President Bola Tinubu recently declared a state of emergency in Nigeria’s oil-rich Rivers State, in the country’s south-south region.
Prior to this decision, governance in Rivers State was practically paralysed as a result of a power struggle between the Governor, Siminalayi Fubara and his predecessor, Nyesom Wike, now the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
Rivers is at the heart of Nigeria’s once restive oil producing Niger Delta region and the emergency rule declaration was pronounced following reports of explosions rocking oil pipelines. Security scholar Al Chukwuma Okoli unpacks the implications of this development for security in the oil region previously known for militancy.
What does declaring a state of emergency mean?
The president has placed the governor, the deputy governor and the legislative arm of government on a six months suspension. He has appointed Vice Admiral Ibok-Étè Ibas, a retired Navy chief, as the state administrator. This means democratic institutions, except courts, have been suspended in Rivers State.
Section 305 of Nigeria’s 1999 constitution empowers the president to declare a state of emergency when:
the federation is at war
the federation is in imminent danger of invasion or involvement in a state of war
there is actual breakdown of public order and public safety in any part of the country requiring extraordinary measures to avert danger
there is an occurrence or imminent danger of the occurrence of any disaster or natural calamity
there is any danger which clearly constitutes a threat to the existence of the federation
The Governor of a State may, with the sanction of a resolution supported by two-thirds majority of the state House of Assembly, request the President to issue a Proclamation of a state of emergency in the State
The president can also make the decision if the governor of the affected state fails within a reasonable time to make a request.
Is the state of emergency an effective response to the recent bombings?
The state of emergency is a response to a dire internal security situation in which there is actual or threat of a breakdown of law and order. It applies also if security of lives and property is no longer guaranteed.
In other words there’s been a major breach of governability in the area.
There is an argument that the civil and security situations in Rivers State – and the civil unrest amid wanton destruction and vandalisation of oil and gas installations – calls for urgent intervention given the pivotal role of petroleum sector in sustaining the Nigerian economy.
Oil and gas account for 40% of Nigerian government revenues and for around 92% of the value of all exports. Rivers State is a key oil producing area and hosts several major oil companies and critical oil infrastructure.
Nevertheless, the emergency approach to the security crisis in Rivers State is, at best, problematic. Apart from amounting to unnecessary securitisation of politics and governance, it’s not capable of addressing the political undercurrents of the crisis.
At the heart of the problem is the unresolved – or badly addressed – partisan and personality clashes between the suspended Governor Siminalayi Fubara and his estranged predecessor and political godfather, Nyesom Wike, Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja.
The suspension of the Governor and the State Assembly may be strategically expedient. But it will fail to address the fundamental issues at stake without a concomitant suspension of Wike as the Federal Capital Territory Minister.
This is because at the heart of the entire crisis is a power struggle between Wike and Fubara. As the immediate past governor of Rivers State, Wike influenced the emergence of Fubara as his successor during the 2023 general elections.
They fell apart soon after the election. Wike who had become a minister and close ally of President Tinubu is believed to have influenced his loyalists in the Rivers State House of Assembly to oppose the governor. They were in the process of impeaching the governor before the state of emergency was imposed.
Wike and Fubara’s power tussle has also led to a gradual return of Niger Delta militancy with former militants taking sides with the two political gladiators.
Given this background, the emergency rule in Rivers state will be associated with consolidated military operations to quell the rising militancy. This, too, is likely to escalate the crisis.
In handling the Rivers crisis, President Tinubu should have considered some historical precedents. Negotiations have fared a lot better than the military options in the region.
The most recent armed conflict in the region arose in the early 1990s over tensions between foreign oil corporations and Niger Delta ethnic groups who feel cheated in the way their natural resources are exploited. The militant groups became notorious for their violent attacks on oil infrastructure and kidnapping of oil workers.
Military response to this crisis did not seem to yield results until the Nigerian government introduced a disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, known locally as the amnesty program. This was introduced in 2009 and was aimed at members of armed militant groups that were present in the Niger Delta region.
Following this intervention, there has been relative peace in the recent past. Essentially, the emergency rule in Rivers state is likely to bring about a dramatic backlash in the sustenance of the gains of post-Amnesty peace-building in the Niger-Delta.
What are the security implications of explosions rocking oil installations?
Destruction of petroleum installations will bring about significant setback in the efficiency and functionality of Nigeria’s oil and gas industry. It will trigger production cuts and revenue losses capable of affecting the country’s petroleum earnings.
This will be devastating considering the place of the industry in the national economy.
In addition, the vandalisation of oil pipelines and other installations will lead to widespread environmental degradation and disaster. In turn this will affect the livelihood and ecological security of local communities.
As experience from government’s use of force in the region in the early 1990s have shown, the declaration of a state of emergency may result in the renewal of piracy, cultism, hostage-taking, and kidnapping. This will in turn be a setback for the gains of peace building already recorded in the area since the introduction of the Niger Delta Amnesty program in 2009.
Lastly, one of the most likely outcomes of the emergency rule will be the return of inter-militant fighting and vendetta. Already, lines are drawn between the militants aligned with Wike and Fubara.
Such a development may dovetail into a major inter gang war with devastating implications for peace and development of the Niger Delta region.
What approach should the appointed administrator take?
The aftermath of the emergency declaration in Rivers State is dicey.
To make progress with his mandate - which is to restore order in the state - the administrator needs to adopt a completely depoliticised approach to the partisan dispute that’s led to the current crisis. He has to initiate a credible peace process that is holistic and capable of alleviating the fears and doubts of parties.
The administrator has to adopt a strictly non-partisan, multi-stakeholder and inclusive approach to dealing with the crisis. All the aggrieved parties must be treated fairly and reasonably.
There must be a conscious effort at buildings bridges at local levels. These should be aimed at eliciting the buy-in of critical stakeholders and interested parties such as the militant groups and supporters of Wike and Fubara.
Lastly, the administrator has to be conscious and sensitive to the local issues and sensibilities that are at the root of the crisis.
Local problem require local remedies. An inward looking solution that carries everyone along, addresses the underlying issues and grievances, restores trust and goodwill, and transcends partisan divides, is the only route that will bring about a lasting solution to the Rivers state.
Al Chukwuma Okoli teaches Political Science at Federal University of Lafia, Nigeria. An Associate Professor of Security Governance, Okoli has consulted for Center for Democracy and Development, Yaradua Foundation, Partners West Africa (Nigeria), CLEEN Foundation, African Union, UN Women, United Nations Development Programme, etc..He has received funding from the Tertiary Education Fund (Nigeria). A triple Laureate of Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA), Okoli s a member of Conflict Research Network West Africa and Amnesty International.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
