In October 1950, barely a year after the Chinese civil war ended, Mao Zedong sent the first Chinese soldiers to fight in the Korean war. Between 180,000 and 400,000 of Chairman Mao’s troops would die in that conflict, including his own son. But it was important to defend North Korea in that battle, Mao reportedly said, because “without the lips, the teeth are cold”.
That Chinese idiom has been used to described China and North Korea’s close relationship for more than seven decades. China sees North Korea as a strategic security buffer in the region, while North Korea relies on its superpower neighbour for economic, political and military support. But that relationship is now under strain thanks to another war which is drawing Communist-rooted countries into a common battle.
Last month, the US revealed that it had seen evidence of thousands of North Korean troops being sent to Russia for possible deployment on the frontlines of the war in Ukraine. On Tuesday, it said at least 10,000 had reached Kursk province, and on Wednesday Ukrainian officials said some North Korean troops had already come under fire.
The development has sparked significant concern. North Korea’s entry to the theatre draws Asia closer into the European conflict, risking a dangerous expansion and escalation of a war that has global ramifications. It also causes significant headaches for China, which wants to maintain stability in the region as the Asian power and keep the US and allies at bay, all while grappling with a spluttering economy at home. .
Officially, China claims it is not involved in the Russia-North Korea relationship, which was strengthened in June when Moscow and Pyongyang signed a mutual defence pact. But it is Moscow’s closest ally and primary supporter in its war on Ukraine, and while analysts say there is dwindling trust between Beijing and Pyongyang, its supply of what Dennis Wilder, a senior research fellow at Georgetown University, called an “IV drip” of support is vital for North Korea.
Last week, US state department spokesperson Matthew Miller said Washington had been communicating to Beijing that the presence of North Korean troops in Russia’s war effort “ought to be a source of concern for China”.
But how much Beijing can use its sway over Pyongyang to actually move the needle isn’t clear. Some analysts believe China’s leaders probably weren’t told ahead of time of the troop movement, or even the June agreement.
For now, China appears to be keeping a low profile on it. On Friday, China’s foreign ministry spokesperson said the reports of North Korean soldiers in Russia was “their own business”. State media has largely been quiet on the matter.
But analysts believe that behind this official silence lies unease. According to Xi Jinping Thought on Diplomacy, the ideology that guides China’s foreign policy, countries should work towards a “common destiny”. That would suggest that China welcomes a closer relationship between its two friends. But “I am not sure if the Chinese government really believes what it says”, says Shen Dingli, a senior international relations scholar in Shanghai, who also says the situation risks becoming “awkward” for China.
Beijing has repeatedly accused the US of pursuing a “new cold war mentality” with regards to China. But the military collaboration between Russia and North Korea risks bringing the new cold war to China’s doorstep, and will make China’s balancing act between its strategic allies and its economic dependence on the US and Europe even harder to maintain.
The arrangement between Russia and North Korea risked establishing a bloc, inevitably including China, which would be pitted against a US-South Korea-Japan alliance, says Zhu Feng, dean of the Institute of International Studies at Nanjing University. But he says China doesn’t want to reestablish these cold war-era triangles, even with its allies. “The problem is that kind of cold war mentality is completely against the Chinese national interest. Today’s China is not the 1950s China.”
“So far I think Beijing’s option is to keep watching. We have to be very highly aware,” Zhu says.
Feng Yujun, a professor at Peking University, also says China should be “highly vigilant” about the situation, in a recent article that was translated by the Sinification newsletter. “China cannot ignore the historical lesson that gradual changes can lead to a qualitative shift,” Feng writes.
Although China’s biggest influence over North Korea is their economic relationship, trade between the two countries remains below pre-pandemic levels, unlike North Korea-Russia trade, which is booming.
Russia stepping in with an opportunity for battlefield experience and technological assistance that could modernise North Korea’s military suggests Moscow may now be challenging China for influence in North Korea. Especially if Russia is more willing to help with North Korea’s nuclear and long-range ballistic missiles aims. Last week, North Korea launched an intercontinental ballistic missile off its east coast, reaching a record height. It was the country’s first ICBM missile test in nearly a year.
“Should Moscow go as far as to assist Pyongyang’s nuclear program … it would pose a severe challenge to the international nonproliferation regime, in which China has a significant stake,” says Tong Zhao, a senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
“China today envisions a strategic coalition with Russia and North Korea, but with itself in the driver’s seat, wary of either partner taking radical initiatives beyond its control.”
As well as upsetting the balance of power in the China-Russia-North Korea triangle, China fears that North Koreans fighting in Russia could draw Europe towards east Asian security issues, such as Taiwan, and increase the likelihood of an “Asian Nato”. “China sees more harm from sending North Korean forces into Russia than potential benefit,” Shen says.
Beijing is in a tight spot. It doesn’t want a more powerful North Korea upsetting the balance of peace in east Asia, and it worries that a Russian victory in Ukraine would make Nato more cohesive, hardening the west’s stance against China, which has been supporting Russia economically throughout the invasion. But it also doesn’t want a Russian failure. Xi and Vladimir Putin are each other’s closest allies, despite their regional battles for influence, and Russia is a large player in the multilateral blocs that challenge the western-led order which Xi has worked to build.
“China spent decades settling boundary disputes and building a productive relationship with Russia to create room for its strategic goals,” says professor Peter Dutton, senior fellow at Yale Law School’s Paul Tsai China Center. “These developments could quickly derail Beijing’s quest.”
This article was amended on 8 November 2024 to correct Peter Dutton’s job title.
