala Harris — potentially the first female president and first president of Asian and Jamaican descent — makes this convention mostly ceremonial, however, as Harris' nomination is a foregone conclusion.
When political organizations like the Whigs and early Democrats first began holding national conventions in the 1830s, they served a function analogous to modern Zoom conference calls. Those conventions served a practical purpose, allowing leaders from all over the country to discuss their party's future in a single place. Until the mid-20th century, it was more common than not that a party would not have even formally decided on its presidential nominee until all of their delegates actually met face to face. Indeed, although former President Donald Trump and other Republicans are railing against Biden for stepping aside so late in the election cycle, historically, there is nothing unusual about political parties not formally choosing a candidate until the convention itself rolls around.
What distinguishes the 2024 Democratic National Convention is that, since the 1970s, both parties have mainly chosen their nominees far in advance of the convention due to primary elections. (Although primaries have existed since the first decade of the 20th century, the first presidential candidate to focus on primaries, Sen. Estes Kefauver of Tennessee, did so during the Democratic primaries of 1956. Kefauver lost, but his campaign was influential in starting the process of making primaries paramount in choosing presidents, leading journalist Theodore H. White to dub Kefauver "the godfather of the American presidential primary system.") In 2024 Biden first swept the primaries and then decided to leave the race, meaning the Democratic presidential candidate is now being decided by the elected Biden delegates rather than the primary voters themselves. Perhaps appropriately, this means that the best way to analyze the historical significance of this moment is to compare it to a trio of Democratic National Conventions that occurred in the old era when conventions actually mattered more. Perhaps coincidentally, the three most analogous primaries — like the 2024 one — were held in Chicago, which first began hosting conventions when the Republicans chose Abraham Lincoln there in 1860.
Among notable Democratic Chicago conventions, the first on the list is the 1896 convention. Occurring in the middle of an economic depression that had commenced three years earlier, the assembled Democrats lacked any clear favorite as they began to discuss whom they should select. The major issue in 1896 was whether America should address the ongoing economic crisis by converting to a bimetallic currency based on gold and silver; the liberal and populist wings wanted to do this, while the more conservative elements (led by President Grover Cleveland) insisted on retaining a strict gold standard. Because the so-called "gold bugs" had far more financial support than the pro-silver faction, they had a strategic edge as proceedings began. Yet in a moment that could have been ripped from the pages of a romantic epic, an obscure Midwestern congressman inspired the collected politicians to nominate him as a pro-silver candidate. He did so based on the quality of a single speech.
"If they dare to come out in the open field and defend the gold standard as a good thing, we shall fight them to the uttermost, having behind us the producing masses of the nation and the world," declared former Rep. William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska. "Having behind us the commercial interests and the laboring interests and all the toiling masses, we shall answer their demands for a gold standard by saying to them, you shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns. You shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold."
Bryan's words electrified the convention hall; Bryan himself later recalled that his speech succeeded foremost because it established that the banking and financial classes did not represent the majority of Americans who produce wealth. "Since I became interested in the discussion of monetary questions, I have often had occasion to note and comment upon the narrowness of some of the terms used," Bryan later wrote. "And nowhere is this narrowness more noticeable than in the attempt to ignore the most important businessmen of the country, the real creators of wealth." Instead of accepting the conservatives' argument that populists and liberals opposed working people, Bryan effectively retorted that only by opposing the wealthiest classes could working people receive quality leadership.
"It put the Democrats on the path to becoming a modern liberal party on economic issues (pro-labor, in favor of regulation of corporations and a flexible money supply) that presaged the New Deal," said Georgetown University Michael Kazin. Even though Bryan would lose to Republican William McKinley in the 1896 election — and would also lose on the subsequent occasions he was nominated, in 1900 and 1908 — Bryan transformed the Democratic Party and America more than many individuals who actually did become president. Perhaps nothing proves this more amply than Kazin's reference to a "New Deal," a liberal political program that began at the Democratic National Convention of 1932.
Like the 1896 convention, the 1932 convention took place in the middle of an unprecedented depression. The frontrunner was New York Gov. Franklin D. Roosevelt, who was running on a hybrid of sentimentality for his distinguished cousin (former President Theodore Roosevelt) and the fact that he had provided meaningful economic relief to New Yorkers during the Great Depression Yet Roosevelt had avoided taking any firm ideological stances on how to confront the depression nationally, a tactic that helped him consolidate support but left many other Democrats wary of his intentions. One of them was another New Yorker, former governor Al Smith, who four years earlier as the party's nominee had gone down to a landslide defeat in large part because of anti-Catholic bigotry. Despite his previous defeat, Smith was beloved by many of the party's liberals, particularly since his progressive policies laid the groundwork for much of what Roosevelt had later accomplished.
Therefore it was at the 1932 convention that Roosevelt pledged himself to a bold program of proactive government involvement in the economy. Rejecting the laissez-faire economic dogmas of predecessors like Cleveland, Roosevelt told the assembled delegates "I pledge you, I pledge myself, to a New Deal for the American people. Let us all here assembled constitute ourselves prophets of a new order of competence and of courage. This is more than a political campaign; it is a call to arms. Give me your help, not to win votes alone, but to win in the crusade to restore America to its own people."
