When hundreds of pagers used by Hezbollah operatives in Lebanon exploded almost simultaneously on September 17, it began a series of unprecedented events in the Middle East. Twelve people were killed and over 2,000 wounded.
A second wave of explosions took place the following day, this time through walkie-talkies. The explosions killed a further 20 people and wounded over 400. The consensus seems to be that small explosives had been placed within each device at some point during or shortly after the production process.
Meanwhile, confusion has taken over in Lebanon. Within this hazy atmosphere, fear has bloomed, with (so far unfounded) rumours that regular cell phones have also been targeted. This has led some to go as far as removing batteries from their iPhones or swapping out their Lebanese SIM cards for international ones.
Following the first attacks, both Hezbollah’s leadership and the Lebanese prime minister, Najib Mikati, rushed to blame Israel. Hezbollah has already vowed revenge for the attack, though the embarrassment of such a wide-scale penetration of its security apparatus cannot be underestimated.
As a group that prides itself on its clandestine security and communication system – one that it protects at all costs – Hezbollah clearly decided months ago to use low-tech avenues to its advantage in its fight with Israel’s highly advanced technological and cyber capabilities.
The logic is clear and well proven: a pager is much harder to be traced, and much less likely to succumb to a software hack than a cellular phone. In fact, the group’s leader Hassan Nasrallah urged his supporters in February to stop using phones and give up internet access, telling them each phone “is a deadly agent”.
Israel has not taken official credit for the attack. But it would make sense for the Israelis to conduct such a deep blow to Hezbollah’s communication system ahead of – or during – an incursion into the south of Lebanon, as they would benefit from the confusion and surprise.
This is a view shared by former Israeli military general, Amir Avivi, who has been quoted as saying: “You don’t do something like that, hit thousands of people, and think war is not coming … Israel is ready for war.”
On the edge of war
War has been brewing for months between the two sides, with tensions periodically rising. As a researcher of contemporary Lebanese politics, up to now I have been of the opinion that neither side have really planned for a war.
From Hezbollah’s side, too many seemingly advantageous opportunities have been missed to start an all-out war. These include the assassination of deputy Hamas chief Saleh al-Arouri in southern Beirut in January, the Israeli strike on the Iranian consulate in Damascus in April, and, most recently, the killing of senior Hezbollah commander Fu'ad Shukr in July.
But things now seem quite different. Nasrallah has already declared that a “reckoning will happen”. And, while he has promised similar vendettas for the previous attacks, a humiliation on this scale could very well push Hezbollah to up the ante even further.
Meanwhile, Israel has shown no sign of relenting. Israeli strikes have continued to hit Hezbollah targets in the south, while jets flew over the Lebanese capital as Nasrallah was delivering his latest threats.
There are more than two sides to this conflict. Lebanon itself has to operate under a form of dual leadership, with the government’s official response separate to Hezbollah’s.
Mikati, for instance, has called for national unity as the “strongest response to the attack on Lebanon and its people”. And his foreign minister has been even more explicit in his words: “There is no doubt it is a scary moment, and we are afraid of a coming war because we don’t want a war.”
What Lebanese civilians want
The majority of Lebanese citizens have been consistent since October 2023 that they have no appetite for a war. Recent polls indicate that this feeling persists.
However, this latest attack could change things. Polls conducted over the past two years indicate that there has been a slight positive increase in the perception of Hezbollah’s regional policies by the Lebanese.
And if, as pollsters say, this shift is likely to be a result of increased hostility towards Israel since the start of the war in Gaza, then these latest attacks will only push that agenda further.
There is, of course, nuance to these attitudes. Most people in Lebanon seem to be aware that the destiny of the country is not in their hands, with Hezbollah, Israel and other international actors holding the keys to an all-out conflict.
This has led to a general feeling of hopelessness in Lebanon that has been festering since 2019. As a result, a mere 13% of those polled “think the situation will improve in the next two to three years”.
Things are fairly different across the border in Israel. According to a poll conducted by the Israel Democracy Institute in August, only 25% of Israelis believed their country should “refrain from striking at Lebanon’s infrastructure”. In fact, 42% said Israel should “launch a deep assault into Lebanon”.
One would expect the attack on Hezbollah’s communications to be received positively by those who were looking for a harder, deeper operation from the Israeli government. The Israeli authorities will also undoubtedly be hoping that the attacks can sow some frustration within Lebanese society against Hezbollah.
But this doesn’t seem to have worked so far. And the attacks, which seem to have killed more civilians than Hezbollah operatives and could very well amount to a war crime, may have left the Lebanese angry and victimised.
Read more: Pager and walkie-talkie attacks on Hezbollah look like war crimes – international legal expert
In the meantime, all the world can do is wait to see what happens next. For its part, the US has made it clear it does not support a war and, if reports are to be believed, it does not think an Israeli invasion is imminent.
Tarek Abou Jaoude does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.
This article was originally published on The Conversation. Read the original article.
