Last month, I undertook a 10-day trip along the Thai-Myanmar border. In part its purpose was to explore further the nature and workings of the local governance structures which Scott Guggenheim and I had argued needed to be supported by the international community in our piece entitled "Taking risk and supporting local governance", published in the Bangkok Post on March 24.
The conclusion: Strong local community networks exist, and they must be supported. The bottleneck is the willingness of donors to take responsibility to bear the political risks to use these conduits.
Of course, levels of funding are inadequate, but the greater constraint is the actual access to existing amounts. The UN and some international NGOs further confuse the situation by overstating the access they have while at the same time insisting that many parts of the country are inaccessible.
This narrative is blatantly false. For decades, local civil society networks and ethnic governance systems have managed services provision to large communities. These efforts are now being assisted by thousands of highly mobile and qualified healthcare and education professionals from the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM).
While people in the central part of the country have not had to respond to the current levels of violence since independence in 1948, some links have been forged between Ethnic Armed Organization (EAO) administrations and communities in the Bamar heartland to help them do so.
But the real constraints are those being placed on recipients. Such obligations as needing to be registered in Nay Pyi Taw and needing to have funds delivered through formal financial channels put many local organisations at risk.
The top-down instructions on what funds should be used for is equally unhelpful. There is a need for Western donors to understand that programming can be scaled up significantly within the current framework, through greater funding of local civil society networks and ethnic governance systems.
An additional number of horrific realities emerged during different discussions.
The conflict will be a protracted one, with much more suffering to be inflicted on the populations. Basing any strategy on the premise that the Myanmar military is on the verge of imploding would be misguided.
The Myanmar military is no longer only applying its four-cuts operational strategy, as it is heavily constrained in reinforcing its ground troops and is significantly exposed to ambushes by resistance forces, especially in rural areas all over the country.
Instead of only conducting "four-cuts" style lethal patrols in the black areas, the Myanmar military is regularly attacking villages and communities through indiscriminate artillery shelling (mortar fire) from its scattered outposts, as well as by air with jets and helicopter gunships that only recently have included night-time bombings of civilian villages. The new approach means the villagers, who have no electricity and have had their cellular and internet access cut-off, can have no warning of these attacks.
The NLD/CRPH has a confidence problem with the EAOs that needs to be addressed. The NLD old guard continues to be viewed as culturally and politically arrogant and thwarting any attempt to let a real inclusive opposition emerge.
This posture would seem to indicate a lack of appreciation for how dependent the NLD/NUG is on the support of the EAOs. The rhetorical aim of presenting a unified opposition to the wider world remains crucial, but it is challenged by a backdrop of a strained set of relations that must be urgently addressed.
The level of solidarity that exists in some localities between the EAOs and the Bamar protesters fleeing the centre of the country is encouraging. A number of EAO units are training some of the community defence groups from the heartland and giving sanctuary to the new arrivals, and the capabilities of the new arrivals are also being put to good use.
Bamar doctors are now chief medical officers in field hospitals and the EAO education administrations have integrated large numbers of fleeing teachers. EAOs provide security and livelihood support to an increasing number of CDM personnel and political asylum seekers, along with serving the already significant IDP caseload which is increasing by the month. Their need for a substantial increase in direct humanitarian funding is becoming urgent.
Finally, the challenge for those engaged in Myanmar today is how to navigate and deal with uncertainty. As in many similar contexts of conflict and violence, clear and informed analysis is essential. And for this to be produced space needs to exist where approaches can be debated, theories and assumptions tested, and the beginning of answers found. Such a space has yet to exist in the context of Myanmar.
Currently there is little opportunity to have informed and, most importantly, respectful debates on such questions as (1) While fully appreciating the total popular support for the resistance and its objectives, what conditions need to exist before dialogue with the SAC makes any sense? (2) But more importantly, what conditions need to exist before a meaningful national dialogue and reconciliation process can begin?
Others are: (3) How will the new generation, whose voices at the outset of the post-2021 coup transcended the ethnic divides, survive the test of time? (4) How much destruction will the international community allow the country to be subjected to before an acceptable end to the conflict is found? And (5) How will Myanmar manage to heal itself after the civil war, which has generated a dramatic proliferation of violence?
The subjecting of alternative voices to personal and vitriolic attacks needs to cease immediately. Today in Myanmar spurious accusations can lead to executions. In a world of social media where ill-advised spontaneity trumps thoughtfulness, greater care needs to be given to words used and accusations levelled.
Sir Charles Petrie, former UN Assistant Secretary General has had more than 10 years of direct involvement in Myanmar; almost five as the UN representative in Myanmar, a further four (2012-2015) coordinating the Norwegian led support to the ceasefire process, and a final two writing policy briefs for Western governments (2017-2019).
