This is part of a series on AUKUS. Click here to read the full series.
The idea that underpins Australia’s AUKUS commitment — the promise of a new nuclear shipbuilding industry in Australia with thousands of jobs — may yet unravel as the US Congress weighs the costs and benefits to America’s own national security.
An expert report from the US Congressional Research Service (CRS), released last month, has raised the option that the US could maintain control over nuclear submarines and leave Australia to “invest” in other weaponry under the AUKUS umbrella. The report says this arrangement is “broadly similar” to a military division of labour that exists between the United States and its NATO allies.
Under this arrangement, the US fleet would perform both US and Australian missions rather than hive off submarines to Australia. Australia would sink its AUKUS billions into performing “other military missions” on behalf of Australia and the United States.
The CRS has set out a series of options for Congress to consider in light of a projected shortfall in the number of nuclear-powered submarines the US Navy has at its disposal over the coming decades. As Crikey has reported, the shortfall is due to a series of construction and maintenance problems that have beset the Virginia Class fleet. The shortage would be further exacerbated by Australia acquiring at least three submarines from the US fleet as a fix to bridge a looming gap in Australia’s submarine capability.
Under the options raised by the CRS, the US might maintain control over nuclear submarines until Australia develops the capacity to build submarines in Australia. Alternatively, the NATO-like division of labour could carry on indefinitely.
According to leading Australian defence analyst Marcus Hellyer, the CRS advice was aimed at unpacking the issues to allow Congress to make informed decisions, rather than constituting formal government advice.
“They’re very good at it,” said Hellyer, a former long-term expert at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) who has moved into private consulting as head of research at Canberra-based Strategic Analysis Australia. “They have very deep expertise across all areas of government, and the people who work on submarines really know their stuff.”
“What’s interesting is that it’s very rare in my experience for analysts at the CRS to actually propose their own options, which is what they’re doing here. Now why are they doing it? It would seem to me that they understand the challenges involved in actually implementing the AUKUS SSN [nuclear submarine] program. And I think the fundamental issue that they are seeing is that there are simply no submarines available in the kinds of timelines that the three governments have announced.”
The elephant in the room
The CRS report puts in play the thorniest question of all: if Australia is already acquiring at least three (and possibly five) US Virginia-class submarines — either used or newly built “off the shelf” — then why build an Australian industry?
Adopting a sceptic’s position for the sake of the argument, the CRS puts it this way: “What are the benefits and risks of transferring US submarine technology and naval nuclear propulsion technology to Australia for a project that reportedly envisions building as few as three to five AUKUS SSNs?”
According to Hellyer, any submarine that would be transferred to Australia in 2032 — as mooted under the AUKUS agreement — would essentially have to come out of the US Navy’s existing or planned fleet.
“But we already know that they don’t have enough submarines. And in fact, over the next decade or so, their numbers are actually going to go backwards because their Los Angeles-class boats are retiring faster than the Virginias are coming into service.
“The analysts at CRS know this. And it’s something that some Republicans in Congress are aware of, and have been sort of saying, ‘Well, you know, this isn’t gonna work’,” Hellyer said. (Crikey reported last week that the US Navy faces a near decade-long trough in supply of nuclear submarines.)
As well as doubts over the numbers, the CRS questions whether or not Congress has enough information to properly assess the merits of selling Virginia-class boats to Australia. “Is the executive branch being adequately forthcoming in providing Congress with such information?” it asks.
The CRS also canvasses the potential impact on the deterrence of China should Australia and the US operate separately.
“A newly created force of Australian nuclear submarines would present China with a second allied decision-making centre (along with the United States) for operations in the Indo-Pacific, which would enhance deterrence of potential Chinese aggression by complicating Chinese military planning,” it suggests as a “pro” argument.
The argument against that, though, was that it could weaken deterrence against China. This would be the case “if China were to find reason to believe, correctly or not, that Australia might use the transferred Virginia-class boats less effectively than the US Navy would use them if the boats were retained in US Navy service,” the report said.
With the exception of The Australian Financial Review’s foreign affairs and defence correspondent Andrew Tillet, there has been little or no media attention on the uncertainty that continues to surround key aspects of the AUKUS deal.
It is all the more curious given the CRS report emerged on the eve of the ALP’s national conference in Brisbane earlier this month.
Defence Minister Richard Marles has previously expressed confidence that Congress will pass legislation.
Crikey sought comment from Marles’ office on the specifics raised by the CRS report. His office has not responded.
