In 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi laid out a red carpet for Chinese President Xi Jinping in Modi’s home state of Gujarat in the hopes of building a rapport with the Chinese premier and laying a foundation to resolve their countries’ vexing border dispute in the Himalayas. But as they walked on the banks of the Sabarmati River and chatted in the veranda of activist Mahatma Gandhi’s ashram, Indian media was reporting on a new Chinese incursion in the mountainous region of Ladakh. Hundreds of Chinese troops were staring at their Indian counterparts while insisting on building a road inside Indian-administered territory. The standoff only ended after 16 tense days.
Five years later, in October 2019, Modi gave Xi a tour of 7th-century temples at Mamallapuram in southern India. The idea was to convey that India, like China, was an ancient civilization and hence equal to its Asian neighbor—even if it wasn’t yet economically or militarily at par. (Chinese GDP at $18 trillion is six times that of India’s, and its defense spending at $200 billion is more than three times larger.) But eight months later, Chinese troops entered Galwan in Ladakh and killed 20 Indian soldiers with nail-studded clubs. There were four Chinese deaths.
This past November, for the first time since the Galwan clashes, the two leaders met again, this time in Bali, Indonesia, as India assumed the G-20 presidency. Within a few weeks of their handshake, Chinese troops carried out another offensive, this time to occupy a mountain post in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh that China claims as its own.
Modi’s numerous attempts to woo Xi—whether through the evocation of hospitality, history, or global statesmanship—have done little to stem China’s increasingly assertive claims along its 2,100-mile border with India. This worsening of bilateral relations represents a political problem for Modi, who sold himself to the Indian populace as a strong leader, unforgiving on questions of territorial integrity and national security. Yet he has presided over a loss of men and reportedly also land to the Chinese.
But India-China relations also represent a clear policy failure for Modi. New Delhi has limited options against a militarily and economically superior Beijing, yet experts say Modi’s chosen China policy has been too cautious and passive to ever have realistically deterred Xi and is being exploited by the Chinese. Modi’s apparent fear of engaging in any military confrontation that would tarnish his strongman image at home has exacerbated the problem.
“The Chinese do what they want, but the fact that India keeps things under wraps allows China to take advantage,” said Jabin Jacob, a China expert and associate professor at Shiv Nadar University’s department of international relations, when asked about the Indian government’s refusal to discuss the latest Chinese incursion in the Indian Parliament. “Limited discussion means limited criticism. When there is no pressure on the Indian government to respond to Chinese provocation, then they can continue to provoke.”
Modi’s careful approach to China has been informed, in part, by genuine concern of escalating an incursion into a full-fledged war. Some experts believe that China must be managed in a way that ensures skirmishes remain limited to parts of the border and don’t lead to a bigger confrontation. In light of India’s defeat in a border war against China in the 1960s, they advise caution today. They also call for restraint in deepening ties with the United States to avoid giving an impression of ganging up on China or otherwise joining the broader struggle for global dominance between Washington and Beijing. Some experts argue India must also hedge against a potential future improvement of U.S.-China relations.
Happymon Jacob, another China expert and associate professor of diplomacy and disarmament at Jawaharlal Nehru University’s School of International Studies, said the Indian business community has pleaded to the government to be careful and not “pick a fight” with China. “The business community puts pressure on the Indian government. They say they want Chinese goods,” he said. “Just go to the Ministry of [Industry and Information Technology] or Railways, and they say, ‘Wait a minute. Where are we going to get our equipment from?’”
But other experts argue that the benefits of Modi’s caution are overstated because China does not want a full-scale conflict either. And they may have invited further Chinese aggression by signaling India’s own weakness. What’s indisputable is that China’s incursions have continued unabated during Modi’s tenure. If Modi does not respond in a commensurate manner soon, two experts told Foreign Policy, then he runs the risk of losing more territory to an increasingly assertive China under Xi.
“We saw that when the Indian military occupied Kailash Range, from where Indians could see a Chinese garrison, the moment we did it, the Chinese came to the negotiating table,” Jacob, the Shiv Nadar University expert, said. “They were refusing to do it at first. This was months after Galwan. When Indian military is proactive, then we can get the Chinese to behave. We must not think China wants a full-scale conflict. We should opt for a like-for-like response on the Line of Actual Control [LAC], and then the Chinese would step back.”
The Jawaharlal Nehru University expert agreed and said a calibrated escalation at the border was not a bad idea. “The Chinese are occupying the Indian side of LAC,” he said. “India should do it on their side. A little bit of testing isn’t irrelevant. Do a quid pro quo and not just talk. It has been more than two years of talking.”
Yet to the extent that Modi has mounted a response to China’s incursions it has been through economic policy. His government has encouraged domestic companies to look for alternatives to Chinese imports, and Modi has also expedited the construction of essential infrastructure on India’s side of the LAC. In terms of military policy, India has recently increased its defense spending and joined an anti-China alliance called the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or Quad) along with the United States, Australia, and Japan—all of whom intend to contain Chinese influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
But many experts believe these responses are too coy. At India’s current pace, to significantly reduce Chinese imports and match China’s military spending, India would need a tremendous amount of time—probably measured in decades, not years. And some experts say joining the Quad, a nonmilitary alliance, was a half measure that would not address India’s present problems with China. To assuage Beijing, Indian Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar has already insisted that the Quad is not an Asian NATO. “[The Quad] has to be a military alliance or it doesn’t make sense,” the Shiv Nadar University professor said.
Daniel Markey, a senior advisor on South Asia at the United States Institute of Peace, told Foreign Policy that the United States could help India considerably more than it has Ukraine in the case of a war with China—but only if India asked. “India does not have the confidence that it can count on the U.S. It puzzles us, but we try to explain it to ourselves as a historical hangover of Indian perceptions over our partners in the past,” he said, referring to Washington’s traditional ties with India’s archenemy, Pakistan.
“In the near term, the principal question is whether India has sufficient surveillance capabilities to anticipate Chinese movements. My concern is the answer is no, and I think the U.S. could be more helpful in this area. Of course, it should all be done quietly,” Markey added.
Dealing with China is a minefield for any Indian leader, and Modi has already been humbled. For now, he has stopped trying to charm Xi. Whether he’s prepared to learn any further lessons from his policy failures remain to be seen.
