A high-stakes transatlantic miscommunication is unfolding, with the potential to produce far worse consequences than the Oval Office contretemps between Donald Trump and Volodymyr Zelenskyy.
In the past month, the Trump administration has delivered several strong and sometimes conflicting messages to America’s allies and partners in Europe. Discerning the signal in the noise isn’t easy, but amid the zigs, zags and bombast, the new administration appears to be taking a position that Ukrainian and European leaders aren’t hearing – or are trying to alter.
The crux of the message seems to be this: the US will either broker an end to the war in Ukraine in short order or remove itself from the conflict, unless perhaps it deems Russia to have obstructed a ceasefire. (As Trump told Zelenskyy on Friday: “You’re either going to make a deal or we’re out.”) Washington will also refuse to make any commitment to Ukraine’s postwar security, such as Nato membership, that would run a major risk of drawing the US into direct war with Russia – “world war three,” as Trump sees it – if Russia invades Ukraine again.
The US has the sovereign right to adopt this stance, for the sake of its own interests, which include limiting the costs and risks the US is bearing for European defense. So Europe cannot dissuade the US, but it can work with Washington to achieve US goals while finding the best possible arrangement to protect Ukraine, secure Europe, and preserve Nato.
European leaders, however, are hearing a different message – or two, to be precise. One version is maximally pessimistic: Europeans fear that Trump is aligning with Vladimir Putin and preparing to abandon Ukraine and perhaps several more countries besides. Such an outcome remains possible. So far, however, it has not come to pass. An initial meeting to reopen diplomatic relations with Russia, and a disturbingly staunch unwillingness to condemn Putin’s aggression in Ukraine, are significant moves but are a long way from effectuating a grand geopolitical shift.
The other version is far more optimistic: European leaders still hope to convince Trump to make a major US security guarantee to Ukraine. This effort drove British, French and Ukrainian leaders to visit the White House last week. In public remarks, all three attempted to sell Trump on providing a US “backstop” for a European military force, involving perhaps some 30,000 troops, to be placed in Ukraine once the fighting stops. Trump did not rule out some sort of US support for a European military contingent, but he indicated little willingness to put much American muscle behind it. “I’m not going to make security guarantees beyond very much,” Trump said. “We’re going to have Europe do that.”
On Friday, in the Oval Office, Zelenskyy contested Trump’s stance. The Ukrainian president stated flatly: “We will never accept just [a] ceasefire. It will not work without security guarantees.” Zelenskyy maintained that strong security guarantees had to come from the US, not just Europe. A European military force, he said, would not work unless the US provided a significant backstop: “They need USA.”
In short, Zelenskyy insisted he would not agree to a ceasefire, because Russia would not honor it, unless the US provided precisely what Trump had seemingly already ruled out. As the conversation devolved, Trump eventually threatened to withdraw US aid to Ukraine altogether if Zelenskyy’s position did not change.
Since then, Zelenskyy hasn’t budged. To the contrary, he doubled down. “If we cannot be accepted to Nato,” Zelenskyy wrote in a statement, “we need some clear structure of security guarantees from our allies in the US.” Only after such guarantees were on offer would Ukraine proceed with diplomacy to settle the war.
European leaders promptly affirmed Zelenskyy’s view. Following a meeting of 18 leaders on Sunday, Keir Starmer announced that a European “coalition of the willing” was prepared to station a military force in Ukraine to guarantee the peace. He pledged to put British “boots on the ground and planes in the air” – on one condition: “this effort must have strong US backing”.
For years now, officials and experts across the Atlantic have debated the merits of providing security guarantees to Ukraine. But the practical reality is that the Trump administration is not inclined to do so, not if it would obligate, de jure or de facto, the US to go to war on Ukraine’s behalf in the future. That this is the position of the president of the United States should be understandable.
None of Trump’s predecessors ever made a commitment to fight for Ukraine. Joe Biden explicitly ruled out sending US troops when he saw Russia’s full-scale invasion coming. Nor have any Nato allies come to Ukraine’s direct defense. The reason is obvious: it would mean war with Russia, a prospect that Nato allies can still deter regardless of what happens in Ukraine.
If Ukraine and Europe continue to push for strong US security guarantees, they have a small chance of succeeding and a larger chance of creating a permanent rupture with Trump. The president could conclude that his allies refuse to listen and, worse, keep trying to entrap him. Throwing up his hands, he could take the very actions that Ukraine and Europe most want to avoid: cutting off all US support for Ukraine and making a dirty deal with Putin. The damage could extend throughout Europe if Trump removes US military forces and assets from the region.
Can this worst-case scenario be avoided? A route is still available. The sooner Ukraine and Europe stop fixating on a US security guarantee, the sooner they can coalesce – with the United States – around a viable plan that contains two main provisions.
First, postwar Ukraine would maintain a large and technologically advanced military, trained and supplied by its western partners. Second, the US and Europe would commit to arm Ukraine heavily if Russia invaded again. Because they are doing so now, this commitment would be highly credible, unlike a heroic pledge to wage war on Ukraine’s behalf. Nato allies could also sign a legally binding document and stockpile specific weapons systems that could be surged to Ukraine in case of a renewed attack.
This formula may fall short of what Ukrainians want, but it may provide what they need. After all, Ukraine’s own forces have protected the country in the current conflict, preserving 80% of Ukrainian territory and forcing Russia into a costly war of attrition. If those forces remain strong, it would hardly be a foregone conclusion that Putin or his successor will make another attempt – not because the Kremlin can be trusted to keep its word but because it would suffer enormous losses for little gain.
Ukraine, Europe and the US must use their leverage at the negotiating table to get Russia to stop fighting without requiring Ukraine to disarm. Russia might acquiesce, having kept Ukraine out of Nato and Nato, and its members’ forces, out of Ukraine. To reach a deal, however, the transatlantic community should come together, post haste, and throw its weight behind a common demand.
To do otherwise is to court disaster not only for Ukraine but for European security as a whole.
Stephen Wertheim is a senior fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of US Global Supremacy