As historian Oscar Handlin later recalled, "there were some in the cheering crowd in Chicago who rejoiced not only because Roosevelt had won, but also because Smith had been routed." It was a cruel twist of fate for Smith, who had been born into poverty yet risen to the height of power — all the while helping other poor people whenever he could — only to be denied the ultimate prize because of religious bigotry. Yet Smith's loss ultimately proved to be America's gain, as Roosevelt defeated Republican Herbert Hoover and thereby forged a durable political coalition that lasted for more than three decades. Linking the interests of labor unions, big city machines, blue-collar workers, Southern whites, intellectuals and racial and religious minority groups (especially African Americans, Catholics and Jews), Roosevelt's coalition allowed the Democrats to win seven of the nine presidential elections from 1932 to 1964. (Their two defeats were at the hands of a Republican, Dwight Eisenhower, who ran as a moderate and won largely due to his popularity as a World War II hero.)
Then came the 1968 election. The New Deal coalition was in tatters, with liberals fleeing because of President Lyndon Johnson's support of the Vietnam War and conservatives angered at Johnson's support of civil rights legislation for African Americans. Even worse, presumptive Democratic nominee Vice President Hubert Humphrey — once beloved by liberals for his success in passing civil rights, farmers assistance, pro-labor and Medicare legislation — was now despised by many liberals for backing Johnson's Vietnam policies. The feeling among rank-and-file Democrats was that Humphrey's nomination had been forced on them after a more appealing alternative, Senator Robert F. Kennedy of New York, had been removed from the equation by an assassin's bullet. The only anti-war candidate left, Senator Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota, had been systematically outmaneuvered by the Humphrey forces. Therefore anti-war protesters coalesced in Chicago to protest Humphrey's impending coronation, lending an air of illegitimacy to the otherwise inevitable. As gonzo journalist Norman Mailer wrote at the time, "Either the convention was sewn up for Humphrey or the convention was soft. No one really knew." Mailer also described the atmosphere at the convention as having "the packed intimacy of a neighborhood fight club."
Unfortunately for Humphrey, a worst-case scenario transpired: The Chicago Police Department, under orders from Mayor Richard Daley, violently suppressed the protesters. Instead of the American people focusing on Humphrey's message of a "politics of joy," they were treated to images of protesters being brutalized by cops. The American public turned against Humphrey; he suffered so badly in the polls that, although his campaign eventually recovered, his "comeback" in the polls was too late to allow him to win. To stave off future conflicts like the one in Chicago, Humphrey personally supported reforms that democratized the primaries and convention to ensure they would be more representative in the future. These helped the party in its future, but not in 1968: Conservatives faulted the Democrats for not being able to better control the upstarts, while liberals were horrified at the repressiveness. All agreed on one thing — Humphrey took a major political hit from the convention.
"By the end of 1968, Democrats had lost more than a presidential election," historian Frank Kusch said. "They had lost the south and their stranglehold over organized labor, including many moderates and independents, not to mention the alienation of younger voters. Southern white Democrats and others didn’t dissent over war policy, they did when one of their own embraced civil rights for black Americans, and that did more to shatter what was left of the old new deal coalition than an interparty battle over Vietnam War planks between Hubert Humphrey and Eugene McCarthy at the convention in Chicago. The splintering of that once strong coalition with big labor, white ethnic groups, rust belt and mid-western and southern voters during the mid-1960s was a gift to challenger Richard Nixon who saw his chance with a southern strategy in ‘68 and a Midwestern and northern one in 1972."
This brings us to the first lesson that Democrats will need to take away from their party's history: Under no circumstances should they respond to protests — such as those planned by critics of Israel at the 2024 convention — with violence or repression. Even though it is essential for the party's nominee to establish that they are strong and in charge of their own organization, they risk fracturing their coalition if they do so by seeming brutal or prone to overreaction.
Unlike Humphrey in 1968, Harris has multiple advantages that make her a much stronger candidate going into the general election.
"1968 is like 2024 in the same way that Neptune is like Uranus," Nick Proctor, a historian at Simpson College, told Salon. "They are both gas giants. They are about the same size. They have rings and moons, and they are far out in the solar system. To a non-astronomer, they seem basically the same, but when you start to look more closely, the differences are striking."
As Kusch put it, any analogy between 1968 and 2024 is "more a story of contrasts."
"We are dealing with a very different time," Kusch said. "In the 1960s, with civil rights demonstrations, political assassinations, and race riots for almost two full years prior to the ‘68 convention, the situation today could not be more different. From the Black Panthers to the Weathermen to the war at home against involvement in Vietnam, the 1960s witnessed a galvanizing protest movement that defined a generation. We have nothing comparative today. It’s difficult to imagine a mayor anywhere in the United States today suggesting that their city looked 'like Berlin in 1945,' as Detroit mayor Jerome Cavanagh did in 1967."
