On the morning of 16 September 2021, the federal ALP caucus was presented with the shadow cabinet’s fait accompli of support for the Morrison government’s Aukus submarine deal.
Caucus members were told that on the previous afternoon, the leader, Anthony Albanese and several shadow ministers had received a two-hour briefing on the proposal from the government. No documents were provided at the briefing. On the basis of that, and the shadow ministry’s endorsement, Labor MPs were expected to leap into bipartisan support for the Aukus deal.
Caucus did not endorse the deal. No vote was taken because a vote was not proposed. The caucus simply noted the report.
This was to be the biggest procurement in Australian history. Many questions were asked – I raised some of them myself at the meeting. Many remain unanswered.
Given the scale and implications of this project and the fundamental assumption that we should be seeking to secure the best technology the country can afford, it is not unreasonable that these questions continue to be raised.
The suspension of critical judgment or the signing of blank cheques is simply not reasonable.
Much has been said of the historic changes in our region that are claimed to be the basis for undertaking this project. How much of that understanding goes to changes that will not be reversed by wishful thinking of the capacity of great and powerful friends to turn back the tides of history?
The US is no longer the region’s unrivalled economic and military power. As a country, we need to be realistic about our own national interests in the new environment. There needs to be equally realistic assessments of the capacity of “great and powerful friends” to prosecute a war in Asia.
It is now 20 years since the illegal and catastrophic war in Iraq, into which we were led by accepting spurious intelligence briefings on weapons of mass destruction. In light of that experience, we know that it pays to reflect critically on what we are being told by security agencies.
There have been too many occasions where the intelligence agencies have simply got it wrong.
Relying on a revamped forward defence strategy, given our historic experience, seems particularly strange.
Given the historical patterns that have seen Australia participate in so many regional conflicts since the 1950s, the questions remain as to how our national interest is served by locking Australia into the strategic priorities of the US for the next 50 years, regardless of regime changes in the US, the UK, or our own national interests.
The $368bn claimed to be the cost of this project leaves open the question of how we verify the amounts to be spent in Australian rather than American or British shipyards. The issues concerning our own industry development, given the long history of procurement failures, need close scrutiny. The ability to maintain our sovereign capabilities regarding civilian as well as military personnel also needs closer examination.
The opportunity costs of other defence procurements that will have to be foregone to fund this project require particular attention. We are entitled to ask: is this the best value for money in the defence of Australia?
Time will tell how much of the stated rationale for Morrison’s deal developed at a time of his own political failings, will survive close scrutiny. Given that it has taken us 40 years to develop a low-level waste dump, the establishment of a high-level nuclear waste dump will be fascinating to watch. We’ve seen already the divergence of views among state premiers.
But this highlights a much broader problem. Assuming that consensus remains in the US about the export of defence materiel and investment in Australia, the establishment of a regulatory regime in Australia is fraught with profound difficulties.
Australians need to understand just how strong the sentiment is in the US for “buying American” and the legal foundations that underpin that sentiment.
Significant commonwealth laws regulating nuclear activities will need to be amended. Dozens of commonwealth and state legislative instruments will need to be changed. The most significant at the commonwealth level include the Australian Radiation and Nuclear Protection Act; the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Safeguards Act and the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Act.
Will reactors be required on shore for training and research purposes, and will a nuclear reactor at a dockyard meet the criteria of the current legislation?
It’s a remarkable proposition to suggest that we can have a nuclear navy without a nuclear industry to support it.
To date, the media debate has been profoundly one-sided. That will change as independent expert opinion mobilises to apply appropriate scrutiny to these measures.
Kim Carr is a former federal Labor minister and is the vice-chancellor’s professorial fellow at Monash University
