The Russian presidential election (March 15-17, 2024) is the country’s eighth presidential election since the dissolution of the USSR. Vladimir Putin is contesting for a fifth term, also the first time after the 2020 constitutional amendment nullifying his previous terms. He was first elected in 2000 and then re-elected in 2004, 2012 and 2018, with a brief interlude from 2008-2012 when he was the Prime Minister, making his trusted man Dmitry Medvedev the President. Mr. Putin remained the de facto ruler, and it was to avoid the constitutional requirement that forbade the sitting President to seek a third consecutive term.
No serious opponent, the future
In this election, the outcome of which is a foregone conclusion, given that there is no serious contender in the foray, he will be in power for the next six years. He can be re-elected in 2030 and technically remain in power until 2036. Mr. Putin will contest as an independent candidate in 2024. The other three contenders, Nikolai Kharitonov (in his 70s) of the Russian Communist Party, Leonid Slutsky (in his 50s) of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and Vladislav Davankov (40) of the New People Party, are also in the race. Mr. Kharitonov was a distant second in the 2004 election. All three candidates are considered to be very close to Mr. Putin and have been supportive of the Kremlin’s policies, which includes the invasion of Ukraine. In a way, they are puppets in the well-orchestrated drama of the Russian presidential election.
The only serious opposition presidential candidate, Boris Nadezhdin, a critic of the Russian war with Ukraine, was debarred by the Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation. Speaking to CBC News, Mr. Nadezhdin said, “Elections in Russia now are not fair and not free, but I don’t know another way to challenge the politics and power in Russia.” Another most prominent Putin opponent, Alexei Navalny, died in a high-security Arctic penal colony in February 2024, with his supporters alleging that he had been murdered and that Mr. Putin was behind it. Predictably, the Kremlin refuted this allegation and, interestingly, did not explain what led to Navalny’s death.
Then what is the rationale behind such an exercise? What does it say about the Russian political system and political culture? And how will it impact Russian foreign policy, Europe in particular and world politics in general? Abbas Gallyamov, a political scientist and former speech writer for Mr. Putin, has described the election as where “multiple choice is replaced with a simple, dichotomic one: ‘Are you for or against Putin?’ And has said that it will be a referendum on the issue of the war and a vote for Putin will become a vote for the war.” “The current election will not offer even a semblance of competition to Mr[.] Putin, much less give a limited stage to any critical opponent as past elections sometimes did. It will not be an election, but a plebiscite on the loyalty to Putin,” says Ms. Masha Lipman, a Russian journalist.
In a poll by the Levada Centre (it is known for its reliability) in January 2024, it concluded that mass opinions over the Russia-Ukraine war (Russia calls it special military operations) in favour of Russia remain high. For instance, 85% of Russians approved Mr. Putin’s actions; there was 77% approval of the military’s actions. Despite the approval ratings, war fatigue is setting in, but it is less than what it is in Ukraine. With the progress of the conflict, the goalposts of the war are also shifting. It started as a war against “Nazism” in Ukraine, but has gradually shifted to a war on the West. But the initial goal is touted as the ultimate objective of the war.
Why Putin is still popular
The resilience shown by the Russian economy in the face of sustained western sanctions is credited to Mr. Putin’s leadership. Scholars have attributed this success to the “Military Keynesianism” of Mr. Putin. The shot-up demand for military hardware in the face of a war of attrition has spurred the growth of the military-industrial complex. This has led to increased military contracts and import substitution in response to sanctions. This has also created a demand for skilled labourers and a support base that has benefited from the war.
The Ukraine war is projected as a western plan to weaken Russia and impose western cultural hegemony over it. Historically, Russia has projected itself as a fortress of liberal-conservative values that trace their origin to the Russian orthodox church. The idea of “Moscow-Third Rome” is one of the Kremlin theological theories and it projected itself as a true representative of conservative Christian values. Liberalism and its value of individualism present a threat to the communitarian and social values of Russia and the preservation of traditional Russian values, being projected as if the West is attacking it.
The common perception that Mr. Putin completely controls the affairs of the Russian state is a half-truth. Mr. Putin is the lynchpin around which Russian politics revolves, but there is the entrenched control of the Russian elites, and Mr. Putin is the arbiter of different interest groups. These interest groups are made of the bureaucracy, the business elite and local political elites, and their complete loyalty towards Mr. Putin is needed to ensure their survival. They are certainly competing for favour, and it is dependent on loyalty towards Mr. Putin. In a way, there are two social contracts — i.e., one between state and citizen and the other between the state and elites.
Russian political culture
One probable reason for Mr. Putin’s iron fist-like control over the Kremlin is the political culture of Russia. Russians are invariably described as the enablers of their own autocracy. Western accounts portray supporters of democracy as a small minority in Russia, amidst a majority that is supposed to be inclined to authoritarianism. This attitude relates to the Russian history of autocratic regimes, political culture and the absence of a democratic government. In a counter to this cultural determinism, Russian authoritarianism is described by some scholars as circumstantial, a result of the unfortunate coincidence of Russia’s Soviet past, democratic opening with institutional disintegration, economic disruption and political uncertainty. A section of scholars believes that Russians are both authoritarian and democratic at the same time, which Levada dubs as “Russian doublethink”. Russian scholar Richard Sakwa has rebutted the historicism of these scholars — the past, like facts, is created in the eyes of the beholder. There are many Russian pasts that reflect its European and Asian identities.
Any monocausal explanation for the current state of the Russian political system flies in the face of a nuanced understanding of Russia. As Churchill famously said about Russia, in 1939, it is a “riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma”. This is a statement that still holds true, signifying Russia as the intimate ‘other’ of the West. It amalgamates many elements, some rooted in Russia’s culture, history, and precarious geopolitical position. Political leadership does have an important place in all this. Doomsday prophecies of western scholars should be taken with a pinch of salt. The resilience shown by the Russian state in the face of heavy-handed economic sanctions and the efforts on the part of the West to isolate Moscow give Russia a prominent place on the world stage. Russia’s efforts to galvanise the support of anti-western countries and expose the double standards of the West seem to be successful.
Amitabh Singh is Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Ankur Dixit is a doctoral candidate, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