He added, "The generation that grew up in the shadow of the Cold War and with the bookends of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Kennedy assassination on one side and Kent State, the Pentagon Papers and Watergate on the other might look at current student protesters and wonder why it appears as if they took the summer off from the struggle on college campuses. In the dog days of 1968, no one took the summer off."
On the other hand, comparing the 2024 election to both the 1896 and 1932 contests works quite well because the stakes are so high. Trump has a long history of refusing to accept any election's results unless he is the winner, and as a result attempted a coup after losing the 2020 election, the single most violent action to occur in the Capitol since the War of 1812. If elected, Trump is expected to implement an agenda known as Project 2025, which would radically alter the government's policies on everything from protecting the environment and providing public education to fighting sexism, racism and anti-LGBTQ prejudice. Trump has even promised his supporters that if he wins, they "won't have to vote anymore," leading many critics to suspect that he plans on eliminating democracy entirely if he wins. Democrats are already mobilizing to protect democracy in case Trump wins,
Even though the consequences of defeat will be dire, though, the 1896 and 1932 contests also provide Democrats with a path for rebuilding their party in a manner that is both liberal and electable. To do this, they must simultaneously craft their own careful coalition while taking advantage of Trump's political weaknesses.
"I think 2024 provides an opportunity to be one of the more significant elections in recent memory if those involved keep an eye on how policy decisions and cultural positioning have dictated previous party dynamics," Kusch said. "As one of the current sayings goes, 'This is not your father’s GOP.' Indeed, there were no legacy families at the Republican National Convention; no Reagans, Bushes, Cheneys, McCains, Romneys, or Pences were in attendance and if there had been, they would likely not have felt at home. For some, the current Republican Party exists in name only, and in some respects, no longer feels like the one that they grew up in."
Kusch added, "Republicans may not be jumping to the Democratic Party exactly but there are signals that an exodus might be on the horizon, where voters who describe themselves as independent or disaffected might feel tempted to vote for Harris or to stay home on election day, both equally bad for the GOP. Like in ‘68 and ’72 for the GOP, or with Roosevelt in 1932 and 1936, there is an opportunity for the Democratic Party under new leadership to see what is possible and salvageable in this divided country to build something like a coalition."
As for building a lasting political coalition — one that can triumph in multiple elections, like the one put together by Roosevelt in 1932 — the Democrats need to pay attention to American demographics.
"Despite an aging population, there remains a large, untapped youth voting block that could end up deciding this election for the first time in American history," Kusch said. "Young voters are known to make noise, but then ghost polling booths on election day. Those days could be numbered. While it’s easy to dismiss the relevance of influencers on social media, ignoring their power and their reach would be unwise. The Democrats seem more poised to benefit from this, a trend in support in such circles that seems to be increasing since Harris joined the race. While global superstars like Taylor Swift have remained mostly silent on this election, given her very public donations to food banks and other charities, it’s not a great stretch to believe she would back the Harris/Walz ticket. This could be considerable and play directly into relevant policy issues if the Democratic Party wishes to build itself around the narrative of protecting vulnerable people and backing issues like woman’s reproductive rights, sensible gun laws that most Americans already agree on despite the 'gun grabbing' rhetoric, fair taxation, affordable healthcare, and protecting the rights of farm and factory workers, and especially reaching out with aid for 18-24 year olds who often need senior discounts more than the wealthier baby boomers."
Kusch added, "The party can also do well by developing policies for affordable housing and other measures to ensure young people don’t end up impoverished and on the streets. This could be a significant opportunity to realign the nation’s political direction by targeting voters under 30 while ensuring that cuts to social security and Medicaid and Medicare never happen for the vulnerable people who need such programs. This is the beginning of coalition building."
Of course, much as the 1896 and 1932 contests were only the start of the coalition-building commenced by Bryan and Roosevelt, any successes experienced by the Democrats in 2024 will only be a first step.
"It’s a rather short window between now and the election and if Harris wins in November, it will be by the narrowest of margins," Kusch said. "Currently, the labor vote is split, as it is with Hispanics and women, the working class, and lower wage voters. But could it be possible that Walz could do for Harris what Lyndon Johnson did for Kennedy? Perhaps, but Walz will not be able to bring in Southern states like Texas as Johnson did, but he might appeal to Midwesterners, military families, labor and working-class families, at least as much as someone in the number 2 slot can."
If nothing else, one thing is known for sure: The notion that Democrats were "unfair" by swapping Biden for Harris is ahistorical and ridiculous. As White wrote about national conventions before the primaries, they were "a system where states, sovereignties, interests, pressure groups, machine blocs, unions, ethnics, all regarded the national convention as the ultimate bargaining place where wheeler-dealers, cause people, and vested interests traded claims." By Harris making a national convention intriguing again, she is if anything a throwback to an earlier time. The Democrats' actions are not only literally "democratic"; they are also entirely fair in terms of what political parties are allowed to do.
"it's an absurd argument: political parties, like other private organizations, can make or unmake any rules they like within their rules," Kazin said. "When Biden dropped out, every state delegation had been chosen, and there was no time or state laws in place to run another set of primaries less than two months before the Democratic convention."
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